Foreclosure externalities: New evidence

Policy makers have used externalities to justify government intervention in the foreclosure process. Using a new dataset that covers 15 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas in the U.S. and a novel identification strategy, this paper provides new evidence on the size and source of these externalities. Our results show that a property in distress affects the value of neighboring properties from the time when the borrower becomes seriously delinquent on the mortgage until well after the bank sells the property to a new owner. Properties with seriously delinquent loans within 0.1 miles are found to decrease transaction prices of non-distressed properties by approximately one percent on average. The spillovers are found to dissipate rapidly with distance and completely disappear one year after the bank sells the property to a new homeowner. Importantly, we find that the size of the externality is sensitive to the condition of foreclosed properties, as bank-owned properties in poor condition lower nearby transaction prices by 2.6% on average while those in good condition marginally raise prices. We argue that the measured price spillovers are physical externalities caused by a lack of property maintenance and not pecuniary externalities that reflect local supply or demand shocks.     

Net Neutrality in Europe: Desperately seeking a market failure

Net Neutrality has become the focus of attention in the regulatory debate on the Internet. This article attempts to strip down the debate to its bare essential. It identifies two main types of Net Neutrality obligations that have been put forward and assesses what type of potential concerns they may be designed to address. It concludes that while some of these concerns may be important it remains doubtful (at least in Europe) that an ex ante per se rule, such as those proposed under the Net Neutrality term, is the best way to address them.     

The contagion effect of foreclosed properties

Although previous research shows that prices of homes in neighborhoods with foreclosures are lower than those in neighborhoods without foreclosures, it remains unclear whether the lower prices are the result of a general decline in neighborhood values or whether foreclosures reduce the prices of nearby non-distressed sales through a contagion effect. We provide robust evidence of a contagion discount by simultaneously estimating the local price trend and the incremental price impact of nearby foreclosures. At its peak, the discount is roughly 1% per nearby foreclosed property. The discount diminishes rapidly as the distance to the distressed property increases. The contagion discount grows from the onset of distress through the foreclosure sale and then stabilizes. This pattern is consistent with the contagion effect being the visual externality associated with deferred maintenance and neglect.     

Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults,self-cures and securitization

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis.     

美国“止赎危机”事件综述及影响分析

近日,美国陆续传出多家银行在房屋止赎处理程序上出现重大纰漏,并由此引发了＂止赎危机＂,包括机械签名、房贷回购、贷款拖欠等问题。本文阐述了＂止赎危机＂事件发展以及美国各大银行的涉及情况,在此基础上分析了整个事件的影响。本文研究表明,＂止赎危机＂可能引发美国房主和投资者的一系列法律诉讼,破坏美国金融系统稳定,打击脆弱的房屋市场及经济复苏。研究同时指出,＂止赎危机＂仍需一段时间发酵,将持续影响投资者对美国银行业的信心。     

Incentives for input foreclosure

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in a model of upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly substitutable inputs. Our main motivation is a critical assessment of common assertions that draw inferences from pre-merger observable variables to post-merger incentives to foreclose. In particular, we find that, contrary to some commonly expressed views, high margins on the downstream and low margins on the upstream market are not good predictors for the incentives of a newly integrated firm to foreclose rivals. Besides this contribution to policy, our model also extends existing results in the literature on vertical foreclosure through allowing for the interaction of product differentiation on the upstream and on the downstream market.     

The economic role of foreclosures

We consider the economic consequences of changing the foreclosure rules. By incorporating renegotiation into the analysis, we show that although renegotiation decreases the number of foreclosures it can make the effects of foreclosure more significant. Even when foreclosure does not actually occur, a change in foreclosure rules changes the threat points of lender and borrower in any renegotiation, and thus changes the effective interest rate that the lender receives. In the long run, stated interest rates on loans will adjust to compensate for any change in the effective interest rate. We also examine the impact of a change in foreclosure laws on the borrower's welfare.     

Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values

Previous studies have shown that foreclosure often results in vandalism, disinvestment and other negative spillover effects in the neighborhood. This paper extends these views into a formal theoretical model through pricing based on comparables. We project that the spillover effect of a foreclosure on neighborhood property values depends on two factors: the discount of foreclosure sale and the weight placed on the foreclosed property as a comparable in the valuation. The former is related to housing cycle and the latter varies by time of foreclosure and its distance from the subject property. Empirical results based on a 2006 sample show that this effect is significant within a radius of 0.9 km (roughly 10 blocks) and within 5 years from its liquidation. The most severe impact is an 8.7% discount on neighborhood property values, which gradually drops to anywhere between −1.2 to −1.7% for foreclosures liquidated within the past 5 years. These spillover effects vary slightly when the sample selection bias is taken into account. Based on an alternative sample of purchase transactions in 2003, the estimated spillover effects in booming years are reduced by half, confirming on the important role played by housing cycles.

Foreclosure,vacancy and crime

This paper examines the impact of residential foreclosures and vacancies on violent and property crime. To overcome confounding factors, a difference-in-difference research design is applied to a unique data set containing geocoded foreclosure and crime data from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Results indicate that while foreclosure alone has no effect on crime, violent crime rates increase by roughly 19% once the foreclosed home becomes vacant – an effect that increases with length of vacancy. We find weak evidence suggesting a potential vacancy effect for property crime that is much lower in magnitude.     

Asymmetric access pricing in the Internet backbone market

For an arbitrary number of networks, I study the impact of asymmetric interconnection charges on competition for consumers and websites in the Internet backbone market. I show that the configuration of interconnection charges has important implications for the market structure.