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1.
Federico Echenique 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):903-905
Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice
of the joint strategy space.
Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 相似文献
2.
Federico Echenique 《Games and Economic Behavior》2004,46(2):348-364
I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games. 相似文献
3.
4.
Benoit Dostie 《Applied economics letters》2018,25(19):1364-1367
In this article, we investigate the presence of possible complementarities between investments in information technology (IT) and firm-sponsored training using economy-wide longitudinal representative workplace-level data. Since information on the firm’s capital stock is often missing in such representative data, we match our workplace records to tax data to construct measures of the firm’s capital stock. We find some evidence of positive complementarities between investments in human capital and IT, suggesting that on-the-job training can also have a positive impact on productivity when complemented with investments in CAD or other technologies. 相似文献
5.
We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities. 相似文献
6.
中英两国经贸往来历史悠久,但两国双边贸易仅占两国对外贸易额的10%左右。笔者利用RCA指数、IIT指数以及TCI指数分析中英货物贸易的比较优势和贸易互补性,指出中英货物贸易今后的发展方向。 相似文献
7.
Hiroshi Uno 《Journal of Mathematical Economics》2011,47(6):728-732
This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player. 相似文献
8.
This paper studies supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary (finite) type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the designer may have to use Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, because ex-post implementation may not be possible. We propose direct (Bayesian) mechanisms that are robust to certain forms of bounded rationality while controlling for equilibrium multiplicity. In quasi-linear environments with informational and allocative externalities, we show that any Bayesian mechanism that implements a social choice function can be converted into a supermodular mechanism that also implements the original decision rule. The proposed supermodular mechanism can be chosen in a way that minimizes the size of the equilibrium set, and we provide two sets of sufficient conditions to this effect. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementation in unique equilibrium. 相似文献
9.
We present a simple model where complementarities between wages and demand due to factor market distortions can make a transition economy worse off from trade. Prior to trade, a virtuous circle prevails: high wages in industry support a high demand for indivisible industrial goods, which in turn supports high wages. However, factor market distortions in the transition economy create a comparative disadvantage in industry. Opening up to trade results in the import of indivisibles and a fall in manufacturing wages, breaking this virtuous circle. Consequently, trade liberalization without structural reform can have serious adverse effects in a transition economy. 相似文献
10.
This paper highlights the cross-country spread of self-fulfilling financial crises through an informational channel. It sets up a two-country framework of investment with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about economic fundamentals. Each market may be subject to sudden stops, triggered by agents preemptively withdrawing their investments for fear others do so. After observing a massive capital outflow from one country, agents downgrade common fundamentals, and therefore have higher requirements regarding factors specific to the other country. This in turn may induce a crisis in the latter, which is not justified by idiosyncratic events or economic interdependence. 相似文献