On the difficulty of combining actual and potential criteria for an increase in social welfare

Summary. This paper examines two problems associated with the use of potential Pareto criteria in welfare economics. The first problem is the well-known intransitivity of the compensation criteria à la Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky. The second problem is the possible incompatibility between the Chipman-Moore-Samuelson criterion and the Pareto principle. The main result of this paper is that, in order to avoid either of these problems, it is necessary and sufficient that the domain to which these criteria are used is such that the Chipman-Moore-Samuelson criterion encompasses completely the Pareto criterion. When interpreted in a standard economic environment, this result is shown to be equivalent to Gorman's requirement of non-crossing between utility possibility frontiers. Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: March 2, 2000     

Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice

Do violations of classical rationality theory imply that agents are acting against their self-interest? To answer this question, we investigate whether completeness and transitivity necessarily hold when agents choose outcome rationally—that is, their choice sequences do not lead to dominated outcomes. We show that, because of the danger of money pumps and other manipulations, outcome rationality implies that agents must have transitive psychological preferences. Revealed preferences, on the other hand, must be complete since agents can be forced to choose from any set of options. But these justifications of transitivity and completeness cannot be combined. We show that if psychological preferences are incomplete then revealed preferences can be intransitive without exposing agents to manipulations or violating outcome rationality. We also show that a specific case of nonstandard behavior, status quo maintenance, is outcome-rational in the simple environments considered in the experimental literature, but not in more complex settings.     

Statistical Inference under Symmetry

We explore the consequences of adjoining a symmetry group to a statistical model. Group actions are first induced on the sample space, and then on the parameter space. It is argued that the right invariant measure induced by the group on the parameter space is a natural non-informative prior for the parameters of the model. The permissible sub-parameters are introduced, i.e., the subparameters upon which group actions can be defined. Equivariant estimators are similarly defined. Orbits of the group are defined on the sample space and on the parameter space; in particular the group action is called transitive when there is only one orbit. Credibility sets and confidence sets are shown (under right invariant prior and assuming transitivity on the parameter space) to be equal when defined by permissible sub-parameters and constructed from equivariant estimators. The effect of different choices of transformation group is illustrated by examples, and properties of the orbits on the sample space and on the parameter space are discussed. It is argued that model reduction should be constrained to one or several orbits of the group. Using this and other natural criteria and concepts, among them concepts related to design of experiments under symmetry, leads to links towards chemometrical prediction methods and towards the foundation of quantum theory.     

The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions

Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that all preference aggregation rules (PARs) must violate a specific set of normative conditions (transitivity, Pareto, IIA, nondictatorship) over an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. However, the theorem does not address which PARs are more likely to violate those conditions across preference profiles. We compare the probabilities that thirteen PARs (anti-plurality, Hare, Nanson, plurality, plurality runoff, Simpson–Kramer, Baldwin, Borda, Coombs, Copeland, Dowdall, pairwise majority, and ranked pairs) violate Arrow’s conditions. We prove that Baldwin, Borda, Coombs, Copeland, Dowdall, and ranked pairs are less likely to violate IIA than the first six PARs, and they are less likely to violate Arrow’s conditions jointly. In contrast, pairwise majority never violates IIA but can violate transitivity. Simulations with three alternatives reveal that among the PARs studied, pairwise majority is the most likely to satisfy Arrow’s conditions jointly. Our results suggest pairwise majority violates transitivity with a small probability, while the other PARs violate IIA with much larger probabilities.     

A simple characterization of majority rule

Summary. Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity. This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskin's, dispenses with another, and contains weak versions of his other two axioms. It allows the number of voters to be odd or even. Received: December 23, 1998; revised version: May 10, 1999     

Preference through indifference: a topological approach

Two problems of consumer theory are approached topologically. An intrinsic topological characterization of transitivity of indifference is provided. Under very weak assumptions, indifference classes are proved to determine the continuous preference inducing them. Moreover, conditions, under which a given topology is the weakest making a preference continuous, are obtained.     

形式对等:对《送友人》英译文的及物性分析

本文把功能语法的及物性作为衡量形式对等的工具,对<送友人>一诗的四种英译文进行对比分析,从另外一个角度去探讨各个译本的得失之处.本文旨在证明及物性系统理论对研究形式对等是一种有用的方法,并且进一步证明系统功能语言学应用于翻译研究的可行性与可操作性.