Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2005–2006. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Global competition and cooperation in the electronics industry: the case of X-ray equipment, 1900–1970

The electronics industry is often regarded by scholars as an example of a sector driven by endless technological innovation and major competition between a few large companies, thus embodying the common view whereby the free market leads firms to innovate. On the other hand, some business historians have also emphasised that, since the beginning of the twentieth century, most of these companies were engaged in various international cartel agreements. The business and economic history literature on this industry reveals a clear-cut divide between the inter-war years and the post-war era. In this paper, however, we argue that technical and commercial cooperation between large electronics companies continued in various forms despite the spread of anti-trust policies after 1945. In this case study, we explore the global X-ray equipment industry from its beginnings around 1900 to the advent of the CT scanner in the early 1970s. The paper focuses on Siemens and Philips, the two largest manufacturers of radiological equipment. It demonstrates that both companies pursued their commercial and technical cooperation at least until the 1970s, although it was much less overt as during the interwar years.     

Jokowi's First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics

When President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, he promised to usher in a new style of politics, generating optimism among many Indonesians that his government would enthusiastically promote reform. Yet Jokowi has since placed greater value on realpolitik than on reform, as evidenced by his choice of cabinet members, his response to the controversy surrounding senior police officer Budi Gunawan, and his handling of attempts by the police and others to weaken Indonesia's respected Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article shows that Jokowi failed to deliver on his promises of reform largely owing to a combination of personal and external factors. He failed to show leadership on anticorruption and human-rights issues, for example—in part because he prefers economic development over democratic reform, but also because he is not immune to the oligarchic politics that dominate Indonesia's political life and promote the interests of Indonesia's elite.     

Serious cartel conduct,criminalisation and evidentiary standards: Lessons from the Coal Vend case of 1911 in Australia

The criminalisation of anti-competitive behaviour such as price fixing has long been a feature of US antitrust law. Some European countries have introduced criminal penalties for price fixing while in others the matter is under debate. Australia introduced such laws in 2009. Of critical importance when considering criminalisation is the evidentiary standard expected in criminal prosecutions. A century ago, in the Coal Vend case, the High Court of Australia broke new evidentiary ground in applying forensic accounting and economic methods to examine price fixing. Subsequently overturned, much could still be learnt by policy makers and competition agencies from this case.     

Industry associations and non-competitive behaviour in Australian wool marketing: Evidence from the Melbourne Woolbrokers' Association, 1890–1939

From the 1890s the sale of Australian wool was organised through a series of regionally based associations of wool selling brokers and wool buyers. They engaged in cartel-type behaviour by price fixing and exclusive dealing. We ask the question whether the wool selling brokers exploited their monopoly power to thefull in setting fees and charges paid by the growers and buyers. Association records provide data on the pricing structure and rationale for changes. We surmise that the existence of the cartel lifted prices above competitive levels. However, the pricing behaviour was moderated to a strong form of limit pricing.     

Exploration of OPEC and oil world market

In this article, the author will analyze the phenomena of soaring oil price today, how it happened, and find the reasons for the creation of OPEC, how it conducted its affairs in the market, and the economic factors that influenced Dr. Yamani in managing the organization effectively for a fairly long period of time to attain by the goals set out by him. I will apply the economic theories of market models, substitutability of products, the concept of price leadership etc. to explain the situation in the oil market and OPEC＇s function, which also illustrates current market behavior in the business world.     

On the inauspicious incentives of the scholar-level h-index: an economist’s take on collusive and coercive citation

Faculty renewal, promotion, tenure, merit and awards are typically tied to scholarship performance, which is often measured in several ways, among them citation-based metrics like the scholar-level h-index. With the relatively recent developments of ‘one-touch’ Google Scholar citation tracking and Harzing’s Publish or Perish Software, it is simple to monitor and potentially game one’s personal h-index. This article explores this possibility by assessing the incentives embedded in the scholar-level h-index through the lens of cartels, uncertainty, insurance and game-theoretic best response.     

Reciprocity,associability and cartelisation: Organisational development of the New Zealand Shipowners’ Federation, 1906–1960s

But for the reciprocity garnered early by the New Zealand Shipowners’ Federation, its organisational life-chances would have been curtailed. Reciprocity-based cooperation sustained the Federation until member bonds gelled and strong membership incentives could be offered. Although the Federation subsequently fixed prices and spawned a shipping cartel, forceful external constraints limited its ability to extract economic rents from shippers and prompted it to enhance member efficiency. While this end state is not uncommon, the Federation's atypical developmental pathway affords two insights. Firstly, reciprocity can function as a ‘starting mechanism’ for industry associations with few selective incentives. Secondly, government regulations can evoke cartel-like behaviour by an association at the same time as they limit its ability to raise prices.     

Cotton: ‘The Most Studied of all Manufactures’

This article offers an account of European cartelisation in the rayon industry, with a particular emphasis on the inter-war period. It adds to the debate about the role of European cartels in the multinationalisation of European big business. While showing that cartelisation went hand in hand with rapid growth and a boom in foreign direct investment in the 1920s, it argues that, contrary to a widely held view, the collapse of the international financial system, the smooth working of which was a sine qua non for the functioning of a European sales agency, hindered international cartelisation in the 1930s.