Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects

This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura (2005). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership.This paper was previously circulated under the title “Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with Induced Effects”. The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima for helpful comments. The authors would also like to thank Alistair Munro and two anonymous referees providing detailed comments and suggestions. This research was partially supported by Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second-named author was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) (2), 16310118.     

财政补贴改革刍论

财政补贴是国家宏观调控的杠杆之一,但是,目前补贴不规范,财政补贴数额大、项目繁杂,补贴效果‘异化’,加大了社会不公。为了强化财政补贴杠杆功能,提高财政补贴效益,必须按照建立公共财政的要求,本着满足公共需要原则、弹性补贴制度原则和补贴方式间接化原则,改变“一刀切”和补贴刚性的局面,确保采暖费收支合理化,取消肉食、副食品、粮食等价格补贴,改革国有企业的亏损补贴制度。     

矫枉何须过正--评美国《2000年持续性倾销与补贴补偿法》

2000年底，美国国会通过了《持续性倾销与补贴补偿法》(CDSOA)，依据该法，海关征收的反倾销、反补贴税将以补偿的形式分配给受影响的国内生产者。CDSOA借维护公平贸易之名，行保护主义之实，不但缺乏经济上的合理性，也违背了美国依WT0协定承担的国际义务，从而引起了各国的声讨。     

美国农业补贴政策的演变趋势分析

从1933年第一部系统的农业法开始实行以来,美国先后出台了数十个有关农业补贴的法律,对农业进行了长期高强度的补贴,形成了有特色的补贴体系.     

政府补贴是我国发展农业保险的重要保障——来自我国农业保险试点模式的调研报告

新一轮农业保险试点形成了“安信模式”、“安华模式”、“互助制模式”、“共保体”模式和“安盟模式”等5种模式。从这5种模式运行看,政府补贴是发展农业保险的重要保障,经济发达地区政府补贴多,运行就比较好;经济欠发达地区,政府补贴少,运行就比较困难。建议政府明确采取补贴促进农业保险发展的态度,并加大政府补贴的力度。     

城市生活垃圾资源化政府最优补贴博弈分析

城市生活垃圾资源化能够带来巨大的经济效益、环境效益与社会效益,是贯彻国家绿色发展理念的必经之路。城市生活垃圾资源化体系的持续发展需要政府补贴作为保障,减少资源化产品与同类非资源化产品的价格差异,弥补相关企业投入产出不匹配的矛盾。本文基于社会福利最大化理论,将政府补贴作为决策变量,构建各利益主体之间的价格博弈模型,确定政府最优补贴额度和其他主体的最优决策,并根据结论提出相关建议。研究表明:要实现整体效益最大化,政府需要在不同环节采取不同的补贴方式与补贴额度。     

粮食直接补贴面临的问题及对策研究

粮食直接补贴是我国2004年粮食流通体制改革的主要内容之一。直补经过四个阶段的探索和改革,在增加农民收入、保障国家粮食安全等方面取得良好效应。但改革是对政府、企业、农民三者之间利益关系的重大调整,在补贴方法、标准、资金等制度设计和操作过程中还存在很多需要研究的问题。因此,进一步深化改革,尤其是建立产销区间的直补资金转移机制非常重要。     

城市公共设施供给中的融资创新——一种基于政府付费或补贴的资产证券化方式

城市政府当期财政难以满足未来城市建设中的公共设施需求,城市发展需要公共融资创新."私人生产、政府付费或补贴、公众消费"模式是城市公共设施融资中一种吸引私人投资的较好模式.在该模式基础上,提出了一种基于政府付费或补贴的资产证券化创新方式,阐述了该方式的运用范围、基本结构和运作流程,并分析了该方式在城市建设中运用的基本条件.     

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.     

Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency

In an earlier article in this journal, Sefton and Yavas (1995) concluded that subsidizing a monopoly multiple listing service (MLS) can be efficient when the curvature of the representative consumer's demand function leads to overshifting. This paper extends their analysis to a multiple-consumer demand model. It shows that, for the generalized demand configuration considered here, in general, there is no Pareto superior MLS subsidy supportable by nondiscriminatory MLS consumer taxes when the Pareto ranking is imposed without the Hicks–Kaldor compensation principle.