Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

Non-linear Gaussian sovereign CDS pricing models

Prior literature indicates that quadratic models and the Black–Karasinski model are very promising for CDS pricing. This paper extends these models and the Black [J. Finance 1995, 50, 1371–1376] model for pricing sovereign CDS’s. For all 10 sovereigns in the sample quadratic models best fit CDS spreads in-sample, and a four factor quadratic model can account for the joint effects on CDS spreads of default risk, default loss risk and liquidity risk with no restriction to factors correlation. Liquidity risk appears to affect sovereign CDS spreads. However, quadratic models tend to over-fit some CDS maturities at the expense of other maturities, while the BK model is particularly immune from this tendency. The Black model seems preferable because its out-of-sample performance in the time series dimension is the best.     

Economic interpretations of DEA

Research on productive efficiency at the firm level has developed as an important and active strand of research the last decades, both within operations research, management science and economics. Two apparently different definitions of efficiency are examined, but it is shown that when both estimation methods are based on solving linear programming problems the definitions of efficiency are identical. The purpose of the paper is to give the basic ideas of efficiency analyses using DEA as a tool for researchers not so familiar with efficiency analysis and DEA. The concept of shadow prices is given special attention.     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

A note on the existence of unique equivalent martingale measures in a Markovian setting

Simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure are provided. Furthermore, these conditions give us a handle on situations where an equivalent martingale measure cannot exist. The existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure is of relevance to problems in mathematical finance. Two examples of models for which the question of existence was unresolved are studied. By means of our results existence of a unique equivalent measure up to an explosion time is proved.     

格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析

从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

政府预算过程中的多方利益博弈

本文通过探讨目标各异的多种角色参与的预算过程 ,指出预算过程是一种博弈过程 ,在此过程中代表各方利益的参与者为取得支出优先权展开竞争。本文主要对各支出部门之间、政府预算部门与支出部门之间、政府与公众之间以及中央与地方之间在预算决策中的竞争博弈行为进行分析 ,提出完善预算制度的政策建议。     

QUADRATIC TERM STRUCTURE MODELS FOR RISK-FREE AND DEFAULTABLE RATES

In this paper, quadratic term structure models (QTSMs) are analyzed and characterized in a general Markovian setting. The primary motivation for this work is to find a useful extension of the traditional QTSM, which is based on an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) state process, while maintaining the analytical tractability of the model. To accomplish this, the class of quadratic processes, consisting of those Markov state processes that yield QTSM, is introduced. The main result states that OU processes are the only conservative quadratic processes. In general, however, a quadratic potential can be added to allow QTSMs to model default risk. It is further shown that the exponent functions that are inherent in the definition of the quadratic property can be determined by a system of Riccati equations with a unique admissible parameter set. The implications of these results for modeling the term structure of risk-free and defaultable rates are discussed.