我国救济性投资的现状、问题及对策

我国救济性投资的救济力度远远低于救济需求,在社会救济意识、救济管理、资金来源、投资形式等方面存在不足,投资增长缓慢,且存在城乡失衡和地区失衡.应创新公民的社会保障观念和思维模式,建立健全救济性投资的管理机制,着力解决救济性投资的不平衡问题,并且投资形式要向着多元化、多层次的方向发展.     

我国保险条款可读性分析及其通俗化研究

我国保险条款晦涩难懂的问题已经在很大程度上制约了我国保险业的健康发展,本文详细剖析了我国保险条款在文字、内容、形式等方面存在的问题,并从我国实际情况出发,指出了当前我国进行保险条款通俗化的迫切性,提出了我国保险条款通俗化的思路构想.     

对陕西省农村社会养老保险供求主体的分析与政府作用研究

陕西是西部的农业大省,农村社会养老保险制度发展缓慢,农村养老保险市场需要寻找供需双方的均衡点,政府作为制度的提供者和政策的制定者,必须在农村社会养老保险制度建立和运营中明确思路,发挥主导作用,以保证陕西省农村养老保险健康、有序地发展。     

The economics of land transfer and title insurance

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor).     

Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.     

Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.     

信息不对称在农业保险中的表现极其防范

信息不对称严重阻碍了农业保险的健康发展，建议通过建立克服农业保险中信息不对称的有效体系，以促进我国农业保险的健康发展。     

相互制农业保险在我国的困境及适用性

相互制保险在农业保险领域有着明显的优势。然而,相互制保险管理制度上的缺陷及其与农业保险的矛盾制约着相互制农业保险的发展。目前,在我国合作意识不强、农村合作经济组织发育不健全的情况下,开展相互制农业保险还有一定困难。因此,要开展相互制农业保险,必须选择合适的范围和地区,并对相互制保险进行制度创新,为相互制农业保险提供财政补贴,建立再保险机制,加强引导,减少行政干预。