论国有企业改革中的管理层收购

管理层收购在本质上是一种杠杆收购行为,是20世纪70年代流行于欧美国家的一种企业收购方式。它在我国近年来的实践中有着多种模式,由于我国的特殊背景,在实施过程中,面临着法律和市场两个方面的障碍。本文主要讨论管理层收购的方案设计与模式,重点分析我国管理层收购中存在的问题,并提出相关建议,     

杠杆收购（LBO）与税收：美国经验与启示

全球经济衰退背景下,中国企业的兼并重组势在必行。杠杆收购作为资本市场并购的重要方式必然是理论界与实务界关注的热点领域。文章以美国杠杆收购与税务问题为主线,探讨了杠杆收购的内涵、杠杆收购的税收成本与收益、杠杆收购的非税成本与收益等问题,最后指出了对我国杠杆收购业务的启示。     

The Impacts of LBOs on the Performance of Acquired Firms: The French Case

This paper investigates the financial characteristics and changes in performance of French companies involved in a leveraged buy–out. The empirical study covers a sample of 161 MBOs in France from 1988 to 1994. The acquired firms outperform their counterparts in the same sector of activity before and after the buy–out. However, unlike findings concerning LBOs in the USA and the UK, the performance of French firms falls after the operation is completed. This downturn in performance seems to be less detrimental to former subsidiaries of groups than to former family businesses.     

Consistent valuation of project finance and LBOs using the flows‐to‐equity method

The flows‐to‐equity method is used to value transactions where debt amortizes according to a fixed schedule, requiring a formula that links the changing leverage with a time‐varying equity discount rate. We show that extant formulas yield incorrect valuations because they are inconsistent with the basic assumptions of this method. The error from using the wrong formula can be large, especially at currently low interest rates. We derive a formula that captures the effects of a fixed debt plan, potentially expensive debt, and costs of financial distress. We resolve an important issue about what to use as the cost of debt.     

中国现阶段MBO方式的可行性探讨

随着《上市公司收购管理办法》的颁布,MBO目前已成了媒体的焦点,但在中国是否可行,仍需要进一步研究论证。党的十六大的召开,预示着国有资产管理体制将有突破性的变革。为减少政策风险,国有企业应当根据实际情况,在与主营关联度较小的产业领域、新进入领域运用管理层杠杆收购(LBO)的方式降低投资风险、提高企业的管理竞争力。     

Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions Revisited

Lehn and Poulsen (1983) are frequently cited as providing evidence supporting the applicability of Jensen's (1986) 'free cash flow' hypothesis to going private transactions. The paper re-examines the Lehn and Poulsen data and arrives at different inferences about the applicability of Jensen's 'free cash flow' hypothesis to their sample. First, I find that neither the level of a public corporation's pre-transaction 'free cash flows' nor its prior growth rate are significant determinants of its probability of going private. Second, I find a firm's size and its potential for reducing taxes, rather than its pre-transaction level of 'free cash flows', are significant determinants of the premium paid to take it private. And finally, comparing their 1980–1983 subsample to their 1984–1987 subsample reveals that firms that went private during the 1984–1987 period demonstrate a greater incidence of prior takeover interest, lower prior tax burdens, and slower prior growth than firms that went private during the 1980–1983 period: all of which supports Kaplan and Stein's (1993) overheated buyout market hypothesis.     

杠杆收购(LBO)与税收:美国经验与启示

全球经济衰退背景下,中国企业的兼并重组势在必行.杠杆收购作为资本市场并购的重要方式必然是理论界与实务界关注的热点领域.文章以美国杠杆收购与税务问题为主线,探讨了杠杆收购的内涵、杠杆收购的税收成本与收益、杠杆收购的非税成本与收益等问题,最后指出了对我国杠杆收购业务的启示.     

企业并购的重要方式——杠杆收购

杠杆收购是20世纪80年代出现的一种企业并购方式,它的出现改变了传统的企业并购局面,使“小鱼吃大鱼”成为可能。杠杆收购的原理其实质就是举债收购,通常有三个程序。杠杆收入既可为企业带来丰厚的利润,也可能带来巨额的亏损,因此不可忽视杠杆收入在伴随着收入背后存在较高的风险。