Stock Repurchase and the Role of Signaling： A Comparative Analysis between U.S. and China

This paper compares different methods used for stock repurchase and examines the role of signaling in the U.S. and China＇s capital markets. We find that the ways to buyback stocks are very different in the two countries. Most U.S. stocks are repurchased through open market and the signals sent to the market through open market repurchase are getting weaker. Even though stock repurchases are at their early stage in the Chinese stock market and the dominated way to buyback is through a negotiated repurchase agreement for non-floating shares, the power of signaling seems much stronger. Examining stock prices pre- and post-repurchase, we find that stock repurchase records an average abnormal return of 3.42% on the announcement date and 3.24% on the date of actual renurchase.     

Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.     

Using Personal Car Register for Measuring Economic Inequality in Countries with a Large Share of Shadow Economy: Evidence for Latvia

We suggest using information from the state register of personal cars as an alternative indicator of economic inequality in countries with a large share of shadow economy. We illustrate our approach using the Latvian pool of personal cars. Our main finding is that the extent of household economic inequality in Latvia is much larger than officially assumed. According to Eurostat, the officially published estimate of the Gini coefficient for Latvia is 0.374 for 2009, which is much higher than the Gini coefficient value reported for all the 27 EU member countries (0.304), but significantly lower than 0.48 according to our results.     

On post-IPO stock price performance: A comparative analysis of RLBOs and IPOs

This is the first study to examine the post-IPO stock price performance by differentiating between IPOs and three types of RLBOs (i.e. public-to-private (or re-IPOs), division-to-private, and private-to-private deals). We document that public-to-private RLBOs outperform their industry rivals, IPOs, mature firms in comparable industries, and a propensity-score matched control group for up to five years post-offering. Further, we document that, within RLBOs, public-to-private RLBOs, outperform private-to-private and division-to-private RLBOs. We also find support for the underwriter signaling effect for public-to-private RLBOs. Our analysis identifies for the first time what private period restructuring activities contribute to superior post-re-IPO stock price performance. Further, the beneficial effects of private period restructurings are enhanced for deals associated with prestigious underwriters. Our findings suggest that first IPOs and re-IPOs differ substantially in term of post-offer performance, the impact of prestigious underwriters on performance, and performance over time.     

大型零售商收取通道费合理吗?——来自信号传递模型的解释

文章对通道费的相关理论进行了总结,并通过一个包含批发价格和通道费的信号传递模型,分析了非对称信息下通道费的渠道结构优化机制。在零售商的销售成本充分高的情况下,通道费构成了不完全信息动态博弈中剔除劣战略均衡的合约安排的必要条件,能够有效地区别高市场需求和低市场需求的制造商。因此,通道费并不必然是零售商滥用市场势力的工具,在众多的情况下通道费为合理配置货架空间,优化商品流通渠道,以及调整制造商的产品结构提供了有效的信息甄别工具。     

政府会计的逆向选择模型分析

作为国家进行公共财政管理、提高财政透明度的有力手段,政府会计已经日益受到政府和相关人士的重视,但人们的注意似乎都集中在如何建立完善的政府会计体系上,对于"为什么要建立政府会计体系"这一基本的理论却研究很少。本文就以博弈论为理论出发点,建立了政府与纳税人之间的逆向选择模型,讨论了政府和纳税人之间在信息不对称情况下将出现的逆向选择问题,针对这一问题提出两个解决方法——信号传递和信号甄别,结合这两种方法,得出"无论是政府还是纳税人,都对建立完善的政府会计体系有更高的要求"的结论,于是,政府会计才会应运而生。本文试图从博弈论的角度论证政府会计之所以存在的依据。     

基于养殖档案的畜产品供应链质量控制信号博弈分析

针对畜产品供应链质量信息不对称的特点,在提出并论证养殖档案的畜禽质量信号传递功能的基础上,通过构建信号博弈模型,分析了畜产品供应链中畜禽养殖场户与屠宰加工企业质量控制的信号博弈均衡条件及其演变过程。研究结果表明:畜禽养殖场户的虚假养殖档案伪造成本和屠宰加工企业的质量检验成本是决定信号博弈均衡状态及其演变方向的两个关键因素;降低检验成本、增加惩罚额度、加大市场监管力度、提高外部损失额度和增加虚假养殖档案伪造成本,可推进信号博弈均衡状态向有利于畜产品质量改善的方向演变。     

Greenwashing Revisited: In Search of a Typology and Accusation‐Based Definition Incorporating Legitimacy Strategies

Is greenwashing a concept describing companies using misleading communication or is it co‐constructed in the eye of the beholder? By discussing the literature, we find that existing definitions of greenwashing overemphasize the strategic intention to mislead and do not incorporate unjust allegations. Then, by combining signaling theory with legitimacy theory, we frame the communication process of the greenwashing accusation and the emergence of a negative narrative caused by the accusation and its effect on legitimacy. Hence, in this paper we argue that greenwashing epistemologically is constituted in the eye of the beholder , depending on an external accusation. Following this view, the greenwashing accusation is understood as a distortion factor altering the signal reliability of green messages. Based on our conceptual analysis, we provide a conceptual framework introducing a new typology of case‐based greenwashing (greenwashing , false greenwashing , potential greenwashing and no greenwashing ) and the effects of these types on corporate legitimacy. Finally, we propose a revised definition of greenwashing as co‐creation of an external accusation toward an organization with regard to presenting a misleading green message. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Modeling e-loyalty: a moderated-mediation model

ABSTRACT

This work proposes a research model that elaborates upon the development of e-loyalty based on the signaling theory and attachment theory. In the model, e-loyalty is indirectly related to both visual appeal and an e-tailer’s service reputation through the full mediation of trust and affection. At the same time, the relationships between trust and e-loyalty and between affection and e-loyalty are hypothetically moderated by an e-tailer’s service reputation. The proposed hypotheses of this research were empirically tested using data from working professionals in high-tech firms in terms of online retailing. This study surveyed the same research participants at two different time points, one month apart, to verify the theoretical inferences. The empirical findings herein complement the previous literature by presenting how visual appeal and an e-tailer’s service reputation simultaneously influence e-loyalty through various mediating and moderating mechanisms.     

Asymmetric Information,Asset Allocation,and Debt Financing

We analyze a signaling game where firms' financing announcements convey private information about their prospects but a moral hazard problem exists in that managers may suboptimally invest. Consequently, the attempt to address an asymmetric information problem exacerbates moral hazard. The equilibrium recognizes both imperfect information problems. Additionally, the firm must determine how to allocate funds between two technologies differing in cash flow timing and managerial accessibility. We define an above-average firm's comparative advantage as that technology which is most dominant relative to a firm with lesser prospects and show that the resultant equilibria follow the lines of the firm's comparative advantage. Finally, we show that separation may be achieved costlessly, i.e., with no explicit signaling cost.