Do goodwill impairments affect audit opinions? Evidence from China

There has been a steady growth of goodwill impairments in the Chinese stock market since the adoption of the impairment approach in accounting. The influence of goodwill impairments on a firm’s financial position and profitability give reason to doubt its current and future performance. We examine whether auditors, as a crucial external monitor, identify the information risks of goodwill impairments and express their concerns about financial reporting quality in their audit opinions. Using a sample of firms listed on China’s A-share market from 2007 to 2017, we test the association between goodwill impairments and the type of audit opinion received in the same financial period. Our findings are as follows. First, the probability of receiving a modified opinion increases with the amount of goodwill impairments. Second, the positive association between goodwill impairments and modified audit opinions is driven primarily by earnings management risks. Third, this positive association is more salient when auditors are industry experts and there is no auditor–client mismatch. Fourth, auditors are more sensitive to the amount of goodwill impairments than to their mere existence. Overall, we document that auditors perceive goodwill impairments as a signal of information risks and communicate their concerns to investors to avoid litigation.     

Debt Covenant Restriction,Financial Misreporting,and Auditor Monitoring*

Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.     

What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

Trade-size clustering and price efficiency

Using a sample of 26 markets, this paper investigates if trade-size clustering affects price efficiency. Our results suggest that more clustering trades are associated with greater resemblance of a random walk, less pricing errors, and shorter price delays. Moreover, we examine three underlying mechanisms to explain how clustering improves efficiency. First, we show that clustering trades are informative, consistent with the idea that stealth traders leverage such tactics to convey private information to prices. Second, we discover that clustering trades are positively related to investor attention (stock liquidity), implying that informed clustering trades happen at the presence of enormous uninformed investors. High attention and liquid markets help reduce the trading friction, thereby prompting quick price adjustments to private information released by the stealth trading.     

Trading on inside information: Evidence from the share-structure reform in China

We examine stock trading activities in days before Chinese listed firms made public announcement to start share-structure reform. There is significant evidence that, relative to a benchmark period, institutional investors bought more event firms’ shares in the last two trading days prior to announcement. Randomization tests show significant differences in institutional trading activities between event firms and matched control firms, which suggests that some institutions had inside information. Moreover, large trades account for a significant proportion of daily stock price changes in the last 2 days. The evidence is consistent with the prediction by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that, when multiple informed investors acquire the same piece of information, they will trade aggressively. We also find that over the reform period, the median share value change of event firms is 6% higher than that of control firms. Our findings have important implications for enforcement of insider trading regulations in China.     

Investor Sentiment,Misstatements, and Auditor Behavior*

High investor sentiment has been linked with opportunistic managerial behavior in the face of more optimistic investors and analysts. We extend this line of work by documenting that the likelihood of misstatements is higher when sentiment is high. Although this would suggest elevated audit risk, we posit that a contemporaneous reduction in auditors' litigation cost could drive down audit fees and going concern opinion (GCO) reporting conservatism in order to please clientele. Consistent with this notion, we document that auditors charge lower fees and report GCOs less conservatively when sentiment is high. However, this reduction in reporting conservatism is unwarranted; results reveal that auditors are less likely to issue GCOs to clients which subsequently file for bankruptcy during high sentiment periods. We conduct additional tests to examine whether auditors' litigation costs indeed vary with sentiment and document that auditors are less likely to be sued and the market reacts less negatively to misstatement announcements when sentiment is high. Collectively, our findings suggest that, although misstatement risk is increasing with sentiment, auditors' litigation risk actually declines.     

A re-examination of accruals quality following restatements

Empirical research from the first years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US suggests that firms improve accruals quality following restatements, but the materiality of restatements has declined since then. This decline may affect firms' responses to restatements, and hence we re-examine whether restatements are associated with subsequent improvements in accruals quality in a more recent sample. We compare the changes in accruals quality of firms restating between 2000 and 2014 with that of a control group. We do not find that firms improve accruals quality more than the control group following a restatement, even when we isolate the types of restatements considered to be most material. However, we do find that restatements followed by the most negative stock market reactions are associated with a relative increase in accruals quality, indicating that only restatements deemed very severe by investors lead to subsequent improvements in accruals quality. Our results suggest that firms' responses to restatements have changed concurrently with the trend of fewer and less material restatements in recent years.     

我国注册会计师虚假陈述之原因及立法完善

通过分析注册会计师虚假陈述的原因,指出规范注册会计师独立审计行为的关键是建立健全相关法律制度,并从完善注册会计师虚假陈述的民事责任制度,建立完善的执业准则,营造良好的执业环境,建立相应的激励制度等方面提出了立法建议。     

国际审计准则第320号和450号的新发展及其对我国的启示

本文介绍和分析了经过重新修订和起草的ISA320《计划和实施审计工作时的重要性》和ISA450《对审计过程中已识别错报的评估》的征求意见稿的主要内容,通过与2004年12月发布的征求意见稿的比较,重点介绍其最新发展情况,并总结出对我国审计准则制定的几点启示。     

周期性有耗介质结构的电磁散射研究

本文介绍一种新的涂层隐身方法:周期涂覆方法,它与均匀涂覆方法相比,能够在不增加散射体厚度的情况下,使用现有单层有耗材料,使目标的隐身特性得以较大改善。本文运用快速傅氏变换和迭代法对一些具体例子进行了计算,并与实验结果进行了比较。