Victory margins and the paradox of voting

This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational–instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myerson's models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US.     

中间选民理论在农民工市民化政策制定中的运用——基武汉市436位农民工的实证研究

The Median Voter Theory is an important theory in the neo-political economics. It can be applied to solve the collective choice paradox and analyze the policy making for the citizenization of peasant workers. Adopting the method of factor analysis, this paper makes an empirical study on peasant workers’ preference for citizenization. We find that there is a paradox of future residence preference and self-identification in peasant workers. On this basis, peasant workers are divided into 5 subgroups, and it is found that the median undecided peasant workers are the median voters. Based on the analysis of the median undecided peasant worker’s complaints and appeals, it is proposed that the country should strengthen the vocational training system, establish a social security system, expand the agricultural reform and promote educational reform to facilitate the citizenization of peasant workers. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 맜理世界 (Management World), 2007, (4): 40–67     

Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.     

The effect of education on the minimum wage

This research shows for the first time that the level of education has a causal, negative effect on the minimum wage. I use 2SLS, with historical educational data as an instrument for the level of education in 2010, and I find that across the US states a one percentage point greater proportion of college graduates is associated with a real minimum wage that is lower by 1.5%–1.6%. Also, in order to control for state-level omitted variables, I regress the change in the minimum wage on the change in education and I find again a negative, and significantly at the 1% level, effect. Minimum wage is a policy that is chosen by governments according to voters’ preferences. The results of this research imply that when the level of education increases voters prefer a lower minimum wage.     

Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty

We study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters׳ preferences to uninformed political candidates. We conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are (initially) unknown and change over time. In the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences. We find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group. In fact, we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups, which convey new information, and uninformative advocacy groups, which do not. Overall, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter. However, advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

"按族裔划分家庭年均收入"标准的实质

通过对各族裔家庭年均收入差距形成的原因进行分析,探讨了当今美国社会中流行的“模范少数民族”理论和“文化缺损理论”,并指出了以家庭年均收入水平为标准来衡量各族裔在美国社会中对经济资源的占有是不科学的,这个标准的提出是多数族裔掩盖各族裔在社会经济资源占有上实质上的不平等的体现。它的使用是多数族裔的政治性行为,其目的是为了巩固多数族裔已取得的政治、经济和社会地位。     

Economies of scale and trade policy: The median voter model revisited

Why do some political economy models perform so poorly in predicting actual trade policy? Do scale economies provide the missing puzzle to our understanding of the anti-trade bias? By integrating economies of scale in production, this paper theoretically reinstates the median voter model as in Mayer [Mayer, W. (1984). Endogenous tariff formation. The American Economic Review, 74, 970–985] as a suitable political economy model in predicting trade policy. The modified model generates the scope for the anti-trade bias and predicts that sometimes economic, rather than political, considerations may lead to restrictive trade.     

Voting on Pensions: A Survey

Abstract. The paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence, size and political sustainability of pay‐as‐you‐go pension systems. It proposes a simple framework of analysis (a small, open, two overlapping generation economy model), around which some variants are displayed. Dictatorship of the median voter is assumed. The text is organized to answer the following questions: (i) Do political equilibria with PAYG pension schemes exist? (ii) Why do they emerge? (iii) What are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified?, and finally, (iv) What is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous (e.g. demographic) shock?     

Is it the economic policy,stupid? Economic policy,political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage

Incumbent politicians have a well-known advantage in seeking re-election. Using the Economic Freedom of North America dataset, we examine how changes in economic policy during an incumbent governor's tenure influence the probability of losing their re-election bid. Put simply, does economic policy matter for the incumbent advantage? The results suggest that a decrease in economic freedom increases the probability of an incumbent loss, regardless of the governor's party. A decomposition analysis indicates that these results are primarily driven by the government spending sub-index. Furthermore, a more granular analysis suggests that: (1) increases in government consumption spending and government employment are associated with a lower probability of re-election among Democratic incumbent governors, but a higher probability among Republicans; (2) increases in transfer payments relative to personal income reduce the likelihood of re-election, regardless of party; and (3) among Republican incumbents, increases of income taxation and of top marginal tax rates are associated with a higher and lower, respectively, probability of losing re-election. Finally, controlling for a variety of demographic, political and socioeconomic factors, we find that high unemployment increases the probability that an incumbent loses re-election, while increasing net population migration reduces it.