Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline

This paper evaluates the trade-off between the advantages of risk sharing and the perils of common pool problems in federal fiscal arrangements. Under the assumption of asymmetric information we evaluate two alternative regimes of intergovernmental transfers. In one regime, the central government pre-commits to a certain level of transfers that compensate vertical fiscal imbalances and provide some limited ex-ante insurance. In the other regime, it accommodates ex-post the fiscal needs of the different provinces. In this second case, full-insurance results, but the economy is subject to a tragedy of the fiscal commons, with excessive subnational spending, insufficient local taxation, and reduced production of federal public goods. We find the range of parameters for which one or the other institutional regime will be preferable. The result is a fiscal-federalism version of the usual trade-off between rules and discretion.     

Transboundary Environmental Problems with Mobile but Heterogeneous Populations

Most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant, ignoringpopulation mobility. We showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions, and populations are homogeneous, asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa Nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting, even without any internationalenvironmental agreement. In the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population, and showthat when people differ, a non-cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient. We alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments, there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient. Finally, we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility, butinefficient when there is population mobility.     

On the cost-benefit of the regionalisation of the National Health Service

In this paper we analyse in formal terms the desirability of the regionalisation of a National Health Service. The policy consists of a devolution process, i.e. the increase in the health services provision to be decided by a region and financed by an increase in its revenues. The change is a marginal one, as it regards the part of supply of the health services exceeding a minimum standard, which for purposes of equity is maintained uniform in the national territory. As the central government is responsible for this component of the provision of health care (a federal “mandate”), the level of the said component is chosen by this authority and financed by federal taxation. Moreover, the government also applies an equalisation scheme based on the difference between a standard level of tax revenues and the revenues which the region is deemed able to raise for this purpose. Within the theoretical context of welfare improving reforms with distortionary taxation, we derive two conditions which focus on the regional, as well as the social, convenience of regionalisation. Received: May 5, 1999 / Accepted: January 21, 2000     

我国省际间财政差异趋势与影响因素的实证研究

本文通过1980-2005年间的样本数据,揭示1980年以来我国省际间财政差异的变化趋势,以及这种变化趋势的影响因素.我们的研究表明,在财政收入方面,受地区经济差异加大的影响,1994年以后财政收入差异有扩大态势,而分税制改革有助于缩小省际间财政收入差异.在财政支出方面,1995年以后财政支出差异呈上升趋势,这是地区间经济发展水平差异与分税制共同作用的结果,但是前者的作用远远大于后者.因此,缩小省际间财政差异的途径除转移支付外,还应当主要致力于缩小省际间经济发展水平差异.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not yet considered federal structures. In this paper, we show how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.     

FINANCING URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE: KNOWNS,UNKNOWNS, AND A WAY FORWARD

Improved urban infrastructure is widely believed to be essential in facilitating economic growth and in improving the lives of urban dwellers, both in developed and in developing countries. This paper focuses on several dimensions of urban infrastructure finance: finance for major infrastructure improvements in major economic centers, finance for expansion of basic municipal services in secondary cities and towns, and intergovernmental systems for financing investments with impacts beyond jurisdictional limits. It reviews what is “known” about current practices in these areas, using international evidence and case studies and summarizing international best practices. It also indicates areas in which knowledge gaps remain. Despite these “unknowns,” there are avenues by which our understanding of infrastructure schemes can be enhanced, and some suggestions for a research agenda on financing urban infrastructure are offered in the concluding section.     

Can Federal Grants Mitigate Social Competition?

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobilityof factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transferprograms. This article investigates the possibility to achieveby means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocationof factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presenceof factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin(1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferencesfor redistribution. We first investigate a simple process inwhich the federal authority progressively raises the matchinggrants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and alldistricts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfersall around. This process is shown to increase efficiency ofboth production and redistribution. However, it does not guaranteethat all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistributionis attained. Assuming complete information among districts,we derive the willingness of each district to match the contributionof other districts and we show that the aggregate willingnessto pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficientlevel of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factorsare achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for thematching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcomeand guarantee that everyone will gain. (JEL Classification:H23, H70)     

国有企业改革能否引起财政激励效应——以西部某省为例

国有企业改革对我国建立社会主义市场经济体制至关重要。本文以第二代财政分权理论的研究为基础,以西部某省的24个行业为样本,分析研究了地方政府改革国有企业的财政动机。结果表明,近年来样本省的国企＂做大做强＂改革路线具有明显的财政激励效应,这种效应使得地方政府有动机将国有企业引上一条资本规模不断扩大、人员冗余和退出机制不完善的道路。     

Integrating local ecological services into intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of the ecological ICMS in Brazil

Local conservation efforts are often related to benefits at higher governmental levels. On the one hand, these efforts are strongly connected to local land-use decisions. On the other hand, activities such as sustainable water management or biodiversity conservation are associated with regional, national or even global public goods. Therefore, spatial externalities or spillovers exist, which—if not adequately compensated for—lead to an underprovision of the public goods and services concerned. This article investigates intergovernmental fiscal transfers as an innovative instrument for compensating local jurisdictions for the ecological goods and services they provide across local boundaries. From a public finance perspective, fiscal transfers are a suitable instrument for internalising spatial externalities. However, most federal states use this instrument predominantly for social and economic public sector functions rather than for ecological ones. This article investigates the case of the ecological “ICMS” that was first introduced by a few states in Brazil during the 1990s. Part of the revenue from this value-added tax is redistributed to the local level on the basis of ecological indicators. In this way, the state level uses fiscal transfers to compensate municipalities for the existence of protected areas and other ecological services provided within their territories. The Brazilian experience illustrates that such fiscal transfers can represent both a compensation for land-use restrictions and an incentive to value and engage in more conservation activities at the local level.     

Where Should the Elderly Live and Who Should Pay for Their Care?*

We consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons; elderly care is publicly provided. There is one big city, where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work, and a number of small villages. We show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees, and we characterize the second‐best solution. Decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages.