Impact of modern communication infrastructure on productivity,production structure and factor demands of US industries: Impact revisited

This study investigates the contribution of modern communication infrastructure characterized by high speed broadband access network on the productivity growth, production structure and factor demands for US industries and for the aggregate economy. To evaluate such contribution, we modify the traditional cost function by incorporating communication infrastructure as input in production process in conjunction with other public infrastructures. The network externality and spillover effect of broadband access technology are captured by introducing broadband penetration rate as a shift factor in industry level production function. Empirical results show that the increased use of modern communications infrastructure increases the productivity of all industries with wide variations across industries. Estimated impacts on input demands show that increase in use of communications infrastructure service saves labor and materials and increase the demand for private capital. Finally, aggregate social rate of return on such investment has been estimated for policy implications.     

Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points and faces of the feasible set. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. We characterize the mechanisms that maximize revenue for some well-behaved distribution of buyer's valuations.     

A general equilibrium analysis of software development: Implications of copyright protection and contract enforcement

We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market.     

The Discriminating Beta: Prices and Capacity with Correlated Demands

Uniform customer‐class pricing can do much of the work of congestion‐based or time‐of‐day pricing in communication or wireless networks. A monopolist exploits differences in the stochastic characteristics of demands. If demands are correlated and the firm faces a capacity constraint, then it can set prices to reduce the variability of aggregate demand, thereby reducing the probability of excess demand and the associated service quality deterioration. Demands that covary negatively with aggregate demand are valuable to the firm in much the same way that securities that covary negatively with the market are valuable in a stock portfolio. Customer classes that exhibit low covariance with aggregate demand realize lower optimal prices. Optimal capacity is also affected by these covariances. As long as demands are not perfectly positively correlated, expected costs of joint production are less than expected costs of serving demands separately.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Does computer penetration increase farmers’ income? An empirical study from China

The diffusion and adoption of modern information technology provide new chance for China to close urban-rural income gap. This paper uses China's provincial panel data from 2002 to 2013 to investigate the effect of computer penetration on rural residents' income. A public program aiming to connect every village with broadband Internet and other rural facilities provides plausibly exogenous variation in rural residents' availability and adoption of the broadband Internet, which is used to explore the instrument variable for rural computer penetration. The results show that rural computer penetration tends to increase rural residents' income over time, but the average effect remains limited. The dynamic panel threshold effects model, which allows for both the threshold variable and other covariates to be endogenous, is further used to explore the constraints of the income-increase effect of rural computer penetration. It shows that the effect is at least doubled over the average effect estimated from instrument variables method, once the digital divide causes are removed. Our findings have important implications for the government to increase rural residents' income and reduce urban-rural income gap by encouraging rural computer usage and removing the digital divide.     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

预包装食品标签标注内容探讨

通过分析、研分我国目前现存法律法规中对食品标签的标注内容的规定,探讨企业自行设计食品标签的方法,帮助有关监督管理部门对食品标签的管理,提高产品监督抽查标签标识的合格率.     

Regulatory inertia versus ICT dynamics: The case of product innovations

This article conjectures that the legacy industry-specific regulation that has governed the telecommunications sector for a long time is in basic conflict with the dynamics and product innovations that characterize the modern information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Reasons for the failure of legacy regulation to promote product innovations are explained and proposals for alternatives, such as deregulation and regulatory reform are discussed. Both regulation and competition policy are more difficult for ICT than for other sectors. Therefore both, regulation and competition policy may need reforms in order to deal with new problems. The most drastic and most realistic alternative to legacy-type regulation remains deregulation and a move to competition policy. Symmetric regulation, smart regulation, quasi-Coasean approaches and subsidies all have some limited applicability to specific situations, but are all associated with complications that have to be resolved, while competition policy is a comprehensive alternative. Last-mile access and gatekeeper access are analyzed as two main areas of legacy regulation, which are in danger of being exported to other ICT areas. Such exports may negatively affect the dynamics of the ICT industry. Rather than being exported, legacy regulations should be reduced in order to enhance product innovations.