Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest

Rating agencies produce ratings used by investors, but obtain most of their revenue from issuers, leading to a conflict of interest. We employ a unique data set on the use of non-rating services, and the associated payments, in India, to test if this conflict affects ratings quality. Agencies rate issuers that pay them for non-rating services higher (than agencies not hired for such services). Such issuers also have higher default rates. Both effects are increasing in the amount paid. These results suggest that issuers which hire agencies for non-rating services receive higher ratings despite having higher default risk.     

Relief aid stocking decisions under bilateral agency cooperation

We aim to quantify the benefits of cooperation between humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stocking decisions. We consider two agencies that stock the same type of relief item at different locations prone to individual disaster risks and agree to transship the shortage amount from available stocks in case of a disaster. We incorporate the disaster risk to the Newsvendor model by conditioning the stock quantity decisions on the event that a major disaster occurs within the lifetime of the stocked relief item. We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity and compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically. We apply this game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul to optimize the stocking decisions of an agency for shelter units in cooperation with another agency. We investigate the characteristics of the solutions under various parameter settings and identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

为什么国有企业越来越垄断?

近年来,我国的国有企业在产业政策的保护下表现出越来越垄断的趋势。本文运用共同代理模型解释了这种政策倾向的形成原因。代表各个产业部门的利益集团围绕政府的政策展开博弈,政策的形成是政府对各个产业利益集团进行平衡的结果。但是,政府对国有部门的重视程度超过非国有部门。随着国有企业逐渐从许多产业退出,余下的国有部门越来越缺乏其他利益集团的制约,政府因而就倾向于保护这些国有部门的垄断利益。     

Consumer value conflicts surrounding ethical food purchase decisions: a focus on animal welfare

Ethical attitudes in relation to meat purchases were studied among urban and rural consumers in Scotland. All subjects perceived at least some ethical issues in relation to animal production systems, in particular, systems keeping animals in close confinement. Welfare‐friendly production systems were viewed as adding value to a food, but this value was not necessarily realizable to producers if purchases occurred only when foods were on special offer. Statements made by individuals were often contradictory, revealing ambivalence, unresolved value conflicts and a general lack of involvement in the nature of meat production. A number of barriers to the establishment of stable attitudes and behaviours in relation to the ethical treatment of food animals were also identified. A key finding of the study is that individuals can hold two views on animal welfare. On the one hand, they may think as citizens influencing societal standards, and on the other, as consumers at the point of purchase. As citizens, they support the notion of animals being entitled to a good life; as meat consumers, they avoid the cognitive connection with the live animal. This paper explores both the citizen–consumer relationship and purchase strategies used by consumers to resolve value conflicts. Lessons for public and commercial policy are highlighted in the context of the Curry Report (2002) which advocates more effective market segmentation where markets are finely attuned to their customers, with the development of a number of assurance schemes discussed in the article.     

融资优序与行业管制——兼析中国上市公司“异常融资优序”现象

企业融资先通过内部资金进行,然后再通过银行借款或发行低风险的债券,最后才采用股票,这种融资的“先后顺序”是企业出于降低融资成本和防止剩余利润被分享所做出的理性选择,这就是融资优序理论。本文认为,寡头竞争所形成的行业进入壁垒为优序融资的实现提供了必须的市场环境,其资金使用方式能够优化资源配置,提高资金的使用效率。融资优序理论在发达市场经济国家得到了实践的验证,但在我国上市公司中却存在“异常融资优序”(Abnormal pccking Order)现象,即外部资金优于内部资金,外部资金中股权融资优于债权融资。其原因在于,中国市场经济不太完善,缺乏通过寡头竞争自发形成的行业进入壁垒。本文认为只有采取行业管制手段,设置一定的行业进入壁垒,才能实现优序融资,从而达到优化资源配置的目的。     

积极发展我国对外服务贸易——基于规避货物贸易争端的视角

加入WTO五年来,我国经济持续快速增长,很大程度得益于我国对外贸易的强劲增长.2005年我国货物进出口总额达到14221亿美元而使中国成为世界第三贸易大国,但贸易摩擦也急剧上升.随着中国经济结构的转换,有效规避不断升级的货物贸易争端,积极发展对外服务贸易必将作为我国未来对外贸易的突破口和主力军.     

美国对华贸易技术壁垒的政治经济学分析

技术贸易壁垒已成为中美贸易摩擦的最主要原因之一。本文拓展了格罗斯曼和海普曼的关税模型．对美国对华贸易技术壁垒进行政治经济学分析，指出贸易技术壁垒是美国政府与相关利益集团博弈的结果，其存在具有必然性和长期性，进而提出对我国政府、企业、行业协会的政策建议。     

股权结构、代理问题与公司多元化折价

本文利用我国最新的上市公司资料,在得出我国上市多元化公司存在折价的基础上,从股权结构的角度来验证了代理问题和公司多元化折价的关系.我们发现,国有股权与公司多元化程度呈现负相关关系,法人股与多元化程度呈倒U形曲线关系,流通股与多元化程度呈正比例关系;股权集中度、机构持股比例和管理层持股与多元化程度呈负相关关系.结果表明,代理问题在有效解释公司多元化程度的同时,也有效地解释了公司多元化折价的产生.     

上市公司控制权争夺的动机及其特征

本文结合国内外研究成果以及我国当前的市场环境,对可能成为控制权争夺目标的公司会具备什么样的财务特征、股权结构以及公司治理进行了分析,以寻找上市公司控制权争夺的真正动机和目的.我们研究发现:上市公司经营业绩越差,债务比率越高,当年具有增发或配股资格,产权的可转让性越低,产权性质为国有企业和终极控制人为国有企业或政府机构时,其控制权被争夺的可能性也越高.