The development of the group accounts disclosure system in Japan

The Japanese disclosure system of consolidated statements was introduced in 1977 and extensively revised in 1997. The role of the bureaucracy has been significant in these developments and seems to be part of Japan's closed culture. However, other explanations could also be applied. In particular, although Japanese firms opposed such disclosures on the basis of preparation costs, the Japanese government had to modernize the disclosure system, including consolidation, in order to develop the securities market regardless of an individual company's interests.     

Optimal investment with fixed financing costs

Models with a premium on external finance produce counterfactual predictions about liquidity management. We address this shortcoming by introducing a fixed cost of increasing external finance into an otherwise standard investment/financing problem. This additional financial friction is well-motivated by case studies and our analysis shows that it generates more realistic predictions about liquidity management: firms hold external finance and idle cash simultaneously, and may invest an additional dollar of cash flow in liquidity rather than repaying external funds or investing in productive capital. In addition to better fitting the stylized facts about the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of liquidity holding, these results may help shed light on the fragility of estimates of investment–cash flow sensitivities.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

A change in market responses to the environmental management ranking in Japan

This article investigates stock price reactions to the release of the environmental management ranking issued by Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei newspaper) from 1998 to 2005, by using a standard event study methodology. An examination of stock price movements of the top 100 manufacturing companies reveals that stock prices during the sample period did not respond significantly to the release of the ranking within a 3-day event window. However, market responses became significantly positive after 2003, while they were significantly negative in 1999 and 2000. The stock prices of upgraded companies in particular reacted negatively before 2000, but positively after 2002. These results indicate that market reactions were changed between 2001 and 2002, when the Japanese government showed its strong commitment to environmental policies by establishing the Ministry of the Environment and signing the Kyoto Protocol, following a number of legislations.     

独立董事、战略审计与公司绩效

关于独立董事与公司绩效呈现弱相关关系的一个假说性解释是:独立董事对于作为关键绩效驱动因素的公司战略管理过程参与不足。独立董事积极参与公司战略管理的功能定位是战略监督与评价,而战略审计作为正式的战略监督与评价程序,是独立董事深入公司战略管理过程以提高其绩效贡献的有效途径。本文认为,在我国推行独立董事战略审计制度,必须解决独立董事人数与比例、审计委员会设置、独立董事来源与结构以及激励与权益保护等相关问题。     

Media attention and regulatory efficiency of corporate violations: Evidence from China

We examine the influence of media attention on the regulatory efficiency of corporate violations in a restrictive media environment. Using a hand-collected sample of corporate violations in China during 1998–2018, we find that fraudulent firms accompanied by more negative media attention are associated with a higher hazard rate of the violation being investigated and enforced. The effect is not diminished by the political connections of the fraudulent firms and is robust after controlling for potential confounding factors. Our findings suggest that by influencing regulatory efficiency, the media serve as an effective governance mechanism even in markets with strict media control.     

家族企业公司治理文化探析

家族企业已成为我国经济发展中一支不可缺少的有生力量,而公司治理文化将直接影响到家族企业的发展.文章分析了家族企业的公司治理文化的特征、根基及利弊.     

CEO power and annual report reading difficulty

We examine the impact of CEO power on reading difficulty of corporate annual reports. We find that CEO power is positively related to reading difficulty, implying that annual reports of corporations with powerful CEOs are difficult to read and understand. More importantly, we find that the relation between CEO power and reading difficulty is moderated by earnings performance or corporate governance. Additional findings suggest that this relation becomes stronger for firms with lower financial reporting quality or for CEOs with shorter tenure. Our study not only joins the debate on the consequences of powerful CEOs but also uncovers several factors that moderate the relation between CEO power and annual report reading difficulty.     

Corporate social responsibility committees and the use of corporate social responsibility assurance services

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees associate with the external assurance of CSR reports. Specifically, we consider the presence and effectiveness of CSR committees. Using a sample of Australian firms over the period 2004–2016, we show the mere presence of a CSR committee is not related to the external assurance of CSR. However, CSR committee effectiveness is positively related. In addition, firms with higher CSR committee effectiveness are more likely to seek external assurance provided by the Big4 accountancy firms and acquire financial audit and CSR assurance services from the same provider. Taken together, CSR committee effectiveness plays an active role in CSR assurance services. Our results are particularly relevant to those with interests in understanding the demand and choice of external CSR assurance services, as well as the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on these services.