The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

Are people in the SADC region willing to pay more tax to fund public healthcare?

ABSTRACT

For Africa to develop and achieve sustainable development, African governments have to prioritise spending on public health. However, the current spending data shows that health spending is a continuing struggle for African countries. Many researchers have the view that African governments have to collect more tax to spend enough on public healthcare. The question here is what extent people are willing to pay more tax to increase spending on public healthcare? Employing a multilevel regression model on Afrobarometer survey data, this paper examined to what extent individual and country level factors influence people’s willingness to pay more tax to increase spending on public healthcare in 12 Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states. This study found that peoples’ trust in their government is an important determinant of willingness to pay more tax, while factors such as the country’s quality of democracy, economic condition, and current per capita health expenditure have no influence.     

Macroeconomic consequences of state fragility in sub‐Saharan Africa

Are poor macroeconomic outcomes primarily the result of economic policies, or of deeper underlying state fragility problems in sub‐Saharan Africa? We attempt to answer this question by using carefully specified dynamic panel regression techniques to show how state fragility conditions help to explain the differences in the macroeconomic performance of sub‐Saharan African economies, and to identify the most plausible mechanisms of transmission. We find that countries with greater fragility suffer higher macroeconomic volatility and crisis; they also experience weaker growth. When we disaggregate state fragility into its various components, we find that it is the security and social components that have the strongest causal impact on macroeconomic outcomes, while the political component is, at best, weak. Therefore, we conclude that it is state fragility conditions, and not necessarily macroeconomic policies, that are of first‐order importance in explaining the differences in macroeconomic performance for African countries. The knock‐on effects are mostly mediated through the fiscal channel, the aid channel, and the finance channel. Accordingly, we recommend that interventions in fragile states should best focus on exploiting the potential for using fiscal policy, aid, and finance as instruments to improve macroeconomic outcomes in sub‐Saharan Africa.     

EMPIRICAL PERFORMANCE OF GARCH MODELS WITH HEAVY‐TAILED INNOVATIONS

We introduce a new type of heavy‐tailed distribution, the normal reciprocal inverse Gaussian distribution (NRIG), to the GARCH and Glosten‐Jagannathan‐Runkle (1993) GARCH models, and compare its empirical performance with two other popular types of heavy‐tailed distribution, the Student's t distribution and the normal inverse Gaussian distribution (NIG), using a variety of asset return series. Our results illustrate that there is no overwhelmingly dominant distribution in fitting the data under the GARCH framework, although the NRIG distribution performs slightly better than the other two types of distribution. For market indexes series, it is important to introduce both GJR‐terms and the NRIG distribution to improve the models’ performance, but it is ambiguous for individual stock prices series. Our results also show the GJR‐GARCH NRIG model has practical advantages in quantitative risk management. Finally, the convergence of numerical solutions in maximum‐likelihood estimation of GARCH and GJR‐GARCH models with the three types of heavy‐tailed distribution is investigated.     

COMPARING PPP WITH TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF SCHOOLS PROCUREMENT IN IRELAND

Advocates of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) argue that they can deliver public infrastructure more efficiently than traditional procurement through timelier completion and superior value for money. Despite these claims comparative analysis of the performance of both procurement methods has received scant attention in the PPP literature to date. This paper addresses this issue by providing an in‐depth, case‐based comparison of PPP versus traditional procurement in the schools sector in Ireland. Through detailed semi‐structured interviews with key stakeholders and an examination of the available documentation, we assess whether the key objectives of using PPP have been achieved. Overall, we find no evidence that PPP leads to faster delivery of infrastructure when the overall procurement process from contract notice to delivery is accounted for. In addition, we find only limited evidence to suggest that PPP results in better value for money.     

Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents

Some agents are more accurate than others in estimating the best policy. The more accurately an agent estimates a policy's effects, the more he will resist biases, such as bribes from a special interest. Thus, a special interest needs to pay a larger bribe to an accurate agent than to an inaccurate agent. The accurate agent who is biased will then more likely cause harm than does an inaccurate agent who favors the special interest. Therefore, the principal may gain more from controlling biases of an accurate agent than of an inaccurate one. Thus, high ability of public officials may be associated with little corruption.     

Environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers: an application to energy consumption in France

This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality ‘a lot’. Secondly, if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality-correcting role, they benefit all types—although the gains are rather modest. The gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well. Third, setting the environmental tax at its Pigouvian level, rather than its optimal externality-correcting-cum-redistributive level, benefits the high-income group at the expense of the low-income groups. Fourth, nonlinear taxation of polluting goods, and nonlinear commodity taxation in general, is a powerful redistributive mechanism. Fifth, introducing environmental taxes in the current French tax system, with its suboptimal income taxes, results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well-off persons.     

Job growth in early transition: Comparing two paths*

Small start‐up firms are the engine of job creation in early transition. We ask about differences in their growth across two different transition economies: Estonia, which experienced rapid destruction of pre‐existing firms, and the Czech Republic, which reduced the old sector gradually. We find that the majority of job growth corresponds to within‐industry reallocation. The within‐industry growth of small start‐up firms is similar in the two countries, in line with the convergence to Western industry firm‐size distributions. We also find similar patterns in the evolution of wage differentials between start‐ups and old firms and small differences in the extent of low‐wage employment in start‐ups across the two transition paths. JEL Classifications: J2, J3, J4, L1, O1, P2.     

From the margins: globalization with(out) home economics

Pies and peas, noughts and crosses, fish and chips, chicken and egg, teaching and learning, home economics and . . . globalization? In psychotherapy, this simple technique of providing a word and another automatically coming to mind is called free association and some of the internationally accepted pairings are noted above. Do we want ‘home economics’ and ‘globalization’ to have an automatic association? In this paper, I argue that home economics must make a shift from the margins of patriarchy by re‐thinking the ways in which the field is legitimized and positioned if it is to be a key player in taking on the challenges and dilemmas raised by globalization.     

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union.