Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Marriage Settlements

French couples may choose between two types of marriage settlements governing asset ownership after a divorce or inheritance: common property or separate property. A cooperative model considers the marriage contract as a means of providing for widowhood of the less endowed spouse. A second model addresses the probability of divorce and the production of a marriage good. The common property contract then becomes a means of inducing the wife to invest in the marriage good. Choice of contract, labor supply and fertility are simultaneous. Empirically we find that characteristics of the spouses such as relative age or differences in endowments influence the choice. So do the expected number of children and the wife's labor supply decision. This last decision is also shown to be influenced by the chosen settlement, while fertility is not.
JEL classification : J 12; J 4; K 12     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.     

铁矿石国际贸易定价权与议价力的博弈分析

文章通过对铁矿石国际贸易定价的博弈分析,发现定价权能够带来先动优势,因而买卖双方内部寡头都有竞争定价权的动力,且竞争的相对强度决定了各自的议价力大小;在铁矿石国际贸易中,定价权竞争具有\"弱者优势\"效应,但其作用有限.因此,为应对铁矿石国际贸易持续上涨的压力,我国钢铁企业应综合考虑定价权竞争与议价力的提升,并以改变买卖双方定价权竞争的相对强度为目标设计博弈对策     

渠道博弈视角下粮食最低收购价政策的效果研究

中国是人口和粮食大国,促进粮食生产、保证粮食安全是国之大事。由于市场利益主体之间存在博弈行为,收购价格由农户与粮食收购企业共同决定。采用纳什议价模型表示议价过程,运用2006年至2014年的小麦价格数据,研究农户和企业在粮食收购过程中的议价问题,从而判断粮食最低收购价的政策效果。结果表明：政策确实能改变农民的议价能力,保护农民利益,但政策实施存在时滞;更重要的是,政策会导致农户议价能力从绝对劣势到绝对优势的突变,造成农户凭借最低收购价获得主导价格的能力,即政策扭曲了市场定价机制。最后,给出模型结果、实证结论和政策建议。     

基于"综合谈判力"的企业所有权安排

现代企业理论打开了“企业”这一“黑箱”,为理解和创建现代企业制度提供了有力的理论支撑。本文通过对企业各要素所有者谈判力三个方面,即:签约人自身实力、签约人相互关系地位、签约外部环境的具体分析,阐释了各要素所有者对企业剩余的分享,并以此初步构建一个以企业要素所有者“综合谈判力”为基础的企业所有权安排分析框架。     

The impact of tax reforms on unemployment in a SMOPEC

This paper analyzes revenue-neutral tax reforms for a small open economy which is constrained to a balanced current account and whose producers have market power on the world market. We consider origin-based and destination-based commodity taxes as well as taxes on income, the payroll, and on an imported factor of production. Our main findings are the following. First, the strength, and for some parameter constellations, even the sign of the employment effect of tax reforms varies with the degree of openness of the economy. Second, the indeterminacy of the sign of the employment effect crucially hinges on the presence of an internationally mobile factor. The central mechanism underlying our results are adjustments of the real exchange rate which have repercussions on wage and price setting and therefore on employment.