The role of financial journalists in the expectations channel of the monetary transmission mechanism

Monetary policy relies on managing the inflation expectations of the public in order to influence prices (inflation). Relying on the South African experience, we argue that most of the general public are exposed to the communication of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) only via the media. This state of affairs is fairly typical around the globe. We explored the role and biases of the journalists in transmitting the SARB’s communications to the rationally inattentive general public. Our aim was to obtain insights about the factors that influence media articles that deal with monetary policy issues. Using interviews and qualitative content analysis, we explored the extent of the journalists’ knowledge about inflation and monetary policy, their views concerning the credibility of the SARB, the sources of information they use, and the constraints and incentives they face in writing their articles.     

Are imports and remittances cointegrated for the Central and Eastern European countries?

In this article, we investigate the existence of long-run common trends between imports and remittances in 11 Central and Eastern European countries which are part of the European Union. Using the Engle–Granger two-step procedure, we determine that for all countries in our sample there are no long-run common trends (no cointegration) between imports and remittances. However, the results are mixed when running a Granger causality test. For nine countries, we can establish either a bidirectional or unidirectional Granger causality, indicating that past values of one variable have predictive content on the other variable. In two countries, there is no Granger causality between imports and remittances.     

Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

Internal labour markets in the Australian banking industry: their nature prior to the Second World War and their recent decline

This paper uses evidence from late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century personnel records of two Australian banks to examine the nature of internal labour markets prior to the Second World War. It is argued that the industry possessed all the classic features of internal labour markets: limited ports of entry, internal promotion, long careers, and assignment of wages by well-defined rules. The paper then examines the reasons why banks adopted internal labour markets. Finally, the paper examines the recent decline of internal labour markets and examines the role of technological and social changes in this decline.     

Learning and the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank

This paper examines the welfare implications of alternative inflation targeting proposals for the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. We assume that policy makers have to “learn” the laws of motion of inflation in an economy characterized by “stickiness” in domestic price setting behavior and subjected to recurring shocks to productivity, exports and foreign price. We find that a switch from an “asymmetric” inflation targeting strategy to an “symmetric” makes little difference in welfare payoffs, but it comes at a cost of much higher interest-rate variability. We also find that there are practically no welfare gains from switching from an inflation-targeting strategy based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to a strategy based on the domestic price component of the HICP.     

The effect of exchange rate changes on trade balances in the short and long run

Using generalized impulse response functions, this study tests for the trade J‐curve for three transitional central European countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – in their bilateral trade with respect to Germany. Our findings suggest that for each country there are some characteristics associated with a J‐curve effect: after a (real or nominal) depreciation the export‐to‐import ratio briefly drops to below its initial value within a few months and then rises to a long run equilibrium value higher than the initial one.     

欧盟成员国银行业政策主要特点分析

本文认为欧盟《第二银行指令》全面推动了欧盟各成员国银行业规制协调,可将成员国近20年以来的银行业政策主要特点归纳为四个方面,即全面放松管制、私有化、鼓励银行并购和对外扩张,金融监管体制一体化。这些政策促进了各成员国银行业竞争和快速发展,提高了欧盟银行业效率和盈利,有助于降低消费者和企业的融资成本,提高欧盟银行业整体抗风险能力。     

The Workout of Banking Crises: A Macroeconomic Perspective

This paper provides a macroeconomic perspective for governmentinterventions in banking crisis. Such crisis occur when a largenumber of banks fail to meet capital requirements or are insolvent.Using a macroeconomic model with financial intermediation, ouranalyis suggests that strict enforcement of capital-adequaterules suffices in prosperous periods. Capital requirements serveas an indicator for crises interventions in critical stateswhich may require interest rate intervention and restructuringof the banking industry. These policies can be reinforced byrandom bailouts and temporary financial relief, with a largepercentage of the costs being covered by current and futureowners of banks. (JEL D41, E4, G2)     

试论货币政策与银行监管的协调运行

货币政策和银行监管是我国中央银行的两项重要职能 ,货币政策与银行监管两者的关系是既相互独立 ,又相互联系 ,但是在现实中主要表现出独立性而甚少表现出协调性 ,因此 ,中央银行有必要加强货币政策与银行监管的协调配合。     

Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers: Inflation versus Money Supply and Exchange Rate Targets

Some recent papers have shown how a simple contract can eliminate the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy. This paper shows that if the central banker is risk averse, a contract in terms of money is superior to one in terms of inflation. The paper also shows that, if the central banker cares about his reappointment, an exchange rate target might always leads to the implementation of the optimal policy.