南阳市乡村聚落空间分布特征及驱动力分析

[目的]通过研究乡村聚落的空间结构和影响因素,可以揭示人类活动与生态形成的机制,对南阳市乡村聚落空间分布的优化和重构具有重要意义。[方法]文章利用渐变尺度空间结构度量法、最近邻指数模型和分布密度对乡村聚落的空间分布特征进行分析,用探测力指数对影响因素进行分析,定量探究南阳市乡村聚落的空间分布特征和驱动因素。[结果]VCM曲线分析结果表明63.70%的乡村聚落与相邻聚落的距离在500~1000m内,该范围内乡村聚落比较集中。通过研究距离城镇的距离与乡村聚落分布的关系,发现距离城镇越远,乡村数量越少;距离城镇越近,乡村的数量越多。南阳市乡村聚落的空间分布最邻近指数N=0.8863,属于集聚分布,各县乡村聚落的分布密度差异较大。[结论]该文利用不同的模型对南阳市乡村聚落的空间分布特征进行研究,探测到乡村分布的特征及影响乡村聚落空间分布的决定性因素。在城镇化的进程中,乡村空间分布的重构应该以集约用地、提高有效耕地面积为前提,合理安排土地结构的有效利用,并结合当地的资源条件因地制宜发展农村经济。     

基于价值链管理的成本会计的完善

随着科学技术和经济全球化的发展,会计环境发生变化,价值链管理成为企业管理的重要思想。传统的成本会计弊端暴露,已经不能适应价值链管理思想的需要。文中从价值链管理的需要出发,指出传统成本会计的缺陷,并为现代成本会计的完善提出建议。     

Punishment in a Linear Public Good Game with Productivity Heterogeneity

Summary  Although it is widely recognized that sanction increases cooperation in a public good game, comparatively little attention has been paid to a scenario in which agents have heterogeneous productivities (i.e. asymmetric impact on the group account). This paper examines the extent to which sanction works in this scenario by varying marginal per capita return (MPCR) among group members. Experimental results indicate that in the absence of sanctions, productivity heterogeneity hampers cooperation. Allowing punishment in these groups significantly enhances average contributions of group members, but does not increase welfare. In groups in which cooperation is highly successful, high-productivity agents actively punish low-productivity agents in initial periods. However, conditional on individual contributions, high-productivity agents receive more punishment, and behave more responsively by raising their contributions in the next period. The results mirror the reality in which elites in a society are under higher pressure, since their choices are likely to have a deeper impact on a society.     

论价值链管理与企业标准化

价值链管理作为当前全球最新的一种管理模式,已经被世界上许多大型企业所推广和采用,但与企业标准化方面的结合还较少有探讨。本文是从正面和侧面六个方面分析阐述了价值链管理与企业标准化之间的关系,作为两者结合的一种初步探讨。     

Building Trust? Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Social Capital*

In this paper, we propose a measure of social capital based on behaviour in a public goods game. We conducted a public goods game within 28 groups in two similar neighbourhoods in Cartagena, Colombia, one of which had been targeted for over two years by a conditional cash transfer programme that has an important social component. The level of cooperation we observe in the ‘treatment’ community is considerably higher than that in the ‘control’ community. The two neighbourhoods, however, although similar in many dimensions, turn out to be significantly different in other observable variables. The result we obtain in terms of cooperation, however, is robust to controls for these observable differences. We also compare our measure of social capital with other more traditional measures that have been used in the literature.