Managing organizational entry in China: the roles of newcomer–supervisor exchange,incumbent support,and perceived insider status

The socialization literature has long recognized the important role of perceived insider status in facilitating newcomer adjustment, but knowledge on how to cultivate this desirable psychological state is limited. This study examines newcomer–supervisor exchange as an antecedent of perceived insider status of newcomers, which in turn facilitates their social adjustment and task mastery during organizational entry. We also explore incumbent support as a boundary condition for these effects. We conducted a survey study on 320 new employees and 92 supervisors in China. This study revealed that newcomer–supervisor exchange was related positively to newcomers’ perceived insider status, and perceived insider status mediated the positive relationships of newcomer–supervisor exchange with social adjustment and task mastery. In addition, incumbent support moderated the positive relationship between newcomer–supervisor exchange and perceived insider status, as well as the positive mediated relationships of newcomer–supervisor exchange with social adjustment and task mastery through perceived insider status. Specifically, these relationships were weaker when incumbent support was higher. Theoretical and practical implications were discussed.     

Asymmetric information consolidation and price discovery: Inferring bad news from insider sales

Due to the paucity of sources of negative firm‐specific information, US capital markets have more difficulty identifying and incorporating bad news into stock prices than they do good news. Even though insider selling is a potentially important proxy for undisclosed bad news, researchers have difficulty ex ante identifying information‐based sales due to an inability to separate liquidity‐motivated from information‐based insider trades. We hypothesize that when insiders in multiple firms sell shares of one firm in which they are insiders and at the same time buy shares of other insider portfolio firms, the sale is more likely to be information‐based, since the proceeds are reinvested. Conversely, when an insider sells one firm without purchasing others or sells multiple insider firms the sale is likely liquidity‐motivated. We find that insider sales identified as information‐based using this algorithm are followed by significant negative abnormal returns. Information‐based sales are also more likely to be associated with delistings, earnings declines and earnings restatements. Analysts are also more likely to revise their earnings forecasts downwards for these firms. It is thus possible to ex ante identify insider sales with information content. Our results will be of interest to investors and also to regulators designing insider trading rules.     

简析内幕交易罪中犯罪主体的认定

为了规范证券市场，维护投资者的合法权益，我国立法机关加强了对内幕交易犯罪行为的惩处，理论界对内幕信息、犯罪主体的界定等一些具体问题有较大争议，本文对这类问题在一定程度上进行了探讨。     

股票回购中内幕交易与股价操纵行为规制——由新《公司法》第一百四十三条引发的思考

新<公司法>增加了股票回购事由的条款,放宽了对股票回购的限制.但在股票回购的立法方面,总体上仍较为简单、粗略,缺乏具体的操作规则,没有形成完整、严密的规制体系.由于立法模式的差异,各国对股票回购过程中内幕交易及股价操纵行为的管制形式也有所不同.对欧美等国对股票回购过程中的内幕交易和股价操纵行为的监管进行比较分析,可以为我国股票回购实施过程中如何抑制股价操纵行为提供启示.     

内部人控制的形式、危害与解决措施

内部人控制问题引起了经济理论界和社会各界的广泛关注，经济学对其进行了较为深入的研究。但是，在对内部人控制的形式、产生的具体危害以及如何消除内部人控制的研究方面缺乏应有的深度。本文在分析内部人控制形式的基础上，探讨内部人控制对企业的影响，阐述了彻底解决具有垄断企业内部人控制的公开信息措施的原理。同时，也针对竞争性行业的内部人控制提出了内部人控制的一般解决措施。     

Do corporate insiders circumvent insider trading regulations? The case of stock repurchases

We use calculated values of standardized abnormal insider trading activity to investigate for patterns of unusual insider activity around fixed-price and Dutch auction repurchase announcements. Firms are classified according to whether the repurchase is signaling information about future cash flows, about the distribution of excess free cash flows, or about management's attempts to maintain control in the presence of a takeover. We find below normal levels of sales well before the event and above normal levels of sales after the event. This tendency is strongest for fixed-price offers and for firm's conveying information about future cash flows, and is absent for firms involved in takeovers. No evidence exists of abnormal levels of purchases before or after the event. We interpret the evidence as consistent with insiders successfully circumventing policies and regulations designed to prevent the exploitation of private information by timing the pattern of their security sales.     

对金融衍生品市场内幕交易的一些新思考--澳大利亚现行的反内幕交易法及其带给我们的若干启示

本文着眼于澳大利亚在治理金融衍生品市场内幕交易中积累的丰富经验,针对一个崭新的前瞻性课题,即金融衍生品市场的内幕交易问题展开研究。作者认为,由于内幕交易与信息非对称性之间存在的内在冲突,实际上反内幕交易法规很难有效地阻止金融衍生品的内幕交易行为,过于复杂的反内幕交易法规会对市场产生一些负面影响,而放松内幕交易监管这一新思维将对市场的良性发展更为有益,应该让市场来决定内幕交易行为的“存亡”。但目前最为现实、温和的选择仍然是修改现行反内幕交易法,以维护市场的公平性和有效性。最后,笔者对如何缓解中国目前内幕交易猖獗的现状提出建议。     

股权激励的市场反应及其内幕交易的实证研究

文章以2008年1月份前推出股权激励计划的67家公司为样本,采用事件研究法,对股价在股权激励计划方案公布前后21个交易日是否存在超常收益率进行了实证研究。实证结果表明:样本公司的股票在事件窗口内存在显著为正的超常收益率,市场对这一事件作出了正向的回应,而且超常收益率主要是由消息公布产生的,不存在消息的提前泄露和内幕交易。     

股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易

本文考察了股权分置改革过程中机构投资者与非流通股股东之间的合谋问题以及合谋的可能途径——内幕交易。文章的基本发现有两个:第一,在控制了影响股改对价水平的主要因素之后,机构投资者对方案的赞成比例与股改对价水平之间存在显著的负相关关系,而全体流通股股东以及大个体流通股股东对方案的赞成比例与对价水平之间呈现显著的正相关关系;第二,机构投资者对方案的赞成比例越高,公司的内幕交易程度也越高,而其他流通股股东的表决意见与内幕交易程度之间没有显著关系。这意味着机构投资者与非流通股股东利用内幕交易进行了合谋,合谋的结果使得非流通股股东得以支付一个较低的对价水平,而机构投资者则通过内幕交易获得额外收益。     

Derivative disclosures and managerial opportunism

Derivatives are increasingly used by managers not only to hedge risks but also to pursue nonhedging activities for fulfilling opportunistic incentives. The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 161 (SFAS 161) requires firms to disclose their objectives and strategies for using derivatives. Using the adoption of this standard, we examine whether and how derivative disclosures influence managerial opportunistic behavior. We employ insider trades and stock price crash risk to capture managerial opportunism. Applying a difference-in-differences research design with hand-collected data on derivative designations, we find that, after the implementation of SFAS 161, derivative users that comply with SFAS 161 experience a significantly greater decrease in both insider trades and stock price crash risk, compared with a matched control sample of nonderivative-users. We further provide evidence to suggest that SFAS 161 curbs managerial opportunism via reducing information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors and enhancing the effectiveness of derivative hedging.