Audit Regulation and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from the PCAOB's International Inspection Regime*

This study investigates the relation between audit regulation and cost of equity capital. There is scant empirical evidence on this relation because changes in audit regulation are frequently accompanied by other major regulatory changes. We exploit variation in the timing of regulatory changes induced by foreign governments' staggered allowance of PCAOB inspections. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that foreign SEC registrants with auditors from countries that allow PCAOB inspections enjoy a lower cost of capital, relative to foreign SEC registrants with auditors from countries that prohibit inspections. Furthermore, we find that this cost of capital effect is attenuated for companies with higher-quality governance mechanisms. Finally, we document that inspection access is associated with higher-quality analyst forecasts, which suggests that this change in audit regulation reduces information risk for market participants.     

Accounting and Auditing Activities of the Ontario Securities Commission, 1960s to 2008 Part 3: The Fifth Chief Accountant, 1996–2008

We present Part 3 of a historical review and analysis of the role played by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) in accounting and auditing from the 1960s onward. Part 1 dealt with the period from the 1960s to 1985 (Zeff and Radcliffe, 2010a). Part 2 reviewed the work of the first four chief accountants, from 1986 to 1996 (Zeff and Radcliffe, 2010b). This third and final part reviews the work of the fifth chief accountant, John A. Carchrae, from 1996 to 2008. It began with the reorganization of the OSC and the reassignment of functions. The chief accountant position was now that of a permanent employee, albeit still as head of a very small department. The second part of Carchrae's tenure was dominated by the need to respond to the financial crises of the early 21^st century with extensive regulatory change as well as addressing the shift to international accounting standards in Canada.     

The Effect of Reversibility on a Manager's Decision to Record Asset Impairments

Over time, accounting standards have moved toward presenting more items at fair value on the balance sheet. Consistent with this trend, IAS No. 36 permits an impairment loss on a long‐lived asset to be reversed if the economic value of the asset recovers. This article uses empirical data from an experiment conducted with 118 managers to explore the implication of allowing impairment reversals on a manager's decision to record the loss. Results suggest that permitting reversals significantly increases the likelihood that a manager will record the impairment, especially if the manager has a bonus plan. The bonus plan effect is not caused by the manager's intention to smooth income through impairment reversals, but by his disutility from a bonus forgone if the value of the asset recovers but accounting rules prohibit him from reversing the loss.     

Smoke and Mirrors? Disclosures in the Marijuana Industry in Canada

Licensed producers (LPs) of marijuana in Canada are embedded in a highly competitive industry where they raise funds from investors to finance their growth. They face substantial risks from the uncertain legal status of marijuana and from its unsettled health and safety consequences. We argue that this context stands to have implications for the disclosures of firms in the marijuana industry. We rely on a multicase study of three large Canadian LPs to explore their mandatory and voluntary disclosures during the third quarter of 2018. We find that their mandatory interim disclosures are largely consistent with disclosure rules that target marijuana operations. We also find that they make voluntary disclosures relevant for their context (e.g., about risks from legal, health, and safety consequences), and that there is variation in these disclosures. We use our findings as a springboard for discussing the antecedents of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the marijuana industry (i.e., proprietary costs, investor interest, detection costs of selective disclosures), and their consequence (i.e., lack of comparability). We offer suggestions for future research.     

Trading Prior to the Disclosure of Material Information: Evidence from Regulation Fair Disclosure Form 8‐Ks*

Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material. Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.     

Preferences for Performance versus Potential in Promotion Recommendations

As high-performing employees with high potential (or superstars) are rare in the workplace, practitioners often face a performance–potential trade-off when deciding who to promote. We use regulatory focus theory as a framework to examine whether Canadian managers (n = 58) and human resource (HR) professionals (n = 121) show a preference for performance or potential when making near-term promotion recommendations. We show that respondents generally had a preference for performance versus potential when making their recommendations, and HR professionals versus managers accorded greater weight to potential. We discuss the implications of the relative emphasis on performance versus potential in promotion recommendations and when this may contribute to organizational inefficiencies.     

Canadian Evidence of Adherence to “Comply or Explain” Corporate Governance Codes: An International Comparison

This study documents the rate of compliance by Canadian public firms with corporate governance recommendations imposed by the Canadian Securities Administrators. Canada uses a “comply or explain” governance structure in which harmonized provincial regulation establishes mandatory disclosure of governance practices. Firms can be compliant with these requirements either by voluntarily adopting the recommended best practices (i.e., adopt) or by explaining the alternative practices implemented to achieve the same governance principle (i.e., explain). Firms that fail to comply (i.e., neither adopt nor explain) are in violation of Canadian securities regulation with respect to governance. Using a hand‐collected sample of 742 Canadian public companies and 16 governance recommendations, our results show that an average of 82 percent of firms complied by adopting the best practice and an additional 4 percent complied by explanation. Our study also shows that 39 percent of Canadian publicly traded firms were completely compliant with all 16 recommendations examined in this study, either by adoption or explanation. To provide a broader context for these results, we compare rates of compliance in Canada to rates in Australia, a country broadly similar to Canada with comparable governance recommendations. The Australian Securities Exchange supplied data sample of 1334 Australian companies reports a complete compliance rate of 74 percent compared to Canada's 39 percent complete compliance rate. Our analysis shows that compliance by adoption of best practice is more common in Canada, whereas compliance by explanation is more common in Australia. In our analysis of compliance with individual recommendations, we find that half of the recommendations are more likely to be complied with in Australia, and the other half are more likely to be complied with in Canada.     

Examining the Ethical Behavior of Ontario Chartered Accountants: A Longitudinal Review of the Disciplinary Process

The governing bodies of the Chartered Accountant (CA) profession and business schools go to great lengths to ensure accounting professionals are equipped with a skill set that meets technical, professional, ethical, and other general requirements. In spite of a strict code of ethics, violations of the professional conduct rules leading to disciplinary action are a reality. Using the total CA membership (N = 36,465) of Ontario, Canada, this study makes a 27‐year retrospective assessment of the frequency of disciplinary cases, the characteristics of offenders, the disciplinary process, and the sanctions imposed. Results indicate that: (i) approximately 1.38 percent of the members have been charged with violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by the Institute of Chartered Accountants over that period; (ii) most were sole proprietors engaged in public accounting; (iii) on average, men make up 76 percent of the CA membership, outnumbering women by three to one (3:1); yet, men were 16 times more likely than women to be charged; (iv) the majority of the offences occurred while members with public accounting licenses were conducting external audits; and (v) sanctions ranged from a “rap on the knuckles” admonishment to expulsion from the CA profession. This study is exploring the CA disciplinary process as observed through disciplinary notices and suggests improvements to the system.