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排序方式: 共有921条查询结果,搜索用时 78 毫秒
1.
This study endeavors to enhance political marketing literature about the impact of lobbying on firm performance. Our sample is composed of 140 U.S. firms and spans the years 2007–2014 to encompass the 2007–2009 recession and the subsequent recovery period. Our findings indicate that lobbying expenses positively contribute to firm performance. Also, government contracts in both ways, dollar amount and number of government contracts, act as mediators between lobbying expenses and firm performance. In addition, organizational slack moderates the relationship between lobbying expenses and government contracts. The managerial implications suggest that lobbying expenses can be leveraged as a potent tool for firm performance. Firms with larger lobbying efforts acquired both, higher dollar amounts and a greater number of government contracts. 相似文献
2.
Stanley R. Johnson Tigran A. Melkonyan 《American journal of agricultural economics》2003,85(1):216-233
We develop a model explaining the consolidation patterns in the agricultural biotechnology industry. Among different consolidation and cooperation mechanisms, we consider collaborative and licensing agreements, joint ventures, acquisitions, and exchanges of ownership and spin-offs. The key results derive from the benefits of coordinated actions, distinction between transferable and nontransferable payoffs, the substitutability, complementarity, and the importance of the managers' noncontractible investments, and access and expansion of markets. Results from the model are used to examine the cooperation and consolidation activities for four major players in the agricultural biotechnology industry, DuPont , Dow Chemical , Monsanto , and Novartis . 相似文献
3.
Modeling Conditional Yield Densities 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Given the increasing interest in agricultural risk, many have sought improved methods to characterize conditional crop-yield densities. While most have postulated the Beta as a flexible alternative to the Normal, others have chosen nonparametric methods. Unfortunately, yield data tends not to be sufficiently abundant to invalidate many reasonable parametric models. This is problematic because conclusions from economic analyses, which require estimated conditional yield densities, tend not to be invariant to the modeling assumption. We propose a semiparametric estimator that, because of its theoretical properties and our simulation results, enables one to empirically proceed with a higher degree of confidence. 相似文献
4.
Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news. 相似文献
5.
Piotr Zielonka 《International Review of Financial Analysis》2004,13(2):217-225
The present research provides a justification for the popularity of the technical analysis. It finds that financial analysts firmly discriminate between two types of technical signals—those based on typical cognitive biases and “empty” signals that sound like a technical analysis but are without any connotation with psychological inclinations.At the same time that they treat them differently, different analysts rate these items very similarly. These results suggest that the popularity of technical analysis is associated with its relation to the typical cognitive biases of humans. 相似文献
6.
电子商务合同成立与认定刍议 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
随着我国电子商务的加快发展,在理论与实践中,产生了一系列的问题,需要深入研究。电子商务合同与传统的合同制度有不同的特点,尤其是电子商务合同的成立与认定问题。 相似文献
7.
姜明福 《中国高新技术企业评价》2007,(5):205-208,210
随着我国人口老龄化进程的加快,我国空巢老人家庭发展迅速。老年人口已成为我国不可忽视的重要问题之一,如果不及早采取正确的和有效的措施,就会给社会经济发展带来不利的影响。开发和利用老年人力资源实现老有所为,是综合治理人口老龄化的积极对策与战略措施。本文阐述了人口老龄化对我国老年人力资源开发的机遇及挑战,特别论述了老年再就业的可能性和重要性以及因此而产生的社会效应,并对我国的老年人力资源开发工作提出一些建议。 相似文献
8.
Subsidised employment is an important tool of active labour market policies to improve the reemployment chances of the unemployed. Using unusually informative individual data from administrative records, we investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsidised temporary employment implemented in Switzerland: non-profit employment programmes (EP) and a subsidy for temporary jobs (TEMP) in private and public firms. Econometric matching methods show that TEMP is more successful than EP in getting the unemployed back to work. Compared to not participating in any programme, EP and TEMP are ineffective for unemployed who find jobs easily anyway or have a short unemployment spell. For potential and actual long-term unemployed, both programmes may have positive effects, but the effect of TEMP is larger. 相似文献
9.
会计诚信契约的理论框架与实现机制研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
刘建秋 《广东经济管理学院学报》2005,20(4):53-58
会计诚信是一项非正式制度安排,一种隐含契约,也是企业契约主体之间的信任关系表现。按信任的来源分类,会计诚信可以分为基于制度的会计诚信、基于契约的会计诚信与基于信誉的会计诚信三种。提高会计信息质量必须从制度、契约和信誉三方面加强会计诚信契约的履约机制建设。 相似文献
10.
Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Pradeep Agrawal 《Journal of Economics》2002,75(1):33-61
generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort).
The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent
of monitoring.
Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the
agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or
the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts
observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work
under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for
senior managers than for the production workers.
Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997 相似文献