我国自然垄断产业的民营化改革

在自然垄断产业,国有企业垄断经营低效是一个世界性的问题。自然垄断产业在一定范围内具有可竞争性,即使是在不可竞争性的领域,也可以通过建立潜在的竞争性替代机制,形成模拟竞争环境。自然垄断产业的可竞争性为民营化提供了可能。自然垄断产业民营化就是通过产权制度变革,提高垄断企业的效率。     

跨国垄断在中国:现状、影响及规制

该文通过统计数据和案例分析认为跨国垄断已经在中国发生，并指出存在着两种不同类型的跨国垄断，即跨国企业整体垄断某个行业和单个跨国企业垄断整个行业；进而分析了两种不同形态的垄断对经济造成的不良影响。最后，探讨了如何防范和规制跨国垄断，认为防范跨国垄断要从多方面着手，除了最重要的竞争政策手段以外，还必须在反垄断法中加强对跨国垄断的规制。     

Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.     

China＇s Social Security： Case Studies of the Interest Groups and Policy Monopoly

This section introduces an asymmetric information model to analyze the interest groups and policy monopoly in social security management, mainly focusing on the relation between the interest groups in the social security products market and the social security government institutions at the central level, namely the major social security policy makers.     

Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41.     

Environmental protection versus economic growth

This paper presents and analyses the differences in the eco-models implemented worldwide （such as whether and how carbon taxes being ＂recycled＂）, or in their efficiency parameters （inconsistent parameter values that account for different results）. This is the assumption that a real tradeoff exists between the production of environmental goods. The present article empirically proves that something must be given up in order to gain something else, and once equations are specified to trace out the path of the economy over time, the natural economic formulation of such equations will embody the notion of economic and bio-tradeoffs.     

中国财政性教育投资的实证分析与对策研究

在现代市场经济社会里 ,几乎所有国家的政府投资在为全社会提供教育服务方面都起着主导作用。我国财政性教育投资严重不足 ,而且教育投资结构很不合理 ,因此必须改变教育投资观念 ,切实、稳定增加财政的教育投资 ,优化财政教育投资结构     

"隐形冠军"的市场垄断及其对我国中小企业的启示

“隐形冠军”能够在所在市场中处于垄断地位，有其深刻的原因。分析他们取得成功的经验，对我国中小企业的进一步发展具有很大的意义。     

打破垄断促进市场有效竞争

行业性行政垄断的存在,严重阻碍着我国市场化的进程.引进竞争、打破垄断是当前我国继续深化改革、实行全面开放的一项紧迫而又艰巨的任务.我们要按照现代社会经济与公共管理的演进趋势认识垄断问题,并从多方面寻求打破垄断的思路与措施.     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.