Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s Close Call

Indonesian democracy experienced a near miss in 2014, when Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) defeated former general Prabowo Subianto by a margin of 6.3% in the presidential election. Both candidates were populists who rose to prominence in the context of public disillusionment with incumbent president Yudhoyono; Prabowo, however, condemned Indonesia's democratic system and promised to take Indonesia in a more authoritarian direction. We trace democracy's close call through five phases: the dying months of Yudhoyono's presidency, the rise of populist alternatives, the parliamentary elections of April 2014, the July presidential campaign, and the aftermath. We attribute the strength of Prabowo's campaign to superior organisational and financial support, while Jokowi's victory rested upon strong identification with him among poor and rural voters. Also determining the outcome was the fact that public satisfaction with democracy remained strong, undermining the effectiveness of Prabowo's authoritarian-populist message. Nevertheless, democracy's future remains uncertain, given that Prabowo and his supporters now control a sufficiently large number of parliamentary seats to continue promoting a rollback of democratic reforms.     

Social Structure in Economic Theory

This paper investigates the factors that drive ruler decision making under democracy. By dividing politicians’ actions into two distinct domains and exploring their compositions, we construct a fuller and more realistic picture of politician decision making. In the non-discretionary domain, the politician’s actions are clearly limited by voter desires; in the discretionary domain the politician is free to make choices as he chooses without voter repercussions. Standard neoclassical models of political behavior suggest that when votes don’t matter, monetary income drives ruler behavior. While monetary pursuit may explain some ruler decisions, it leaves many other observed choices unexplained. Our non-discretionary/discretionary dichotomy highlights the up-to-now neglected role that psychic income plays in explaining otherwise unexplained ruler decisions. The case studies considered support this view.     

信访的法制功能新探

国务院《信访条例》出台以后,《信访法》的起草和制定成为信访制度法制化的进一步目标,明确信访制度在我国法秩序中的准确功能是立法的关键性工作之一。现行信访制度兼有监督功能和权利救济功能,但是作为制度设计,必然有所偏重,其进一步改革的基本方向应该是对行政权的民主监控。     

Is money where the fun ends? Material interests and individuals’ preference for direct democracy

Are people’s attitudes towards referendums as a decision-making procedure predominantly driven by their material self-interest, or do individuals also value direct democracy as such, regardless of the material payoffs associated with anticipated policy outcomes? To answer this question, we use a survey data set that offers information on respondents’ support for referendums as a procedure to decide on tax policy, their income levels, socio-economic characteristics, and, most importantly, their expectation about the majority’s support for higher taxes. We find that the support of low-income individuals for referendums increases substantially if they expect a clear population majority in favor of more redistribution. Conversely, individuals with a high income who expect a majority in favor of higher taxes do not reject referendums more strongly than individuals with an average income who share these expectations.     

Direct democracy: obstacle to reform?

Swiss direct democracy is often accused of being an obstacle to reforms, with the strong influence of interest groups being the reason. Actually, the referendum has a retarding effect: it implies a status quo bias. On the other hand, the initiative has an accelerating effect. The influence of interest groups is hardly larger in direct compared to representative democratic systems. Thus, it is highly questionable whether the abolition of Switzerland’s direct democracy (at the federal level) would—in the long-run—really lead to political decisions which are more open to reforms.     

Democracy and prosperity in two decades of transition1

This article revisits the relationship between democracy, liberalization and prosperity in transition countries, using a panel of 25 countries over 20 years. Earlier investigations found political and economic liberalization to be positively correlated although the relationship between political liberalization and prosperity remained unclear. In this article, the results are ambiguous regarding the relationship between democracy indicators by Freedom House and the Polity Project on one hand and growth on the other. This contribution therefore investigates the component variables of these indicators to determine their degree of influence. The findings suggest that basic constitutional rights and constraints on the government rather than political competition as such may be conducive to both economic liberalization and prosperity in the transition countries.