Health and political regimes: Evidence from quantile regression

This study investigates how political regimes affect health conditions such as infant and child mortality rates and life expectancy using data from 180 countries observed between 1960 and 2013. Panel quantile regression is used to examine the effects at different intervals throughout the distribution of health outcomes. The estimation results indicate that democracy has significant positive effects on health outcomes and that its impacts are greater when health outcomes are worse. These results are robust to different democracy and health indices. The effects of different types of democracies and dictatorships are also considered, that is parliamentary, mixed (semi-presidential) and presidential democracies, and civilian, military and royal dictatorships. The parliamentary form of democracy has the largest positive impact on health outcomes at the worst quantile of health outcomes, although the difference in the impacts of the three types of democracies is not necessarily large. Furthermore, all types of dictatorships have a negative impact on health outcomes, with military dictatorship having the worst outcome when health outcomes are worse. Finally, the effects of democratization on health outcomes are significantly positive when the health outcomes are worse.     

江泽民人民民主专政思想论析

江泽民在新时期坚持人民民主专政思想并进行理论突破和创新，其主要思想有：(1)必须坚持人民民主专政；(2)要努力发展和完善社会主义民主；(3)国家政权的专政力量不但不能削弱，还要加强；(4)巩固和加强党的执政地位，确保国家的长治久安；(5)越须全心全意依靠工人阶级。江泽民人民民主专政思想是二十一世纪中国人民民主专政国家政权巩固和发展的重要理论指南。     

Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?

This paper explores the effect of dictatorial institutions on revenue composition. The higher the degree of institutionalization of the regime, the higher the perceived levels of legitimacy, efficiency and credibility, so taxes that require cooperation and compliance can be more effectively collected from the population. Institutionalized regimes thus make sense if non-tax revenue sources are scarce so limited representation must be granted in exchange of economic support. Our selection-corrected results show that more institutionalized regimes are able to collect more taxes on income, profits and capital gains, taxes on goods and services, taxes on property and payroll taxes.

When will a Dictator be Good?

Dictatorship is the predominant political system in many developing countries. However, different dictators act quite differently: a good dictator implements growth-enhancing economic policies, e.g., investment in public education and infrastructure, whereas a bad dictator taxes her citizens for her own consumption. The present paper provides a theoretical model by deriving underlying determinants of dictatorial behavior. We assume that the engine of economic growth is private investment. It can increase the productivity of individuals who invest, as well as the aggregate technological level. A good dictator encourages this investment in order to tax more. However, the cost of this encouragement is that the ensuing higher growth rate will induce earlier democratization. In this paper we will illustrate the risk of choosing a growth-enhancing policy, while leading to additional tax revenues in the short-run will also increase the likelihood of a revolution resulting in the eventual overthrow of the dictator. Furthermore, we will find that the higher the return from private investments the less likely the dictator will be a good one. Contrary to McGuire and Olson (J Econ Lit 34:72–96, 1996) we find that a long life-time does not always induce positive incentives among dictators. I wish to thank Monika Merz, who carefully read the earlier version of this paper and provided many valuable suggestions. I also would like to thank the editor, the anonymous referee, Uwe Sunde, Philipp Kircher and participants at the 4th international annual conference of JEPA for helpful comments. I am grateful to Stephan Heim for his assistance. All possible errors are, of course, mine.     

Mises’ democracy–dictatorship equivalence theorem: A critique

Ludwig von Mises argues that public opinion, not the form of government, is the ultimate determinant of policy. The implication is that, holding public opinion constant, democracies and dictatorships will have the same policies—a result I call Mises’ Democracy–Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. According to Mises, dictators have to comply with public opinion or else they will be overthrown. I argue that he seriously overestimates the power of revolution to discipline dictators. Mises was perceptive to note that, in practice, “dictatorially imposed” policies are often democratically sustainable, but he neglected several mechanisms—all more plausible than the threat of revolution—capable of explaining this fact.

Can television bring down a dictator? Evidence from Chile’s “No” campaign

Can televised political advertising change voting behavior in elections held in authoritarian regimes? We study the case of Chile, where the opposition used television campaigns weeks before the election that ended the seventeen-year dictatorship known as the Pinochet regime. Using national surveys conducted before the election and administrative electoral data, we provide evidence of a positive effect of television exposure on opposition votes. When compared to similar estimates in democracies, the effect of campaigns in Chile appear large. These results suggest that televised political campaigns can help to defeat dictators at the polls.     

Dictatorial domains

Summary. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three. Received: July 12, 2000; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments. Correspondence to: A. Sen     

A positional version of Arrow’s theorem

Arrow’s theorem is based on two “vertical” aggregation conditions expressed in terms of the relative positions of two alternatives in a preference ranking. This note obtains the same result for the strict preference case using instead two “horizontal” aggregation conditions expressed in terms of the absolute position of an alternative in a preference ranking.