Forecasting unknown-unknowns by boosting the risk radar within the risk intelligent organisation

This theoretical perspective paper interprets (un)known-(un)known risk quadrants as being formed from both abstract and concrete risk knowledge. It shows that these quadrants are useful for categorising risk forecasting challenges against the levels of abstract and concrete risk knowledge that are typically available, as well as for measuring perceived levels of abstract and concrete risk knowledge available for forecasting in psychometric research. Drawing on cybersecurity risk examples, a case is made for refocusing risk management forecasting efforts towards changing unknown-unknowns into known-knowns. We propose that this be achieved by developing the ‘boosted risk radar’ as organisational practice, where suitably ‘risk intelligent’ managers gather ‘risk intelligence information’, such that the ‘risk intelligent organisation’ can purposefully co-develop both abstract and concrete risk forecasting knowledge. We also illustrate what this can entail in simple practical terms within organisations.     

期权型资源配置对企业竞争优势的影响

旨在打开资源基础观中组织黑箱，丰富资源配置研究成果，探讨在新竞争时代何种资源配置方式能更有效地促进企业创新特别是探索式创新，从而建立或强化企业竞争优势。通过梳理西方最新研究成果，基于我国146家企业样本，利用回归分析法检验期权型资源配置对企业竞争优势的促进作用，采取因果逐步回归法检验探索式创新在该过程中的中介作用。研究表明：期权型资源配置既能强化企业竞争优势，又能促进探索式创新；探索式创新在期权型资源配置与竞争优势间发挥部分中介作用；相对于创新的资源投入，资源配置方式对竞争优势的作用更强。     

规范劳动合同制是地勘单位用工制度改革的关键

文章认为,计划经济体制下形成的,地勘单位采用行政命令配合思想政治工作的方式,对固定职工进行各个用工环节的管理模式,已不适合市场经济条件和经济全球化的要求,地勘单位必须规范劳动合同制管理,进行用工制度改革。文章分析了地勘单位劳动管理现状,论述了实行劳动合同制管理的必然性和紧迫性,以及现今地勘单位在规范劳动合同管理方面存在的差距。最后提出了地勘单位规范全员劳动合同制管理的四项措施建议。     

超市寄包的法律思考

本文试图对商业流通企业中存在的两种寄存包行为的行为性质进行法律分析,并对此引起的法律责任,产生的法律后果作一理论上的探讨,以求正确界定它们,保护消费者与商业企业的合法权益。     

Marriage Settlements

French couples may choose between two types of marriage settlements governing asset ownership after a divorce or inheritance: common property or separate property. A cooperative model considers the marriage contract as a means of providing for widowhood of the less endowed spouse. A second model addresses the probability of divorce and the production of a marriage good. The common property contract then becomes a means of inducing the wife to invest in the marriage good. Choice of contract, labor supply and fertility are simultaneous. Empirically we find that characteristics of the spouses such as relative age or differences in endowments influence the choice. So do the expected number of children and the wife's labor supply decision. This last decision is also shown to be influenced by the chosen settlement, while fertility is not.
JEL classification : J 12; J 4; K 12     

以特色产业打造现代城镇形象

在市场经济条件下 ,城镇之间的竞争 ,往往最终体现在特色之间的竞争。塑造城镇特色 ,最理想的办法还是用产业来打造特色城镇 ;本文论述了以产业打造特色城镇的步骤和以产业打造特色城镇需要重视的问题。     

对远期外汇合约信用风险的监管

随着远期外汇合约近几年来在我国的逐步推行,外汇市场活跃的同时也增加了外汇交易的信用风险,。要实现外汇市场的有序开放和稳定发展,就必须对其实行有效的风险管理,这包括交易主体对信用风险的识别,处置和外部监管。     

企业合同管理制度创新初探

合同是企业与外部进行物流、资金流、信息流交换的基本形式；当前我国市场规则和秩序还不很规范，合同极易被不法分子利用，进行各种违法犯罪活动，企业就可能因此蒙受巨大的经济损失。因此，搞好合同管理，是维护企业合法权益的最基本的要求。文章从分析目前企业合同管理中存在的问题人手，提出完善和创新企业合同管理的建议。     

Domestic Support and Border Measures for Processed Horticultural Products

In horticultural markets, trade barriers often apply to the processed products whereas domestic support applies to farm-produced raw commodities. Here we assess the effects of such trade barriers and domestic support by simulating the effects of policy reform on global processing tomato markets, which are faced with modest processed product tariffs and high domestic support in the European Union (EU). Both protection and EU subsidy drive down world welfare, but we find that reducing import tariffs for tomato products would yield greater effects on markets and larger welfare impacts outside Europe than would reductions in EU domestic support.     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.