会计信息质量检查、董事联结与财务重述

基于财务重述视角,考察会计信息质量检查制度的直接治理和间接治理效应。研究发现：会计信息质量检查显著降低被公告公司财务重述概率,也会降低与被公告公司存在内部董事联结关系(简称“内部董事联结”)公司的财务重述概率,但对与被公告公司存在外部董事联结关系(简称“外部董事联结”)公司的财务重述概率无显著影响。强化媒体报道和内部控制质量是缓解会计信息质量检查在外部董事联结中间接治理失效的有效措施;会计信息质量检查监管力度加大会进一步降低被公告公司以及内部董事联结公司财务重述概率。     

中国证券市场年报补丁公司特征研究

在上市公司午报披露之后，屡屡可见公司对年报的各类补充公告与更正公告（即年报补丁），年报朴丁不仅受到媒体的强烈抨击，也为监管部门所关注。本文选取发布2001～2003年年报补丁的公司作为研究样本，并分年度、行业、公司规模选取配对样本，考察补丁公司的经济特征，研究表明，相对配对样本而言，补丁公司的业绩较差，公目的总资产增长较快，较少设置审计委员会，且审计质量较差。     

审计师行业专长、产品市场竞争与财务重述——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以2007~2012年我国 A 股上市公司为样本,对审计师行业专长与财务重述的关系,以及产品市场竞争程度对两者关系的影响进行实证研究。结果表明：审计师行业专长有助于降低财务重述发生的概率;产品市场竞争则削弱了审计师行业专长对财务重述行为的抑制作用。     

盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素研究——基于我国2004-2010年数据的经验分析

本文以2004-2010年盈余重述为样本,检验了我国盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素。根据重述披露的时点选择特征,首次提出聚合重述和分离重述概念。研究发现,年报的利好消息或非利好消息对盈余重述负面影响的"抵减效应"或"加剧效应"都十分显著;剔除年报影响的分离重述的市场反应显著为-3%。研究还发现,相对于被动重述,主动重述被认为是"主动说真话"的表现,具有"坦白从宽"的效果;重述追溯调整的幅度、公司盈利能力、财务风险和债务水平,都会显著影响重述公告时的市场反应程度。     

政治关联、财务年报恶意补丁与债务融资契约——基于民营上市公司实际控制人政治身份的实证研究

笔者采用2003年～2008年中国民营上市公司为样本,实证分析了实际控制人政治身份、财务年报恶意补丁出现几率及对债务融资契约的影响,发现上市公司实际控制人具备越高级别的政治身份,则上市公司发布恶意财务年报补丁的现象越少;上市公司发布了恶意财务年报补丁,则下年贷款规模明显下降,但是上市公司实际控制人的政治身份对上述负面影响有明显减弱,说明上市公司实际控制人具有的政治关联增强了上市公司出于维护潜在竞争优势的自我约束治理,从而增强了债务诚信,促进了债务契约签订.     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Can Management Turnover Restore the Financial Statement Credibility of Restating Firms? Further Evidence

This paper investigates the association between management turnover following financial restatements and the probability of subsequent restatements. We find that restating firms that replace management (CEO and/or CFO) are more likely to restate their financial statements again. We also find that subsequent restatements are mainly attributable to the new management. Overall, our results suggest that management turnover following restatements may not be an effective mechanism to remediate financial restatements, but the change to a new management results in a greater possibility of lower earnings quality (i.e., higher probability of subsequent financial restatements and accruals‐based earnings management). Our study supports prior literature's findings that the change in the top management leads to organizational instability and higher accounting information risk. Our findings have implications for internal decisionmaking with regard to top executive replacement.     

声誉激励、财务重述与审计费用

选取2001—2016年深沪两市主板上市公司为研究样本,实证检验财务重述对审计费用的影响。结果表明：财务重述与审计费用显著正相关,发生财务重述的公司审计费用显著高于没有财务重述的公司;发生财务重述的公司具有变更事务所和购买审计意见的动机倾向,行业竞争激烈加剧了事务所间的恶意竞争,事务所有可能蓄意降低审计费用招揽有财务重述的低端公司客户;由于声誉激励效应,声誉良好的大规模事务所对财务重述的公司所收取的审计费用显著升高,形成事务所竞争的“马太效应”。