区域知识产权保护发展的空间格局及结构体系研究

以我国各省知识产权保护制度为研究对象，创新性地将探索性空间数据分析方法与社会网络分析方法相结合，基于地理邻近视角，验证了区域知识产权保护的空间相关性、空间集聚特征和空间溢出效应。同时，突破地理近邻效应的局限，解析区域知识产权保护的空间关联特征。结果表明：我国各省知识产权保护具有全局自相关性，相似地区间存在空间集聚效应，不同发展程度地区的空间关联性质不同；网络化后的区域知识产权保护各节点间联系紧密、网络结构稳定，并且可以确定核心行动者和边缘行动者角色；长三角、珠三角、环渤海等较发达地区与其它地区之间存在较多溢出关系。     

管理层权力制衡强度、债务约束与企业创新投资

企业创新是国家经济可持续增长的关键，受到管理层意愿的影响，因而需要对内部经营者的权力进行制衡。以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验管理层权力制衡强度对企业创新投资的影响，以及不同债务约束情境下高商业信用配置、高负债水平的调节效应，此外，还考察了产权性质的差异化影响。研究表明，管理层权力制衡强度越大，企业创新投资水平越高；高商业信用强化了该促进作用，而高负债水平弱化了该促进作用。进一步研究发现，管理层权力制衡强度与企业创新投资的关系在民企中更显著；国企能够更好地获得和运用商业信用，使其高商业信用对该关系的强化效应更显著；民企具有更强的债务约束，其高负债水平对该关系的弱化效应更明显。     

开放式创新社区中用户交互反馈对个体创新贡献度的影响

开放社区中的用户交互反馈是用户创新活动的重要组成部分，基于需求满足理论，研究其他用户反馈对个体创新贡献度的影响。结合典型开放式产品设计社区——Local Motors平台，采用数据挖掘方法，从数量、质量和情感3个方面研究开放式创新社区中FOU对个体创新贡献度的影响。结果表明，反馈数量和质量均对个体创新贡献度有显著影响，其中反馈次数对个体创新贡献度有显著正向影响，反馈率和反馈人员多样性对个体创新贡献度有显著负向影响，反馈长度和反馈支持文件对个体创新贡献度没有影响，正向情感倾向在用户反馈和个体创新贡献度之间无任何调节作用。     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

刑事涉财产执行中的案外人权益救济——以案外人权益救济程序的当事人构造为视角

刑事涉财产执行程序因采取移送执行模式而被误认为不存在申请执行人，使得刑事涉财产执行程序及其衍生的案外人权益救济程序过分依赖执行法院的职权主义。在刑事附带民事诉讼裁判、追缴或责令退赔违法所得并返还被害人判项、责令被免予刑事处罚的被告人赔偿被害人损失判项的执行程序中，案外人权益救济程序原则上应以被害人为申请执行人，并参照适用民事强制执行程序中的案外人权益救济制度。其他刑事涉财产执行程序应以检察机关为申请执行人。除非出现被执行人逃避执行或者案外人对执行标的提出排除执行请求等特殊情形，作为申请执行人的检察机关通常无须现实参加执行程序。     

The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts

Growth in property ownership has raised the stakes in the distribution of financial assets on divorce. Given high risks of marital failure, this has stimulated the demand for private ordering through enforceable marriage contracts. This paper surveys the existing law and economics literature and legal practice to consider the state of knowledge on the economic theory, scope and limits of written nuptial agreements.     

和谐社会与价值--能量理论

本文延续了《经济学的本质》、《经济学的表象》两书提出的“价值-能量”理论,对构建和谐社会的要求、过程和目的进行了科学的分析,并为之奠定了科学的理论基础.     

A model of the origins of basic property rights

This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysis explores, in particular, the roles of the players' fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right.     

Game theoretic derivations of competitive strategies in conjoint analysis

While conjoint analysis has been applied in a wide variety of different contexts in Marketing, most applications fail to explicitly consider retaliatory reactions from competitors. In this paper, a methodological extension is developed for conjoint analysis by explicitly modeling competition in a game theoretic context. The Nash equilibrium concept is employed to model competitive reactions to produce design, and its implications for reactive product strategies are discussed. The optimal product design problem for each firm is formulated as a nonlinear integer programming problem, which is solved via a specialized branch and bound method combined with a heuristic. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium, a sequential iterative procedure is proposed. The proposed procedure is illustrated under several scenarios of competition using previously published conjoint data.This research has been supported by the Henry Rutgers Research Fellowship, Rutgers University.