Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Non-renewable resources in the long run

We model a competitive economy in which production is dependent on labor and a non-renewable resource, the stock of which is inhomogeneous. We solve the model analytically and show how—in infinite time—the economy moves away from an initial balanced growth path (b.g.p.) and towards a mature b.g.p. The characteristics of the initial b.g.p. match historical observations of slowly declining resource price and consumption growth tracking global product. The mature b.g.p. depends on the nature of the stock; the more steeply cross-sectional area declines with depth, the faster the rate of price increase. We show how the theoretical model may be adapted and parameterized to explain and predict the evolution of markets for specific resources, applying the model in two cases, copper and petroleum.     

基于Hotelling模型的医药零售业选址策略研究

应用Hotelling模型解释医药零售企业选址问题,将商誉变量引入Hotelling模型来分析两家医药零售企业在同一线性市场的选址竞争策略。模型分析表明,当两家药店商誉相同时,同时进入线性市场的两家药店将选址于线性市场的两端;当两家药店商誉不同时,商誉较高一方将选址与线性市场的中央,而商誉较低一方则将选址于线性市场的两端。     

电子商务环境下零售商分销渠道的选择

针对电子商务环境下的产品分销渠道,研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中零售商分销渠道的选择问题。运用主从博弈和Hotelling模型,分别建立了单一线下渠道模型和在同价策略下的双渠道模型,通过对模型的分析,给出了零售商选择不同分销渠道的条件。研究表明:制造商会积极促使零售商选择线上线下双渠道;构建线上渠道的运营成本会影响零售商的渠道选择。研究结果对零售商的渠道选择有一定的指导意义。     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.     

产业间平台合作下的双边定价机制研究——基于对固有收益影响的分析

本文以近期日益增多的产业间平台企业合作为背景,针对合作后平台用户固有收益水平提高这一特征,构建了双寡头竞争模型,以此分析合作对平台定价的影响。研究发现,随着合作平台上用户固有收益水平的提高,该平台将提高产生较弱网络外部性的一边用户的定价,而对另一边用户的定价则必须视平台双边用户交叉网络外部性大小差异而定。不仅如此,合作还增加了该平台上双边用户定价的非对称程度。对与之竞争的非合作平台而言,双边用户的定价则恰恰相反。研究还表明,合作可能提高合作平台的利润水平,增加消费者总剩余和社会总福利。这启示规制机构在对双边平台合作进行规制时要特别谨慎,切忌过度干预。     

消费激励对厂商定价选址行为的影响

企业的消费激励策略构成产品的差异特征,通过改变消费者的需求来影响企业的定价方式和定位。文章利用Hotelling两阶段博弈模型,在考虑运输成本基础上,进一步引入消费激励,来分析两个竞争销售企业在消费激励条件下选址定价问题。消费激励使得价格上升,减弱了企业间的价格竞争,也使得企业扩大空间差异的经济效果显著,企业在空间上有集聚的趋势。     

市场结构与横向产品差别化的相互关系分析

产品差别化对市场结构的形成有很大的作用,经典的豪特林模型只得出了产品差别最小化和最大化原则,由此模型得到的市场结构为完全竞争市场和寡头垄断市场,但垄断竞争市场却无法得到。文章在豪特林模型的基础上构造出统一框架,不但分析产品最大和最小差别情况,而且提出中间程度差别化的分析模型。得出所时应的三种市场结构。尤其是中间程度的差别化对应的垄断竞争市场。对这三种市场结构进行社会福利分析,得出在消费者不同质时,相对于完全竞争市场,垄断竞争市场是相对较好的选择。     

农产品区域品牌竞争力的经济学分析

文章运用豪泰林市场需求模型,从经济学的角度对农产品区域品牌竞争力进行了解析。经过分析认为,农产品所在地域的区域要素,即地域资源禀赋、组织管理能力、农业生态环境等以及消费者对品牌的差别感知,形成了农产品区域品牌竞争力的重要来源。最后通过对分析结论的总结,提出了具有针对性的提升农产品区域品牌竞争力的对策。     

A theory of multihoming in rideshare competition

We examine competition among ridesharing platforms, where firms compete on both price and the wait time induced with idled drivers. We show that when consumers are the only agents who multihome, idleness is lower in duopoly than when consumers face a monopoly ridesharing platform. When drivers and consumers multihome, idleness further falls to zero as it involves costs for each platform that are appropriated, in part, by their rival. Interestingly, socially superior outcomes may involve monopoly or competition under various multihoming regimes, depending on the density of the city, and the relative costs of idleness versus consumer disutility of waiting.