Whither seniority? Career progression and performance orientation in South Korea

Framed by institutional theory, this study reassesses the influence of seniority on (HRM) in South Korea today. We analyze first the overall influence of seniority in business, second its significance for career progression (i.e. promotion), and third its relation to individual performance orientation. By conducting in-depth interviews among local and expatriate managers, we find that the role of seniority is still pronounced. Seniority-based promotion remains significant, and individual performance evaluation systems, as are typically found in Western countries, hardly fit the cultural environment and tend to be ineffective. By contributing to the extant theories on institutional dynamics and the convergence–divergence–hybridization debate alike, our results strengthen the culturalist approaches, holding that informal institutions persist and do not disappear quickly. Further, rather than moving towards global convergence, we see the Korean HRM system as being in a state of hybridization caused by coercive isomorphism resulting from experimentation with foreign best-practice systems. As a result, some HRM practices are dysfunctional. We recommend that firms should reinterpret their valuation of individual performance towards team achievements and pay more attention to the optimal team composition.     

Tournament incentives,age diversity and firm performance

This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that the tournament incentives for non-CEO executives relate positively to firm performance. This relationship is weaker when non-CEO executives are from different age cohorts, whereas the tournament effect is enhanced when non-CEO executives are from the same age cohort. The negative moderation effect of age diversity is more pronounced in state firms and in the Northern China Plain cultural region. The negative moderation effect disappears in firms with CEOs who have overseas experience. We reason that the peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the tournament competition and that age hierarchy reduces incentives for younger executives to compete. Our findings have important implications for firms not only in China, but also in countries and regions where seniority is highly valued when setting executive compensation and optimizing organizational structure.     

日本的企业改革与终身雇佣制的新动向

终身雇佣制曾经作为日本型企业管理模式的主要特征之一,备受赞赏。但近年来对于这一雇佣制度的评价出现逆转,终身雇佣制过时论盛行。从理论上讲,终身雇佣制是支撑日本企业竞争能力的一个重要因素,日本企业不会简单抛弃;从日本企业改革的实践来看,许多企业开始减少固定工的数量,但企业对于主要的技术人员、管理人员和技术工人仍然坚持适用终身雇佣制度。日本企业正在通过改革增加雇佣制度的柔软性和灵活性,但是终身雇佣这一适合日本社会的雇佣制度仍然具有强大生命力。     

The transformation of the wage and performance appraisal system in a Japanese firm

This paper analyses how performance appraisal has affected the wages of employees in a unionized Japanese firm over time, using firm-level wage and performance appraisal data. Data show that the wage and performance-appraisal systems have been shifting to a performance basis, and away from the heavy reliance on age and seniority characteristic of the old systems. In the process, wage differentials among employees are becoming wider, particularly among those 37 to 41 years old and those 49 to 55 years old. Management introduced the new wage system through a process of concessionary bargaining. Surprisingly, employees, rather than the enterprise union, were able to convince management to modify their initial plans during bargaining over the new wage system.     

The importance of financial incentives on retirement choices: New evidence for Italy

This study exploits a new dataset to quantify the effect of financial incentives on retirement choices. This dataset contains—for the first time for Italy—information on seniority. The effects of marginal incentives and social security wealth (SSW) on retirement go in the expected direction; when employees become eligible for pension benefits, the change in financial incentives they experience is so great that their retirement probability increases by 30 percentage points.We also find that the procedure used in previous Italian studies to impute seniority leads to a considerable overestimation of that variable and of SSW. We show that, due to these measurement errors, the estimate of the SSW coefficient takes the wrong sign. A comparison of retirement studies across countries (see Gruber and Wise [Gruber, J., and Wise, D., (2004). Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Micro-Estimation, NBER. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.]) provides prima facie evidence that a lack of good quality data often leads to wrongly signed estimates of the SSW coefficient.     

MEASURING HUMAN CAPITAL AND ITS EFFECTS ON WAGE GROWTH

Abstract Ever since Mincer, years of labour market experience were used to approximate individual's general human capital, while years of seniority were used to approximate job‐specific human capital. This specification is restrictive because it assumes that starting wages at a new job depend only on job market experience. In this paper, I investigate the effects of human capital on wage growth by using a more flexible specification of the wage equation, which allows for a rich set of information on past employment spells to affect the starting wages. In addition, I endogenize the labour mobility decision. In order to illuminate the effects of human capital accumulation patterns on wage growth, I compare counterfactual career paths for representative individuals.