Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

Does local government competition aggravate haze pollution? A new perspective of factor market distortion

Haze pollution has become a new threat to China's sustainable development, but it may be that local government behaviour can play an important role in the prevention and control of pollutants. A dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is used to study the relationship between local government competition and haze pollution. To further explore the indirect impact of factor market distortion on haze pollution and control potential endogeneity problems, a newly developed intermediary effect model that incorporates the characteristics of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is utilized to explore how factor market distortion indirectly affects haze pollution. The research results show that regional haze pollution in China is characterized by significant spatial correlation, and local government competition has a positive impact on haze pollution; that is, local government competition exacerbates haze pollution. In general, local government competition not only directly leads to an increase in haze pollution but also further intensifies it by distorting the local factor market, and the intermediary role of factor market distortion is approximately 7.04%. The results of the regional inspection found that competition among local governments in the eastern region did not lead to haze pollution, and distortion of the factor market did not exist as an intermediary effect. However, both direct and intermediary effects are significant in the central and western regions. Therefore, an official performance appraisal system that includes ecological constraints should be established to guide the benign transformation of local government competition, and an environmental management mechanism must be developed for joint prevention and control to reduce haze pollution. In addition, the free flow of factors and marketization are equally important.     

Noise traders,firm-specific uncertainty and technical trading effectiveness

This is the first study to document evidence of technical trading effectiveness at firm level in the Chinese A-share market by investigating the relationship between excess profits of technical trading rules and firm-specific characteristics. Our results reveal that firms with higher excess profits from technical trading have more noise traders and higher institutional ownership and that those firms tend to be growth firms with lower liquidity and higher firm-specific uncertainty. Further analysis shows that the profitability of technical trading rules is unsustainable and the excess profits of the highest technical trading profit quintile portfolio disappear in the following year.     

Co-movement in Stock Prices in Emerging Economies: The Case of the Caricom Region

The Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 recognised the need for financial integration within the emerging economies that comprise the CARICOM region, as a way of furthering the wider process of economic integration and, indeed, economic development in that region. Using co-movement as a measure of financial integration, this paper investigates the co-movement in stock prices among the Barbados, the Jamaica and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchanges, the three major exchanges within the CARICOM region. It also examines how integrated these exchanges are with the New York Stock Exchange. The GARCH-Copula methodology and, to a lesser extent, estimated correlation coefficients, are used to attain this objective. There appears to be co-movement in stock prices and returns within the CARICOM stock markets and significant dependence structures between the returns of the three CARICOM stock markets. However, there is considerably less evidence of integration between the CARICOM markets and the New York Stock Exchange.     

The importance of consumer multihoming (joint purchases) for market performance: Mergers and entry in media markets

Consumer “multihoming” (watching two TV channels, or buying two news magazines) has surprisingly important effects on market equilibrium and performance in (two‐sided) media markets. We show this by introducing consumer multihoming and advertising finance into the classic circle model of product differentiation. When consumers multihome (attend more than one platform), media platforms can charge only incremental value prices to advertisers. Entry or merger leaves consumer prices unchanged under consumer multihoming, but leaves advertiser prices unchanged under single‐homing: Multihoming flips the side of the market on which platforms compete. In contrast to standard circle results, equilibrium product variety can be insufficient under multihoming.     

增信服务还是腐蚀效应:论金融科技等新兴产业发展过程中的风险信号

提出行业性风险暴发的"腐蚀效应"理论,即存在着一种特殊的行业风险暴发过程:行业中各个企业的倒闭是沿着企业的资质链从低到高的顺序发生的.该过程的存在得到了数据回归证实.对于科技金融等新兴行业,警惕和积极防范腐蚀效应,对防范行业性风险具有重要意义.对于客户信任高度依赖的新兴行业,如金融科技等,最容易出现腐蚀效应.因此,在一度高速膨胀的网络贷款领域出现腐蚀效应具有一定必然性."腐蚀效应"的存在也否定了当前把网络贷款行业大面积爆雷的原因归咎于其开展"增信服务"的普遍观点,真正引发风险的原因是网络贷款行业中的企业资质参差不齐和无序竞争造成的无谓成本的大幅增加.从政府对行业的管理视角来看,在促进行业发展时不忘记防范风险十分重要.这在实质上是对制度-制度接口的设计问题.因此应当以制度设计理论来指导防范风险政策的制定,才能取得更好的效果.     

Cluster Analysis for mixed data: An application to credit risk evaluation

Credit risk is one of the main risks faced by a bank to provide financial products and services to clients. To evaluate the financial performance of clients, several scoring methodologies have been proposed, which are based mostly on quantitative indicators. This paper highlights the relevance of both quantitative and qualitative features of applicants and proposes a new methodology based on mixed data clustering techniques. Indeed, cluster analysis may prove particularly useful in the estimation of credit risk. Traditionally, clustering concentrates only on quantitative or qualitative data at a time; however, since credit applicants are characterized by mixed personal features, a cluster analysis specific for mixed data can lead to discover particularly informative patterns, estimating the risk associated with credit granting.     

Risk spillover between Bitcoin and conventional financial markets: An expectile-based approach

In order to challenge the existing literature that points to the detachment of Bitcoin from the global financial system, we use daily data from August 17, 2011–February 14, 2020 and apply a risk spillover approach based on expectiles. Results show reasonable evidence to imply the existence of downside risk spillover between Bitcoin and four assets (equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities), which seems to be time dependent. Our main findings have implications for participants in both the Bitcoin and traditional financial markets for the sake of asset allocation, and risk management. For policy makers, the findings suggest that Bitcoin should be monitored carefully for the sake of financial stability.