基于Stackelberg均衡的第三方物流分包质量合同模型

如何管理、控制分包商的运作质量,使之符合第三方物流服务需求方的质量标准,本文在AlfredssonM构建的第三方物流提供者与分包商之间的Nash均衡模型的基础上,从第三方物流提供者与分包商的决策行为出发,提出了基于stackelberg均衡的第三方物流服务分包质量合同模型,并比较了第三方物流提供者和分包商对Nash均衡博弈结构和stackelberg博弈结构的决策取向。     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

中国外汇储备投资组合选择——基于外汇储备循环路径的内生性分析

本文从中美两国经济的本质性差异出发,通过刻画中国外汇储备对外投资的"循环路径",构建了包括央行、金融市场和实体经济的斯塔克尔伯格及古诺模型,进而模拟出中国外汇储备对外投资对本国经济的间接贡献、合意的外汇储备投资组合,以及最优外汇储备投资规模。研究结果表明,中国外汇储备投资于美国风险资产的规模将影响外汇储备间接转化为美国对中国FDI的比例。同时,中国央行外汇储备规模及投资策略对危机时期的反应不足。改变外汇储备投资收益的主要方法包括降低居民的相对风险回避系数,通过政策引导促进居民消费,以及大力发展中国金融市场,降低对美国金融市场的依赖程度。     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.      

Optimizing the credit term decisions in supply chain finance

We study a credit term determination problem in the context of a supplier-buyer supply chain. The supplier's credit term decision is simultaneously made with its production and inventory decisions, and most importantly, it is impacted by the buyer's order quantity. We present a new game-theoretic framework to model this problem, which captures the interaction between the supplier's credit term decision and the buyer's order decision in a multi-period setting. An exact method based on nonlinear programming is implemented to obtain the optimal solutions. We apply our methodologies on a real world case. The computational results show that our approach significantly outperforms the heuristics with fixed credit terms, and either a short or a long credit term can be sub-optimal for the supplier in profitability. Our work offers the first data-driven model and solution approach that assists purchasing and supply managers to make optimal dynamic credit term decision in conjunction with production, ordering and inventory decisions in a game-theoretic setting.     

需求与生产成本扰动下的供应链最优定价订货模型

文章分析了供应链运作过程中由于突发事件引起的各种扰动,构建了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的单周期单一产品供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型。在这个模型中,假设需求函数是指数函数,而生产成本函数为严格凸的两元一次函数,将订货量及其他影响生产成本的扰动因素引入模型,分析了不同情况下的供应链最优定价订货策略,并对各种结果进行了分析。结果表明,扰动发生后,供应链的定价、订货及收益均会发生变化。供应链将扰动带来的部分成本转嫁到消费者身上,供应商和零售商需要重新确立新的合作契约以确保供应链有序平稳的运行。     

完全信息动态条件下企业总成本领先战略探究

首先,从迈克尔.波特教授的著作中引入总成本领先战略;接着,从博弈论斯坦克尔伯格模型出发,来建立所要分析问题的一般化模型,并分析一般化的完全信息动态模型得到均衡解。在结论分析中,引入要讨论的总成本领先战略,通过对比分析先动的企业和跟随的企业在采取成本领先的时候其市场的份额和利润,得到讨论的结论;先动的企业采取成本领先可以获得行业竞争优势,跟随企业在采取足够低的成本领先的前提下,也可以获得更高的市场份额和利润空间,从而可以获得竞争优势。     

基于Bertrand模型的区域港口双寡头定价策略

基于Bertrand模型的数理分析研究了区域港口双寡头的最优定价策略,指出双寡头在定价策略上的合作有利于提高双方的价格和利润。当寡头存在强弱之分时,强势的寡头定价高一些,弱势的寡头定价低一些,在双方价格的纳什均衡点,双方可以获得最大化的均衡利润。并以上海港与宁波-舟山港为案例进行了实证分析。