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1.
Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists. 相似文献
2.
Kenji Fujiwara; 《Bulletin of economic research》2024,76(1):147-166
This paper makes comparative statics in a model in which oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive firms that are heterogeneous in productivity compete. We demonstrate that (i) entry of oligopolistic incumbents, (ii) reduction in entry cost of monopolistically competitive entrants, and (iii) market size expansion improve the average productivity in the whole economy. However, (i) and (iii) raise welfare, but (ii) may lower welfare because of the presence of oligopolistic firms. 相似文献
3.
Xingtang Wang;Leonard F. S. Wang; 《Bulletin of economic research》2024,76(2):470-487
In this paper, we assume that the domestic public firm competes in the market with a foreign private firm that cares about consumer surplus and the domestic government imposes tariffs on foreign firm. We aim to analyze the influence of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) level of foreign firm on privatization and tariff policy. It shows that if the government implements a privatization policy for the domestic public firm, the optimal degree of privatization decreases in the CSR level of foreign firm. Under the optimal privatization policy, if the product differentiation is relatively small, the equilibrium tariff increases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is relatively large, the equilibrium tariff decreases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is moderate, the relationship between the equilibrium tariff and CSR level is an inverted U-shape. We further consider the policy implications under sequential moves of firms. 相似文献
4.
Rodney Beard 《Bulletin of economic research》2015,67(4):336-345
In this note oligopoly with iso‐elastic demand is analysed. Unlike previous studies we consider general iso‐elastic demand rather than the case of unit elasticity. An n‐firm Nash‐Cournot equilibrium for the case of heterogeneous constant marginal costs is derived. The main result is a closed‐form solution that shows the dependency of the equilibrium on the elasticity of demand and the share of industry costs. The result has applications to a wide range of areas in oligopoly theory by allowing comparisons across markets with different elasticities of demand. 相似文献
5.
Johan Willner 《Empirica》2008,35(5):449-464
This contribution analyses a market with an upstream bottleneck monopoly and a downstream activity that may either be vertically
integrated or separated. Separation always reduces the consumer surplus, and the total surplus unless there are large cost
reductions. Downstream competition from a public or private network monopoly would crowd out other firms, also when public
ownership is associated with more modest objectives than welfare-maximisation. A market is therefore less likely to remain
a mixed oligopoly than without vertical relations. However, private firms would survive in a moderately welfare-improving
mixed oligopoly with cross-subsidisation and access charges equal to marginal costs.
相似文献
| Johan WillnerEmail: |
6.
In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of an environmental tax to pollution, a production subsidy to a domestic eco-industry, and an import tariff on environmental goods (EGs) in a two-country model where the home country imports EGs from the foreign country. Home and foreign firms that produce EGs engage in Cournot competition. We then assume that the number of the home local firms which produce EGs is constant, but that of the foreign firms is variable. Our main findings are as follows: (I) The optimal environmental tax level may be lower than the Pigouvian level even if the tax has a positive impact on the output of EGs produced by a domestic firm. (II) The optimal tariff level may be positive when the country implements the first best policy combination in a closed economy regarding the environmental tax and the subsidy. (III) The optimal subsidy level may be positive, and then the subsidy may be substitutive for the import tariff on EGs. 相似文献
7.
Mayra Rebolledo 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(8):815-825
In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm. 相似文献
8.
Annika Herr 《The German Economic Review》2011,12(4):422-437
Abstract. Hospital markets are often characterized by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of heterogeneous objectives of hospitals on quality differentiation, profits and overall welfare in a price‐regulated duopoly with exogenous symmetric locations. In contrast to other studies on mixed duopolies, this paper shows that, in this framework, privatization of the public hospital may increase overall welfare. This holds if the public hospital is similar to the private hospital or less efficient and competition is low. The main driving force is the single‐regulated price which induces under‐provision (over‐provision) of quality of the more (less) efficient hospital compared with the first best. However, if the public hospital is sufficiently more efficient and competition is fierce, a mixed duopoly outperforms both a private and a public duopoly due to an equilibrium price below (above) the price of the private (public) duopoly. This medium price discourages over‐provision of quality of the less efficient hospital and – together with the non‐profit objective – encourages an increase in quality of the more efficient public hospital. 相似文献
9.
Shoji Haruna 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(1):89-101
We employ a three-stage game model with cost-reducing research and development (R&D) that is subject to spillovers to consider the problem of excess entry under free-entry equilibrium relative to the social optimum. Firms choose to enter or exit a market in the first stage, choose R&D in the second stage and output in the final stage. Results show that there is socially inefficient or excessive entry in equilibrium. However, we uniquely demonstrate that research spillovers hold the key to whether established results regarding socially inefficient entry hold. Specifically, excessive entry occurs as long as research spillovers are relatively small, but this is not necessarily the case with large spillovers. Some policy implications are discussed. 相似文献
10.
Considering the licensing of a drastic cost-reducing innovation by an outside innovator in an n-firm Cournot oligopoly, we show that when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties, there are either n − 1 or n optimal licensing policies. 相似文献