LOGISTICS SALIENCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The primary purpose of this paper was to empirically explore some of the reasons that logistics has become more important, or salient, in comparison to other functions within the firm. A survey of 296 managers across multiple industries in the U.S. found logistics becomes more important within the firm when the industry increases in uncertainty, when there is an emphasis on time‐based competition, when there is greater adoption of information technology, and when there is an emphasis on cross‐functional integration.     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

The Persistence of Profits in the Long Run: A New Approach

We present a trend‐based alternative to the standard first‐order autoregression model in persistence of profits studies. This is motivated by reservations over the interpretation of the standard model, and rests on a different concept of dynamic competition. A nine‐category taxonomy of long‐run persistence stereotypes is developed. Structural time series estimates are presented for a sample of UK companies. We find the null of long run competitive equilibrium not rejected in nearly a third of cases, but non‐eroding persistence to be present in around 60%.     

Innovation and Merger Decisions in the Pharmaceutical Industry

There is increasing public policy concern about the potentialeffects of mergers on innovation. This paper provides acomparative analysis of approaches to innovational competitiontaken by the E.U. and U.S. merger authorities in a sample of threerecent, major, pharmaceutical mergers. The European Commission'sapproach appears lighter handed and places more explicit emphasison effects in downstream markets. The uncertainties in the analysisof dynamic effects of mergers on innovation, even in pharmaceuticals,suggest the need for a cautious approach and for careful framingof any merger remedies where R & D projects and components, ratherthan approved drugs, are involved.     

A baseline model of industry evolution

The paper analyses some general dynamic properties of industries characterized by heterogeneous firms and continuing stochastic entry.After a brief critical assessment of some significant drawbacks of recent contributions to modeling of stochastic industrial dynamics, we propose a novel analytical apparatus able to derive some generic properties of the underlying competition process combining persistent technological heterogeneity, differential growth of individual firms and turnover. The basic model, we suggest, is indeed applicable with proper modifications to a large class of evolutionary processes, well beyond industrial dynamics.JEL Classification: L11, O30, C60Support to this research by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Austria; the Fujitsu Research Institute for Advanced Information (FRI), Japan; the Italian National Research Council (CNR), the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR, prot. 2002132413 003) and the Free University of Bozen Bolzano, Italy, is gratefully acknowledged. Comments by Andrea Bassanini, Francesca Chiaromonte, Steven Klepper, Uwe Cantner, Drew Fudenberg and the anonymous referees helped in shaping the paper to its present form. Mariele Berté provided the computer simulations of the model. The usual caveats apply.Correspondence to: G. Dosi     

The impact of home-country institutions and competition on firm profitability

Firm profitability depends on firm characteristics, industry structure and home-country institutions. Firm profitability is negatively associated with institutional quality. The effect of entry regulation on profitability runs through competition, while the effect of legal and political institutions only partially runs through competition.     

Financial Deregulation and the Role of Statecraft: Lessons from Britain’s 1971 Competition and Credit Control Measures

Within the financialisation literature, a number of approaches identify the coexistence of financial expansion and productive stagnation. Yet there is no consensus on which direction causality operates between these two phenomena. This impasse has been widened by the lack of attention paid to the role of statecraft strategies in mediating possible causal mechanisms. This article contributes to rectifying this shortcoming by focusing on the governance advantages granted to states through financial deregulation. By presenting archival evidence on Britain’s 1971 Competition and Credit Control deregulation, this article lends support to financialisation accounts that argue that weaknesses in the productive economy spurred financial expansion, yet it also indicates that the state’s desire for depoliticised forms of governance played a crucial role in mediating this relationship. This further suggests that International Political Economy should focus on the strategic manner in which states relate to markets.     

Barter Trading as a Microeconomics Teaching Device

Karpoff reports on a “barter trading game” in which students exchanged real goods over a period of seven weeks with different market constraints imposed each week. Student comments about the exercise were favorable.     

Mixed Market Competition in a Quality Differentiated Duopoly Model An Approach to Banking Sector

This paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to investigate the competitive implications of quality choices of financial institutions whereby they charge prices to consumers based on their willingness to pay for the service qualities in the mixed market scenario under vertical product differentiation model. Initially, it analyzes benchmark equilibrium solutions of monopoly and duopoly to establish the degree of quality differentiation between two private banks in an uncover market configuration. Further, it estimates the quality differentiation between private and public banks, and examines the interaction between two market structures keeping public bank as both leader and follower, and then measures the social welfare from different prospectives. The explicit operation of two stages Nash equilibrium game forecasted that public banks＇ monopoly seems to be still better than a private banking, and it is socially optimal. The outcome demonstrates a significant importance of vertical quality differentiation for policy implication in banking industry and provides an insight on the reasons of particular co-existence of public and private banking services in the specified location. In this context, it is concluded that the presence of public banks in banking industries is a crucial condition for obtaining the higher range of social welfare.