国家科技创新能力时空差异性评价

科技创新规模扩张和科技创新效率提升是增强国家科技创新能力的两条关键途径。基于现有研究鲜有结合科技创新规模和科技创新效率开展国家科技创新能力评价的现状，采用因子分析法，系统筛选国家科技创新规模影响因素，并结合科技创新效率影响因素，完善国家科技创新能力评价指标体系，通过构建DEA Malmquist指数模型，评价不同时期国家科技创新效率变化指数，以及中国与全球10个国家科技创新能力的时空差异性。研究表明，R&D投入强度、R&D研究人员、专利申请量、科技期刊文章数、高科技产品出口额占制成品出口总额的百分比、科技创新效率是影响国家科技创新能力的关键指标；1991-2014年中国科技创新能力水平呈指数增长态势，有力提升了国家科技实力；全球10个国家科技创新能力水平除日本出现一定波动外，其余九国整体呈小幅递增态势。     

数字时代的银行业变迁——网点布局与行业结构

数字技术可以帮助市场主体重构组织模式,数字经济时代的金融业也因此迎来变革。本文基于2014年至2019年我国县级行政区数据,研究发现,数字金融的发展显著减缓了我国银行业金融机构实体网点的扩张势头,这种效应主要体现在股份制商业银行和城市商业银行上,并主要影响这两类银行的基层机构。同时,我们发现数字金融的发展加快了农村合作金融机构的转型和网点退出,但对国有“六大行”没有显著影响。进一步研究发现,数字金融的影响效果会随着经济发展程度提高和地区金融可得性增加而增强,但随着在位银行的市场势力提升而下降。本文为理解数字经济时代银行业的变迁提供了一定参考。     

Evolutionary social science and universal Darwinism

How should social scientists, inclined to an evolutionary theory of aspects of human culture like science, technology, business organization and practice, react to proposals that they embrace a “Universal Darwinism”? The most prominent variety of Universal Darwinism argues for close counterparts between the variables and mechanisms of cultural evolution and biological evolution, for example proposing the concept of “memes” as units of culture. Other Universal Darwinists propose, more flexibly, that human culture and biological species both change over time through a process that involves variation and selection, but that the details of the processes may be very different. This essay argues that the narrower form of Universal Darwinism should not be acceptable to social scientists. The differences in the details of cultural evolution and biological evolution are considerable. On the other hand, if Universal Darwinism provides a roomy intellectual tent welcoming scholars studying a variety of topics, with the unifying element being a dynamic theory involving variation and selection, but with the key variables and mechanisms being recognized as perhaps differing greatly between biology and human culture, we can be happy in that camp. Evolutionary Social Science and Universal Darwinism.     

When is it coevolution?

This paper evaluates the differences between Norgaard's and Winder et al.'s approach to socio-environmental coevolution. Winder et al. emphasize the evolutionary dynamics of coevolutionary change. These were omnipresent in Norgaard's work but they have not been adequately explored by other ecological economists. I argue that Winder et al.'s definition of coevolution is in essence the same as Norgaard's and that their real differences are, how they see coevolution applied and how far they are willing to draw a priori a line between evolutionary and non-evolutionary socio-environmental dynamics. My thesis is that at this stage a more open approach to evolutionary dynamics and coevolution a la Norgaard is a wiser strategy than Winder et al.'s narrower approach.     

Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior

Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth. Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim is acknowledged. RID="*" ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de)     

产出吸引、制度演进与增量改革的产权边界——基于中国制度演进路径的动态考察

制度演进理论将制度变迁行为归结为制度主体对环境的学习和适应过程,在完全信息和缺乏外在约束条件下,制度将会按照某种方式向最优的均衡路径逼近。但是,信息的不完全性、经济实体的制度兼容性以及转轨经济面临的产权、效率约束都会改变制度演进的路径和结果。根据Barro(1991)和Skott(1999)的分析框架,通过构建制度的动态演进方程,文章对在一定约束条件下的制度演进长期均衡路径进行了考察,勾勒出一幅全新的制度演进图景。同时,运用相关的宏观经济数据,文章考察了模型对中国经济制度演进路径的解释能力。     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Disagreement over the emergence of private property rights: alternative meanings, alternative explanations

This paper is an exercise in the history of thought, which compares Austrian and neoclassical theories of the emergence of private property rights, and examines, in part, the extent to which Austrians can be said to offer a commonly-agreed upon explanation that parallels Carl Menger's exemplary story of the emergence of money. We address the sources of disagreement (and apparent conflict) among emergence theorists in both schools. We try to show that some of the disagreement hinges on an unclear meaning of the term “emergence,” which is resolvable, while other sources of disagreement are fundamental at the methodological level. JEL Code B25, E40, E53     

Dissertation abstract: Reputational benefits of altruism and altruistic punishment

Recent studies in experimental economics have shown that many people have other-regarding preferences, potentially including preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. It is useful to investigate why people possess such preferences and what functional purpose they might serve outside the laboratory, because evolutionary and social learning perspectives both predict that cooperative sentiments should only exist if they bring benefits that outweigh the costs of other-regarding behavior. Theories of costly signaling suggest that altruistic acts may function (with or without intention) as signals of unobservable qualities such as resources or cooperative intent, and altruists may benefit (possibly unintentionally) from the advertisement of such qualities. After reviewing the theories that could potentially account for the evolution of altruism (Chapter 1), I test some predictions about cooperation derived from costly signaling theory. In Chapter 2, I show that participants in experimental public goods games were more cooperative when they had cues that they could benefit from having a good reputation, and that there was apparently some competition to be the most generous group member. Furthermore, in subsequent trust games, people tended to trust high public goods contributors more than low contributors. Chapter 3 failed to find evidence that granting high status to people makes them more likely to contribute to public goods or punish free-riders, but there was suggestive evidence that physical proximity to the experimenter affected contributions and punishment. In Chapter 4, I found that people tended to trust others who were willing to incur costs to punish those who free-ride on group cooperation provided that such punishment was justified, and men were more punitive than women. In Chapter 5, I show that women find altruistic men more desirable than neutral men for long-term relationships. Together, these results suggest that humans do treat altruism as a signal of willingness to be cooperative. These findings are discussed with respect to the adaptive design of cooperative sentiments as well as the current debate over group selection. Dissertation: Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontarion Currently: Post-Doc, Department of Neurobiology & Behavior, Cornell University     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large