Leadership mindsets: Why new managers fail and what to do about it

It is not a secret that many leadership development programs are not producing intended results, and the majority of first-time managers are ineffective. Even though organizations prioritize leadership development, most companies recognize that their programs need improvement in selecting and developing first-time managers. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the assumptions that these programs are based on. First, while organizations tend to promote high-performing individual contributors, the mindsets of an effective individual contributor do not translate to effective leadership mindsets. Second, leadership development programs generally assume that new managers can change behavior by focusing on skill development. These programs fail to identify, name, and address the underlying mindsets that influence individual action. In this article, I highlight research on leadership and leadership mindsets that can replace the flawed assumptions of underperforming leadership selection and training programs. Building on leadership mindset research, I make recommendations to help organizations better select and train new managers.     

Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments

Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University.     

组织信任及决策承诺与决策质量之关系探讨

通过关注组织信任在战略决策过程中的作用机制，研究组织成员间的信任与战略决策质量的关系，尤其是受信任影响较大的决策承诺在其中的中介作用。对组织信任、决策承诺和决策质量概念进行了系统的探索性分析和验证性分析，证实了组织信任对战略决策质量有显著的正相关关系，研究结论是组织信任对决策质量的影响主要是通过决策者的决策承诺来传递的。     

信任、不信任与控制关系及其应用研究的现状与思考

信任、不信任与控制之间的关系及其应用,已成为当代众多社会科学学科研究信任问题的子焦点之一。我们依据近年国外有关文献的调研,认为：缺乏一个以当代众多社会科学领域重要的理论命题为基础的、统一的科学、严谨、结构合理的三者关系的分析框架,是当前深化和推进有关研究必须克服的一个障碍。     

社会资本发展对企业财务的影响分析

社会资本理论于80年代晚期才引起理论界的广泛关注,此后又引入企业社会资本概念。社会资本的积累直接关系到企业的生存与发展,本文将社会资本理论应用于财务领域,从收益和风险两方面探讨了企业投资于社会资本应考虑的问题,为企业有目的地构建社会资本做初步分析。     

A multilevel, identity-based approach to leadership development

A frontier of leadership development is examined involving the respective roles of levels-of-analysis and identity in constructing an integrated development system. An approach is described in which individual and relational leadership identities are the focus of developmental efforts at lower organizational levels (e.g., individual contributor and first-level supervisor) but collective identities become the focus at higher levels (e.g., general manager and above). The separate areas of levels-of-analysis and leader identities are first discussed in terms of their respective relevance to leadership development. These are then discussed jointly in elaborating on a proposed development approach that integrates across organizational levels as well as levels of development (i.e., leader development and leadership development). In developing collective leadership identities, processes that involve participants in engaging across boundaries (functional, hierarchical, geographical) are recommended.     

我国信托业发展及其存在的问题与对策

本文从中国信托业的现状出发,从经济环境、社会信用、市场定位、法律法规等角度,分析信托投资公司存在的问题,并结合中国信托业的实际情况,提出解决问题、加速信托机构健康发展的途径——增强监管机制、创新信托产品、加强与其他金融机构合作等建议。     

社会资本外部性的经济分析——以信任关系为例

以往理论研究与经验研究均指出社会资本具有正面的效应,但对这种效应是怎样取得的并无共识.我们尝试建立一个不完全信息动态博弈模型,说明社会资本-信任如何产生正的外部性,亦即产生超出个体理性计算之外的利益.我们的分析得出这样的结论,在一个多人互动的环境中,能否达到彼此合作或彼此信任,虽然会受到欺骗者所遭到的惩罚与欺骗利益多少的影响,但主要受到所处环境中具有社会资本者人数比例的影响.因此,可以说社会资本具有正的网络外部性,信任者人数越多,信任者所享受到的利益越大.     

Dissertation abstract: Reputational benefits of altruism and altruistic punishment

Recent studies in experimental economics have shown that many people have other-regarding preferences, potentially including preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. It is useful to investigate why people possess such preferences and what functional purpose they might serve outside the laboratory, because evolutionary and social learning perspectives both predict that cooperative sentiments should only exist if they bring benefits that outweigh the costs of other-regarding behavior. Theories of costly signaling suggest that altruistic acts may function (with or without intention) as signals of unobservable qualities such as resources or cooperative intent, and altruists may benefit (possibly unintentionally) from the advertisement of such qualities. After reviewing the theories that could potentially account for the evolution of altruism (Chapter 1), I test some predictions about cooperation derived from costly signaling theory. In Chapter 2, I show that participants in experimental public goods games were more cooperative when they had cues that they could benefit from having a good reputation, and that there was apparently some competition to be the most generous group member. Furthermore, in subsequent trust games, people tended to trust high public goods contributors more than low contributors. Chapter 3 failed to find evidence that granting high status to people makes them more likely to contribute to public goods or punish free-riders, but there was suggestive evidence that physical proximity to the experimenter affected contributions and punishment. In Chapter 4, I found that people tended to trust others who were willing to incur costs to punish those who free-ride on group cooperation provided that such punishment was justified, and men were more punitive than women. In Chapter 5, I show that women find altruistic men more desirable than neutral men for long-term relationships. Together, these results suggest that humans do treat altruism as a signal of willingness to be cooperative. These findings are discussed with respect to the adaptive design of cooperative sentiments as well as the current debate over group selection. Dissertation: Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontarion Currently: Post-Doc, Department of Neurobiology & Behavior, Cornell University     

独立审计质量的经济学分析

本文通过对审计质量的经济学分析,提出高质量的审计是增进契约效率的内生需要,中小股东和上市公司之间的“隐性契约”是推动审计质量提高的重要力量。我国特有的经济环境背景,决定了审计质量的提高存在着制度性障碍,审计质量是各方利益相互均衡的结果。