Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Dissertation abstract: Reputational benefits of altruism and altruistic punishment

Recent studies in experimental economics have shown that many people have other-regarding preferences, potentially including preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. It is useful to investigate why people possess such preferences and what functional purpose they might serve outside the laboratory, because evolutionary and social learning perspectives both predict that cooperative sentiments should only exist if they bring benefits that outweigh the costs of other-regarding behavior. Theories of costly signaling suggest that altruistic acts may function (with or without intention) as signals of unobservable qualities such as resources or cooperative intent, and altruists may benefit (possibly unintentionally) from the advertisement of such qualities. After reviewing the theories that could potentially account for the evolution of altruism (Chapter 1), I test some predictions about cooperation derived from costly signaling theory. In Chapter 2, I show that participants in experimental public goods games were more cooperative when they had cues that they could benefit from having a good reputation, and that there was apparently some competition to be the most generous group member. Furthermore, in subsequent trust games, people tended to trust high public goods contributors more than low contributors. Chapter 3 failed to find evidence that granting high status to people makes them more likely to contribute to public goods or punish free-riders, but there was suggestive evidence that physical proximity to the experimenter affected contributions and punishment. In Chapter 4, I found that people tended to trust others who were willing to incur costs to punish those who free-ride on group cooperation provided that such punishment was justified, and men were more punitive than women. In Chapter 5, I show that women find altruistic men more desirable than neutral men for long-term relationships. Together, these results suggest that humans do treat altruism as a signal of willingness to be cooperative. These findings are discussed with respect to the adaptive design of cooperative sentiments as well as the current debate over group selection. Dissertation: Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontarion Currently: Post-Doc, Department of Neurobiology & Behavior, Cornell University     

企业家声誉结构及声誉驱动机理的研究综述

企业家声誉是企业赢得竞争优势的关键要素,但在新的时代背景下,现有声誉理论对企业家声誉的研究远未成熟。为此,本文简述了声誉理论的宏观、微观和中观三个层面的研究成果,并在此基础上,对企业家声誉结构和企业家声誉驱动机制的认识发展进行了综述和探讨,本文的研究结论对于企业家声誉理论研究的深化和实践探索具有较好的借鉴意义。     

Reputational Herding in Financial Markets: A Laboratory Experiment

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat [2008], career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment behavior, but not investors' ability types. Thereby, reputational incentives may arise endogenously. We find that a sizable fraction of investors follows an established trend even in a setting where there are no reputational incentives. In a setting where there are reputational concerns, they do not seem to create substantial herd behavior.     

信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例

本文使用网上拍卖交易数据,就卖者信誉对市场交易的影响进行了实证研究。我们发现,卖者的信誉评价一方面影响物品成交的价格,另一方面还对物品拍卖成功的概率有着显著的正面影响;但相对来说,卖者的信誉评价对后者的效果比对前者要更显著。这是本文的主要发现。该结果验证了在一个没有政府干预、近乎自由放任的“虚拟”市场上信誉机制的积极作用。     

On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model

This paper studies symmetry among countably infinitely many agents who randomly enter into a stochastic process, one for each period. Upon entry, they observe only the current period signal and try to draw inference about the underlying state governing the stochastic process. We show that there exist random entry models under which agents are ex post symmetric. That is, all agents have identical posterior belief about the underlying states, although they are not ex ante symmetric. The form of the posterior belief is uniquely pinned down by ex post symmetry and a stationarity condition. Our results provide a common prior foundation for the model studied in Liu and Skrzypacz (2014).     

Exploring the links among corporate social responsibility,reputation, and performance from a multi-dimensional perspective

This study examines the links among corporate social responsibility (CSR), reputation, and performance in hotel companies from a multidimensional perspective. Data were collected from 322 hotels in China and partial least squares equation modelling (PLS-SEM) was employed for a causal-predictive analysis. Study results reveal that CSR practices influence hotel reputation as seen from both international and local perspectives. CSR and reputation influence performance dimensions (accounting-based performance, market-based performance, and non-financial performance) differently. The research findings offer specific theoretical and practical implications for hotel managers.     

证券分析师利益冲突行为的“前因”与“后果”——来自上证A股的经验证据

本文选用我国上证A股的证券分析师投资评级和股票收益率相关数据(2010.04.30-2011.04.30),对我国证券分析师利益冲突行为的影响因素以及证券分析师投资评级的绩效进行实证研究。结果表明:承销商分析师相对于非承销商分析师的投资建议更为乐观,且券商的承销和经纪业务对证券分析师利益冲突行为有显著性影响;券商声誉和分析师上年声誉对证券分析师的股票投资评级存在明显的抑制效应;积极性的投资评级和分析师本年的声誉与分析师所荐股票的短期超额收益率呈正相关关系。     

集体声誉下最低质量标准的福利效应

本文针对集体声誉行业的特点构建两阶段博弈模型,从竞争效应和质量效应两个方面系统考察了集体声誉下最低质量标准规制的福利效应.结果发现,最低质量标准通常具有的反竞争效应在集体声誉行业并不存在,适度并偏高的标准在提高质量水平的同时反而会增加行业当中的企业数量和改善社会福利.最后,结合我国乳品新国标的例子,对运用最低质量标准规制解决我国集体声誉行业普遍存在的质量问题提出了政策建议