Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze priceformation and liquidity in a non-anonymous environment withsimilarities to the floor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis isthat the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probabilitythat a trader trades on the basis of private information. Heuses this knowledge to price discriminate. This can be achievedby quoting a large spread and granting price improvement totraders deemed uninformed. Consistent with our hypothesis wefind that price improvement reflects lower adverse selectioncosts but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit.Further, the quote adjustment following transactions at thequoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustmentafter transactions at prices inside the spread. Our resultsindicate that anonymity comes at the cost of higher adverseselection risk. JEL Classification: G10.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze price formationand liquidity in a non-anonymous environment with similarities to thefloor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis is that the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probability that atrader trades on the basis of private information. He uses this knowledgeto price discriminate. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and granting price improvement to traders deemed uninformed.Consistent with our hypothesis we find that price improvement reflects loweradverse selection costs but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit. Further, the quote adjustmentfollowing transactions at the quoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustment aftertransactions at prices inside the spread. Our results indicate that anonymity comes at the cost ofhigher adverse selection risk.     

Across-the-Curve Credit Spread Indices

We design a novel across-the-curve credit spread index, AXI, a measure of the recent cost of wholesale unsecured debt funding for publicly listed US bank holding companies and commercial banks. AXI, a benchmark for bank lending and risk management, is the weighted average of credit spreads for unsecured debt instruments with maturities ranging from overnight to five years, with weights that reflect both transaction and issuance volumes. We provide illustrative output of the bond-based component of AXI. By widening coverage to include all corporate debt issuers, we also build a financial conditions index (FXI).     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

The effectiveness of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy: Comparative evidence from crisis and non-crisis Euro-area countries

During the European financial crisis, the European Central Bank implemented a series of unconventional monetary policy measures. We argue that these programs lowered the bond yield spreads of Euro-area countries. This hypothesis is tested using pooled OLS estimations and two different datasets: monetary policy event dummies and the purchase volumes of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Overall, we find significantly negative effects on bond yield spreads for both datasets, leading us to accept the hypothesis. While the OMT reduces the spreads of both crisis and non-crisis countries, LTROs and the lowering of the deposit rate to 0 percent are mainly effective in non-crisis countries. The SMP lowers the spreads of crisis countries, but it has the opposite effect on non-crisis countries. This converse effect is explained by the risk that increasingly accumulates on the ECB’s balance sheet through the SMP and that way constitutes a fiscal risk for non-crisis countries. The results are confirmed by pooled OLS estimations that measure the effect of unconventional monetary policy on central government debt.     

Spillovers among CDS indexes in the US financial sector

By employing the robust cross-correlation function approach proposed by Hong (2001), and conducting pre-tests for structural breaks in the variances as well as removing the causality-in-mean effects in the causality-in-variance tests, we investigate volatility and mean transmissions between the credit default swaps (CDS) indexes of three US financial sectors. We use daily series on five-year banking, insurance, and financial services sector CDS indexes at the sector level from January 2004 to December 2011. We find evidence of significant causality-in-mean effects running from the banking sector to the insurance and financial services sector CDS indexes and from the financial services to the insurance sector CDS indexes, suggesting the leading role of the banking and financial services sectors in terms of price discovery. Moreover, we find significant causality-in-variance effects from the financial services sector CDS index to that of the banking sector, implying the existence of information transmission and contagion from the former, the least regulated of the three. The implications of these findings on traders and policymakers are also provided.     

辩证分析信用衍生品功能的利与弊——以07金融危机为例

Stewart Jones和Maurice Peat认为信用衍生品是一种有效管理风险的工具,有利于对冲风险（hedging）,以及提供多元分散化投资的机会。然而,次贷危机也正是滥用这种方便廉价的衍生品的产物。一方面,信用衍生品有自己的先天设计缺陷,另一方面,当它们被滥用时,原本金融体系中产生的错误与压力会被放大而导致最终的金融危机灾难。本文试图客观分析金融衍生品的利与弊,为我国逐步开放信用衍生品市场借鉴经验。     

Spillovers between sovereign CDS and exchange rate markets: The role of market fear

As important variables in financial market, sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) and exchange rate have correlations and spillovers. And the volatility spillovers between the two markets become further complicated with the effect of market fear caused by extreme events such as global pandemic. This paper attempts to explore the complex interactions within the “sovereign CDS-exchange rate” system by adopting the forecast error variance decomposition method. The results show that there is a relatively close linkage between the two markets and the total spillover index of the system is dynamic. For most of the past, the exchange rate has a higher spillover effect on the sovereign CDS than vice versa. Moreover, after the market fear variables are introduced, the “sovereign CDS-exchange rate” system and market fear variables present bidirectional spillovers. The results of the study have particular significance for maintaining the financial stability and preventing risk contagion between markets.     

Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.