Is allowing trading enough? Making secondary markets in spectrum work

The debate on spectrum reforms has mostly focused on the choice between a property rights and a commons regime. This article argues that moving to a property right system requires careful attention to details in order to avoid that “micro” rather than “macro” factors may prevent efficient trades from taking place. It provides a framework to conduct this assessment, identifies a number of possible concerns and puts forward some solutions.     

Setting licence fees for renewing telecommunication spectrum based on an auction

This paper presents a methodology for setting fees for the renewal or extension of spectrum licences, by using the outcome of an auction for comparable licences but with a different licence period. The methodology is a combination of market and cash flow valuation and consists of two main steps. First, prices for spectrum corresponding to that of the licences to be extended are derived from the auction outcome. Second, the relative value addition of the extension period for the new licensee, compared to the value of the licences auctioned, is derived by using a model for the development of EBITDA for an operator over time. A combination of these two is used to calculate fees that match the opportunity costs of extension. Thus, optimum alignment is achieved with the policy objective of using licence fees only to promote efficient use of spectrum, while avoiding state aid at the same time.     

Bids for the UMTS system: An empirical evaluation of the Italian case

The aim of this paper is to analyze the licensing of the telecommunication spectrum as a public good and the search for equilibrium prices through bilateral bargaining and multilateral bidding. It develops a general model of price setting under dynamic uncertainty and applies it to the Italian auction for Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). The empirical application shows that the model can be used both to determine the base price as well as other desirable characteristics to organize an auction and to better understand, after the auction is closed, what really happened in terms of the critical factors involved. After recalling some basic concepts on spectrum rights and reviewing the general experience with UMTS auctions in Europe, the formal model and its application are presented. The results confirm certain views on the Italian auction, which are widely shared but were never tested before, namely that: (i) given the initial price, the number of licenses offered for the bidding should have been fewer, or alternatively, (ii) given the number of licenses, the base price should have been higher and (iii) the main bidder underpaid for the license. The model also allows us to quantify the bidders’ reservation price and the State and the bidders’ implicit bargaining powers.     

农村资金互助社金融许可证制度的反思与变革——以金融许可证制度的功能为视角

金融许可证具有择优功能、维持金融市场适度竞争功能、优化市场结构功能和公示功能。就农村资金互助社而言,这些功能或无存在之必要,或无实现之可能,金融许可证一定程度上反而成为制约农村资金互助社发展的障碍。为促进农村资金互助社的发展,我国应废除对之实行的金融许可证管理制度,但应当加强业务监管,防止农村资金互助社目标异化而产生的风险。