Income and substitution effects of fiscal policy on work effort

The focus of this paper is twofold. First, it examines the impact on work effort of changes in government purchases financed with lump‐sum taxes, in a neoclassical framework, with respect to four industrialised countries. Second, it reconsiders the expenditure–work effort relationship in a broader conceptual context that allows for distortionary taxation and a disaggregation of the income and substitution effects. Our findings are shown to cast doubt on the empirical plausibility of the prevailing (neoclassical and New Keynesian) models which seem to rely heavily on the lump‐sum tax notion, thus ignoring the substitution effects of distortionary taxation.     

THEORIES OF CHOICE UNDER IGNORANCE AND UNCERTAINTY

Abstract. In this paper, Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty, and its significance for economic analysis are examined. The paper consists of a survey of some recent developments on the theory of choice under uncertainty and some applications of these theories to problems for which Bayesian Decision Theory has not proved entirely satisfactory. Two problems are examined in detail. The first is that of finance and insurance and the second is that of risktaking behaviour with special emphasis on lotteries.     

Are Social Costs the Outcome of Struggles over Truth?

Abstract:

This article critically examines the institutional economics theory of social costs by way of reviewing The Dark Places of Business Enterprise: Reinstating Social Costs in Institutional-Economics (2019). In particular, the article assesses the proposal to re-root institutional economics in the theoretical synthesis of “Veblen-Kapp-Mirowski” to better understand the social costs of neoliberalism. One of the findings is that while such a synthesis seems justified on the grounds of significant commonalities and the merits of deeper insights, it nevertheless runs into difficulties due to divergent philosophical foundations. One of the conclusions is that further philosophic clarification is needed on how an alternative economy would understand the relationship between “social costs” and Truth.     

Do Shareholders Have Obligations to Stakeholders?

The question of whether, and to what extent, business managers have obligations to stakeholders has been the principal theme in much of recent business ethics literature. The question of whether shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, however, has not been addressed sufficiently. I provide some needed attention to this matter by examining the positions of shareholders in the contemporary world of investing. Their positions are considerably different than that often envisioned by business ethicists and economists where shareholders determine the directions of corporate activities through their voting decisions. Typical contemporary investors rarely control corporate activities. If they own corporate securities directly, generally they own too small an interest to exercise control. And, in most cases, they do not even own corporate securities directly, but, rather, own shares in funds. Because of the positions of shareholders today, it is highly questionable whether most have obligations to stakeholders. This has a significant implication for business managers. Whether or not shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, business managers have a greater obligation to educate shareholders about how corporate activities affect stakeholders. I provide a justification for that obligation and comment on how business managers might begin to fulfill it.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:
Nielsen, S. B., Incentives and Redistribution in the Swedish Welfare State: The Swedish Tax Reform
Hannesson, R., Principles of Economic Growth     

Environmental Sustainability Versus Profit Maximization: Overcoming Systemic Constraints on Implementing Normatively Preferable Alternatives

There is a systemic condition inherent in contemporary markets that compel managers not to pursue more morally preferable initiatives if those initiatives will require actions that conflict with profit maximization. Normative arguments for implementing morally preferable practices within the existing system fail because they are insufficient to counter-act the systemic conditions affecting decision-making that is focused on maximizing profit as the primary operational value. To overcome this constraint we must elevate a more normatively preferable value, ‚ideal environmental sustainability,’ to the level of being the primary filtering value through which other competing values are evaluated, prioritized, and implemented. In order for this to occur in practice, a change must be made relative to the laws, rules, and regulations that define and guide the market. This can be done by suitably defining the epistemic constraint of impartiality utilizing Rawls’ notion of a ‚veil of ignorance’ as a heuristic device. John K. Alexander is an Adjunct at Grand Valley State University (Allendale MI) and Grand Rapids Community College (Grand Rapids MI). Areas of interest include Socratic, philosophy, business/organizational ethics, health care ethics, and philosophy of management. He has published papers in HEC Forum, Teaching Philosophy, Philosophy of Management, Journal of Business Ethics and Business Ethics Quarterly. Prior to becoming a visiting professor at GVSU in 2001, he had thirty-five years experience working and managing in foundries.     

Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield mutual benefits but only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by ex ante committing to the quality of his information, and the disclosure rule. We show that even when the acquisition of perfect information is costless, the principal may optimally acquire imperfect information when his own action eliminates the agent's incentive to take action against the risk.     

Ecological Structure and Functions of Biodiversity as Elements of Its Total Economic Value

Rational economic decisions regarding theconservation of biodiversity require the considerationof all the benefits generated by this naturalresource. Recently a number of categories of values(inherent value, contributory value, indirect value,infrastructure value, primary value) have beendeveloped, especially in the literature of EcologicalEconomics, which, besides the individual andproductive benefits of biodiversity, also include theutilitarian relevance of the ecological structure andfunctions of biodiversity in the, so-called, totaleconomic value. For the question of including theecological structure and functions of biodiversity inthe total economic value it is of crucial importanceto note, that these categories of values are not onlyterminologically different, but also relate todifferent ecological levels of biodiversity and – mostimportantly – to specific complementary relationships– between species, between elements of ecologicalstructures and between ecological functions and theircontribution to human well-being. This paper analysesthese complementary relationships, discusses theirimplications for the total economic value ofbiodiversity and draws conclusions for decision makingin environmental policy.     

Monitored by your friends,not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.     

The Role of the DS/AHP in Identifying Inter-Group Alliances and Majority Rule Within Group Decision Making

DS/AHP is a nascent method of multi-criteria decision-making, based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence and indirectly the Analytic Hierarchy Process. It is concerned with the identification of the levels of preference that decision makers have towards certain decision alternatives (DAs), through preference judgements made over a number of different criteria. The working result from a DS/AHP analysis is the body of evidence (BOE), which includes a series of mass values that represent the exact beliefs in the best DA(s) existing within certain subsets of DAs. This paper considers the role of DS/AHP as an aid to group decision-making, through the utilisation of a distance measure (between BOEs). Here, the distance measure enables the identification of the members of the decision-making group who are in most agreement, with respect to the judgements they have individually made. The utilisation of a single linkage dendrite approach to clustering elucidates an appropriate order to the aggregation of the judgements of the group members. This develops the DS/AHP method as a tool to identify inter-group alliances, as well as introduce a ‘majority rule’ approach to decision-making through consensus building.