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1.
    
Using a sample of 26 markets, this paper investigates if trade-size clustering affects price efficiency. Our results suggest that more clustering trades are associated with greater resemblance of a random walk, less pricing errors, and shorter price delays. Moreover, we examine three underlying mechanisms to explain how clustering improves efficiency. First, we show that clustering trades are informative, consistent with the idea that stealth traders leverage such tactics to convey private information to prices. Second, we discover that clustering trades are positively related to investor attention (stock liquidity), implying that informed clustering trades happen at the presence of enormous uninformed investors. High attention and liquid markets help reduce the trading friction, thereby prompting quick price adjustments to private information released by the stealth trading.  相似文献   
2.
    
Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.  相似文献   
3.
We examine stock trading activities in days before Chinese listed firms made public announcement to start share-structure reform. There is significant evidence that, relative to a benchmark period, institutional investors bought more event firms’ shares in the last two trading days prior to announcement. Randomization tests show significant differences in institutional trading activities between event firms and matched control firms, which suggests that some institutions had inside information. Moreover, large trades account for a significant proportion of daily stock price changes in the last 2 days. The evidence is consistent with the prediction by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that, when multiple informed investors acquire the same piece of information, they will trade aggressively. We also find that over the reform period, the median share value change of event firms is 6% higher than that of control firms. Our findings have important implications for enforcement of insider trading regulations in China.  相似文献   
4.
There has been a steady growth of goodwill impairments in the Chinese stock market since the adoption of the impairment approach in accounting. The influence of goodwill impairments on a firm’s financial position and profitability give reason to doubt its current and future performance. We examine whether auditors, as a crucial external monitor, identify the information risks of goodwill impairments and express their concerns about financial reporting quality in their audit opinions. Using a sample of firms listed on China’s A-share market from 2007 to 2017, we test the association between goodwill impairments and the type of audit opinion received in the same financial period. Our findings are as follows. First, the probability of receiving a modified opinion increases with the amount of goodwill impairments. Second, the positive association between goodwill impairments and modified audit opinions is driven primarily by earnings management risks. Third, this positive association is more salient when auditors are industry experts and there is no auditor–client mismatch. Fourth, auditors are more sensitive to the amount of goodwill impairments than to their mere existence. Overall, we document that auditors perceive goodwill impairments as a signal of information risks and communicate their concerns to investors to avoid litigation.  相似文献   
5.
    
Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, a manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor of uncertain quality can detect fraud and punish the manager. As the monitor fails to detect fraud, the manager's posterior belief about the monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, the manager's learning leads to a slippery slope, in which the size of frauds grows steeply, and to a power law for detected fraud. Empirical analyses corroborate the slippery slope and the learning channel. As a policy implication, we establish that a higher detection intensity can increase fraud by enabling the manager to identify an ineffective monitor more quickly. Further, nondetection of frauds below a materiality threshold, paired with a sufficiently steep punishment scheme, can prevent large frauds.  相似文献   
6.
This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.  相似文献   
7.
国际审计准则第320号和450号的新发展及其对我国的启示   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
本文介绍和分析了经过重新修订和起草的ISA320《计划和实施审计工作时的重要性》和ISA450《对审计过程中已识别错报的评估》的征求意见稿的主要内容,通过与2004年12月发布的征求意见稿的比较,重点介绍其最新发展情况,并总结出对我国审计准则制定的几点启示。  相似文献   
8.
    
In this paper we perform theoretical and empirical analyses on the insiders' optimal “stealth” strategy and expected profits from mimicking trading when the insiders' trading information is publicly available. When insiders select a mixed strategy of AR (1) process as the information exposure strategy in a multi‐period model, we find the optimal AR (1) coefficient that maximizes the insiders' profit is negative. Also, (1) the greater the transaction volume of mimicking traders in the market and the longer the information exposure period, the closer the optimum AR (1) coefficient becomes to −1; (2) The larger the mimicking transaction volume, the smaller the insider's profit gets; and (3) When the volume of mimicking transaction is large and the private information is not much valuable, the likelihood of loss is high. We also validate certain theoretical results of our model using publicized ownership change data of major shareholders. As a result, we find the strategic evidences in the sample of insider transactions closing within 15 trading days. Also, although mimicking traders' losses have not been reported, they can suffer losses when the private information is not much valuable and the insiders take a significant strategic action.  相似文献   
9.
    
This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is associated with the likelihood and outcomes of securities class action lawsuits. We find a lower likelihood of securities litigation for firms with higher CSR. This effect is larger for companies with lower levels of financial distress, companies with larger proportions of institutional investors, and for internal CSR. Additionally, CSR has a mitigating effect on negative market assessments around the filing dates of securities litigation. The results suggest that higher CSR firms are less likely to engage in financial misconduct, and investors are less likely to penalise them for such occurrences.  相似文献   
10.
    
Empirical research from the first years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US suggests that firms improve accruals quality following restatements, but the materiality of restatements has declined since then. This decline may affect firms' responses to restatements, and hence we re-examine whether restatements are associated with subsequent improvements in accruals quality in a more recent sample. We compare the changes in accruals quality of firms restating between 2000 and 2014 with that of a control group. We do not find that firms improve accruals quality more than the control group following a restatement, even when we isolate the types of restatements considered to be most material. However, we do find that restatements followed by the most negative stock market reactions are associated with a relative increase in accruals quality, indicating that only restatements deemed very severe by investors lead to subsequent improvements in accruals quality. Our results suggest that firms' responses to restatements have changed concurrently with the trend of fewer and less material restatements in recent years.  相似文献   
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