Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

下属潜能的开发——论企业人才从何而来

对企业而言，面对日益激烈的竞争，如何赢得或保住市场都是极为严峻的挑战。能够帮助企业迎接这一挑战的核心竞争力，便是来自高素质高技能的队伍——人才。企业缺乏合适的人才，如若采用挖墙脚方式虽可解救燃眉之急，但无法长期满足企业成长的需要，因此企业应着重于从内部培养。管理人员的一个最重要的职责就是有效地培育与发展下属，并激励团队成员为组织的目标全力以赴。从公司内部培养和提拔业务骨干和中层管理人员，对企业的长远发展来讲是一件非常重要的事情。公司的每位中、高级管理者都有培养下属的责任。但多数企业并没有下大力气实施人才培养，这其中有观念的问题也有实际的障碍。     

格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析

从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

政府预算过程中的多方利益博弈

本文通过探讨目标各异的多种角色参与的预算过程 ,指出预算过程是一种博弈过程 ,在此过程中代表各方利益的参与者为取得支出优先权展开竞争。本文主要对各支出部门之间、政府预算部门与支出部门之间、政府与公众之间以及中央与地方之间在预算决策中的竞争博弈行为进行分析 ,提出完善预算制度的政策建议。     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

公司治理结构中经营者盈余管理的博弈分析

本文从经营者与监督者之间的博弈模型入手,讨论了公司治理结构对盈余管理的影响,并在分析了我国目前的公司治理结构存在的问题后,提出了一些措施,最后给出了研究建议。     

从博弈论看商务谈判僵局的本质和处理

商务谈判中的僵局是谈判双方都不愿看到但又不得不面对的难题。只有了解了商务谈判僵局产生的本质才能够更好地处理好谈判中的僵局。从博弈论的角度,对商务谈判僵局的本质进行了分析,指出在挖掘共同利益的过程中既可以寻求到瓜分共同利益的有效途径,又可寻找到共同利益与个体利益实现的最佳结合点。