Financial scandals: a historical overview

I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of significant financial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a detailed dataset of significant events and news content, underpinned by examination of specific watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the implications for accounting and financial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of fraud and financial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors, particularly banking and finance, facilitated by complex group structures and international capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration. Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and international business networks, which, combined with wider financial deregulation, has led to a resurgence of fraud and financial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-nineteenth century.     

Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

跨国垄断在中国:现状、影响及规制

该文通过统计数据和案例分析认为跨国垄断已经在中国发生，并指出存在着两种不同类型的跨国垄断，即跨国企业整体垄断某个行业和单个跨国企业垄断整个行业；进而分析了两种不同形态的垄断对经济造成的不良影响。最后，探讨了如何防范和规制跨国垄断，认为防范跨国垄断要从多方面着手，除了最重要的竞争政策手段以外，还必须在反垄断法中加强对跨国垄断的规制。     

论法律不完备性与政府介入期货市场

在期货市场上，法律不完备性问题表现得较为突出，法律对于侵害行为的阻吓作用非常有限、期货市场法律的不完备性，主要取决于期货市场的特点和性质。政府采取相关的监管方式管理期货市场非常必要，监管的介入需要满足标准化和损害（外部性）足够高的条件。政府管理期货市场立法和法院执法的作用不可或缺，但更主要的是采用监管的方式。     

浅论我国农产品流通企业扩张的基本规律与政策规制

通过对农产品流通企业扩张形式全面的理论梳理, 研究总结了二种类型的农产品流通企业扩张基本规律,即纵向扩张和横向扩张,并对中国农产品企业扩张问题进行了实证研究,最后对我国农产品流通企业扩张提出建议.     

Measuring the Impact of Regulation: A Study of Canadian Basic Cable Television

We evaluate the appropriateness of regulation within the Canadian cable television industry by applying both parametric and non-parametric approachesto measure scale efficiency. Although we begin with a sample offering adequatedegrees of freedom for parametric estimation, important policy issues lead us toconsider further estimation over sub-samples. Since some of these sub-samplesare small enough that parametric models cannot guarantee reliable estimates, weobtain production characteristics non-parametrically through data envelopmentanalysis. The nonparametric results for scale efficiency support the parametricresults. We find evidence against a natural monopoly argument that might havejustified continuation of the mandated monopolization of Canadian cable televisionservice. By the end of the sample period, there were no longer substantial economiesof scale in most relevant markets.     

The Market's Assessment of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999

We examine the impact of the events leading up to and including the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999 on the stock returns of banks, brokerage firms, and insurance companies. We find that the impact is positive for all institutions. Bank gains are positively related to size and capitalization. Brokerage firms gain regardless of size, but the gains are inversely related to capitalization and insurance companies gain regardless of size or capital position. The strong positive reaction suggests that the market expects the institutions to benefit from the new opportunities created by the FSMA's passage.     

反倾销规则与“中欧石材案”

反倾销规则是 WTO允许的世界各国均可采用的维护公平贸易秩序、抵制不正当竞争的重要手段之一 ,其规则非常严密 ,主要是明确规定了反倾销必须同时具备的三个条件及反倾销的程序。WTO成立以后 ,各成员方纷纷修改本国的反倾销法律 ,我国于 2 0 0 1年 12月 10日颁布了《中华人民共和国反倾销条例》,使之与 WTO的反倾销规则相一致。同时 ,也在积极利用 WTO反倾销规则来反对他国反倾销的滥用。 2 0 0 1年引起各界广泛关注的欧盟对我国石材业反倾销申诉案 ,经涉诉的我国 2 7家企业的积极应诉 ,终以欧盟撤诉 ,我方取得全面胜利而告终。这是我国按照 WTO原则建立自我保护体系 ,有效保护本国经济利益和经济发展的重要举措。意味着我国政府也将利用反倾销这把“利剑”来保护国内企业     

Regulatory reform of the UK gas market: The sase of the storage auction

The UK gas industry has undergone major changes since it was privatised in 1986 as a fully integrated monopoly. The most significant of these has occurred not as a result of the privatisation legislation but by the intervention of the ordinary competition authorities in support of an active industry regulator. While price capping continues to be used as the primary instrument for welfare protection against the still substantial monopolistic powers of the incumbent, new competition (which has been positively encouraged) has had the greater impact on prices and choice. Recently, however, the regulator has encouraged the use of auctions for the sale of storage capacity. This paper considers the merits of auctions and makes a tentative evaluation of their effectiveness. Further use of auctions is recommended but reserve prices are considered inappropriate where monopoly power still remains.     

Regulating Banks through Market Discipline: A Survey of the Issues

Abstract.  The interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed New Capital Accord. This paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation. We start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms. Next, a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced. We evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have. Finally, we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism. In this respect, the Basle Committee has taken the right approach.