Certainty Independence and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs

Economists often operate under an implicit assumption that the tastes of a decision maker are quite stable, while his beliefs change with the availability of new information. We show that for a general class of preferences, a separation of a key component of tastes, the utility function, from the other components of the representation is possible only if the decision maker's preferences satisfy a mild but not completely innocuous condition, called ‘certainty independence’. We also outline the axiomatic characterization of the preferences that obtain such separation, which are a subset of the biseparable preferences.     

QUANTIFYING THE OUTSOURCING OF JOBS FROM MANUFACTURING TO SERVICES

There has been debate internationally and in South Africa about the extent to which a relative decline in manufacturing employment and rise in services employment can be accounted for by intersectoral outsourcing of jobs in the domestic economy. This article develops a new methodology for testing for and quantifying outsourcing at an economy-wide level. This methodology is used to analyse intersectoral shifts in employment in South Africa between 1997 and 2005. Trends in employment in the business services subsector of services are also examined for what they suggest about the extent of outsourcing. Overall, the results suggest that intersectoral outsourcing accounts for some but by no means all of the apparent shift in employment between the manufacturing and services sectors in South Africa.     

西气东输工程用感应加热弯管技术条件探讨

在对国外X70管线弯管技术条件进行调查分析与研究的基础上，对其中的几个关键技术问题包括母管成分，弯管的制造工艺和技术路线，强度与韧性要求，屈强比，Cu污染问题等进行了讨论。一些观点在西气东输感应加弯管技术条件中得到应用。     

Probability theory in fuzzy sample spaces

This paper tries to develop a neat and comprehensive probability theory for sample spaces where the events are fuzzy subsets of The investigations are focussed on the discussion how to equip those sample spaces with suitable -algebras and metrics. In the end we can point out a unified concept of random elements in the sample spaces under consideration which is linked with compatible metrics to express random errors. The result is supported by presenting a strong law of large numbers, a central limit theorem and a Glivenko-Cantelli theorem for these kinds of random elements, formulated simultaneously w.r.t. the selected metrics. As a by-product the line of reasoning, which is followed within the paper, enables us to generalize as well as to bring together already known results and concepts from literature.Acknowledgement. The author would like to thank the participants of the 23rd Linz Seminar on Fuzzy Set Theory for the intensive discussion of the paper. Especially he is indebted to Professors Diamond and Höhle whose remarks have helped to get deeper insights into the subject. Additionally, the author is grateful to one anonymous referee for careful reading and valuable proposals which have led to an improvement of the first draft.This paper was presented at the 23rd Linz Seminar on Fuzzy Set Theory, Linz, Austria, February 5–9, 2002.     

Observable restrictions of general equilibrium models with financial markets

This paper examines whether general equilibrium models of exchange economies with incomplete financial markets impose restrictions on prices of commodities and assets given the stochastic processes of dividends and aggregate endowments. We show that the assumption of time-separable expected utility implies restriction on the cross-section of asset prices as well as on spot commodity prices. However, a relaxation of the assumption of time separability will generally destroy these restriction.     

Reserve price signaling

In a general auction model in which bidders’ signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers’ signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models.     

Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers’ net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyers’ risks, Cournot equilibrium outcomes are close to being second-best. In contrast, if insurance buyers are price takers, equilibria fail to exist or are bounded away from being second-best.     

Educating digital natives for the future: accounting educators’ evaluation of the accounting curriculum

The global digital revolution has irrevocably transformed societies and industries. The accounting profession is predicted to experience a significant change in the future, due to technological developments. Practices will be automated and related positions obsolete, thus accounting graduates need to be educated for new and different tasks and positions. The current study focussed on these expected changes and how accounting profession, practice and, consequently, education will be affected and adjusted to these new technologies in an evaluation approach. A qualitative methodology was employed, investigating accounting educators’ perceptions of these developments. Semi-structured interview data and online accessible empirical data, such as podcasts, were analysed in two coding cycles. The findings illustrate that while significant changes are expected, participants’ opinions vary regarding the necessity of adjusting the accounting curriculum. Supportive changes include amending respective courses to emphasise classic skills, such as problem-solving, and contemporary skills, such as new technologies, to illustrate developments practically.     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.