论法律不完备性与政府介入期货市场

在期货市场上，法律不完备性问题表现得较为突出，法律对于侵害行为的阻吓作用非常有限、期货市场法律的不完备性，主要取决于期货市场的特点和性质。政府采取相关的监管方式管理期货市场非常必要，监管的介入需要满足标准化和损害（外部性）足够高的条件。政府管理期货市场立法和法院执法的作用不可或缺，但更主要的是采用监管的方式。     

Liquidity and market incompleteness

This note shows that according to Lippman and McCall’s (Am Econ Rev 76, 43–55, 1986) operational definition of liquidity, incomplete markets are a necessary condition for illiquidity. This note is a revised subset of a larger paper that circulated under the name of “Liquidity as an Insurance Problem” (Zurita 2001). I am grateful to Luis Ahumada, David K. Levine, Raimundo Soto, Gert Wagner, Federico Weinschelbaum and seminar participants at UCLA, Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Banco Central de Chile, LACEA, Jornadas de Economía del Banco Central del Uruguay, and ILADES, for their helpful comments, as well as the feedback of an anonymous referee. Financial support from Vicerrectoría Académica de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile is gratefully acknowledged.     

商品空缺陈列对消费者选购决策的影响

营销实践和研究文献多强调饱满陈列的作用。假设空缺陈列在特定条件下也会产生积极的效果,商场环境、产品信息、购买卷入度、购买者个性特点是影响空缺陈列作用效果的重要变量。实验结果表明不知名产品的空缺陈列比饱满陈列效果好,但多个产品同时空缺陈列时销售量下降。     

Can Market Incompleteness Resolve Asset Pricing Puzzles?

Abstract:   This paper shows that the presence of persistent uninsurable risk concentrated in economic depressions has the potential to resolve two well‐known asset pricing puzzles. It is also shown that the presence of such risk in more normal economic expansions and recessions is likely to be much less relevant in determining equilibrium asset prices.     

企业契约理论视角下的税务筹划动因分析

税收,对纳税人来说是一种负担,税务筹划正是减轻税收负担、增加税后收益的有效途径。随着现代企业制度的建立,税务筹划越来越受到企业的重视。多数企业都会对其涉税事项进行一系列的事前安排,以达到税收利益最大化。文章从契约理论的角度,分析了企业进行税务筹划的动机,发现政府的主导性地位、税收契约的不完备性、税法的空白与漏洞以及企业之间的关系都促使企业在合理的范围内进行税务筹划,以实现税收利益最大化。     

What makes a joint venture: Micro‐evidence from Sino‐Italian contracts

This paper provides new contract-level evidence on control rights allocation in order to define what makes a joint venture. Property rights theory of the firm identifies circumstances under which joint control alleviates investment distortions due to contract incompleteness. We compare predictions of the theoretical literature with actual governance structures of Sino-Italian joint ventures, as reported in a questionnaire submitted to the entire population of Italian enterprises operating in China. With an exceptional response rate of 60%, our evidence confirms most of the theoretical predictions and helps select among competing approaches to model joint ventures.     

Incompleteness,regularity, and collective preference

This paper examines the incompleteness of collective preference. We provide a series of Arrovian impossibility theorems without completeness. First, we consider the notion of regularity introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006, Games and Economic Behavior 56, 61–86); it is an appropriate richness property for strict preference when preference is allowed to be incomplete. We examine the implication of imposing regularity on collective preference. Second, we propose responsiveness, a variation of positive responsiveness. This axiom requires that some changes in individual preferences make an alternative weakly better than another. Third, we consider coherency conditions for collective preferences; this conditionally requires the existence of comparable pairs in a certain manner. We prove an impossibility result for each condition using Arrovian axioms.     

Market power,market outcomes,and remedies in the UK groceries market

This article describes a number of the issues that played a central role in the UK Competition Commission's investigation into the UK Groceries Sector. We describe the questions at issue, the evidence collected to address those questions, and the conclusions drawn. We go on to describe the CC's remedies both vertically vis‐à‐vis the supply chain and horizontally vis‐à‐vis markets of high local concentration.     

The importance of incompleteness

Kotaro Suzumura can be seen as the most complete social choice theorist the subject has ever had. No area of social choice has failed to benefit from Suzumura's penetrating analyses. Among the many important contributions made by Suzumura is the use of the idea of incompleteness of evaluation in his analysis of consistency, particularly in the form of what has come to be called “Suzumura consistency”. In this paper I explore the need for allowing – and incorporating – incompleteness of preferences in choice theory in general and social choice in particular. This is followed by a number of critical enquiries. Why is incompleteness important? How does it arise as an essential part of rational reflections? What are its implications (i) for prudential decisions, and (ii) for ethical judgments? Finally, how should making room for incompleteness influence theories of justice?