排序方式: 共有9条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Irina Stefanescu Yupeng Wang Kangzhen Xie Jun Yang 《Journal of Financial Economics》2018,127(1):152-173
Large US firms modify top executives’ compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans. 相似文献
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Robert Butler Liam J. A. Lenten Patrick Massey 《Scottish journal of political economy》2020,67(5):539-550
This study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most-difficult, highest-reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved. 相似文献
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ZOLTAN P. MATOLCSY 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2000,17(4):671-692
Current practice of management cash compensation is based on financial targets. The financial targets for a year may be above, equal to, or below the previous year's publicly available performance measures based in part on the prevailing economic conditions. Accordingly, during economic downturn, a flat relation between changes in management cash compensation and simple changes in corporate performance, like annual profits or return on equity, is predicted, while during economic growth, a positive relation is predicted between changes of management cash compensation and corporate performance measures. The evidence in this study is based on the period 1987‐95. Pooled, cross‐sectional results are consistent with the propositions of no relation between changes in management cash compensation and changes in measures of corporate performance during periods of economic downturn and significant positive relation during economic growth. Further sensitivity analysis of these results with respect to market‐based performance measures, size, and industry classifications confirm the main results. 相似文献
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Miao-Ling Chen 《Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies》2013,11(1):65-73
Employee stock bonuses (ESBs) and employee stock options (ESOs) are the means for high-technology companies in Taiwan to reward their employees. This research connects the Ohlson (1995) model and Linear Structural Relations (LISREL) model to investigate these effects of ESBs and ESOs, respectively, for a sample of high-technology companies in Taiwan. I generate two empirical generalizations. (1) The incentive effects of ESBs are significantly associated with performance, thus enhancing firm value; in addition, the incentive effects of ESBs are greater than the dilution effects. (2) The incentive effects of ESOs are also significantly associated with performance, whereas the dilution effects of ESOs are insignificant. Although evidence supports the incentive effects of providing ESOs and ESBs, it is debatable whether ESOs and ESBs dilute shareholders’ equity. 相似文献
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The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking is a well-established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control bankers' bonuses and thereby curtail their risk-taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that an implicit too-big-to-fail policy provides the incentive for banks to take excessive risks and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. A credible no-bailout policy will have a better chance of curbing excess risk-taking than controlling bankers' compensation. 相似文献
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陆贵全 《安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版)》2002,19(2):119-120
我院对实验技术人员的工作量评估及奖金分配,本着多劳多得、按劳取酬的原则确定实验难度系数,进行了实际而有效的探索.该方案的执行有利于调动实验技术人员的积极性,有利于教学质量的提高. 相似文献
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Tahir M. Nisar 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2007,31(1):53-73
The study aims to investigate the determinants of subjective bonus payouts in the UK financial industry. Bonuses are increasingly
linked to wider business goals, such as quality and customer service, firm reputation and employee hiring and retention policies,
thus replacing the traditional focus on output or profit measures. A new conceptual work on subjectivity is used to evaluate
these bonus practices. Results indicate that a variety of contextual factors have influenced the firms to make greater use
of subjectivity in bonus payouts. Of these, organizational interdependency appeared to be the most forceful factor, followed
by management’s strategic focus, long-term investment in intangibles, economic constraints, performance target difficulty,
and competition. The analysis suggests that subjectivity acts as a mechanism that aligns the interests of individual employees
with the firm’s performance goals. The study also draws attention to the costs of subjectivity in performance evaluation. 相似文献
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