Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

The heterogeneous relationship between board social ties and corporate environmental responsibility in an emerging economy

Firms in emerging economies are faced with multiple, incompatible institutional forces in their environmental activities. Which of these forces will be dominant and instantiated within an organization is partly determined by the social relationships that a firm maintains with external actors. This paper investigates the relationship between board social ties and the level of environmental responsibility undertaken by firms in China, an emerging economy, by categorizing board social ties into three types in terms of the three isomorphic forces in the institutional field (coercive, normative and mimetic). Drawing on institutional and agency theories, using a sample of listed firms in environmentally sensitive industries, and a generalized least squares regression method, the results provide empirical evidence that ties that are linked to coercive and normative forces (i.e., political organizations and universities) are related to a higher level of environmental responsibility; however, those that are linked to mimetic forces (i.e., industrial peers) have a negative association with environmental responsibility, which is mitigated by CEO power. These findings suggest that the heterogeneous effects of board social ties on environmental responsibilities experienced by firms in a context of environmentalism are at an early stage.     

入世后旅行社人才竞争对策分析

入民后旅行社业遭受的最大冲击将是人才的竞争。本文在分析我国旅行社面对的人才竞争态势基础上，从企业机制变革、转变人才观念、培育激励制度、职业经理人的培养和强化企业品牌等几方面分析了旅行社应对这场人才竞争应采取的对策。     

Working-time reduction and employment: experiences in Europe and economic policy recommendations

The paper seeks to evaluate the evidence on the employment effectsof the collective working-time reductions in Europe over thepast 20 years. While theoretical analyses produce contradictoryassessments, most empirical studies show positive employmenteffects but take insufficient account of these conditions underwhich the reductions in working time were implemented. Theseconditions for the success of collective working-time reductionsinclude an active training policy designed to minimise skillshortages in the labour market, the modernisation of work organisation,wage increases in conjunction with productivity gains and amore equal income distribution.     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

Whose Capital is It? Putting Owners Back in Control

John Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, looks at corporate governance issues. JEL Classification G3     

Motives in the Acquisitions of NASDAQ Targets during the Aftermath of the 1987 Crash

After the crash of 1987, the Nasdaq composite index stayed below the precrash level for nearly two years. Takeover activity surged in this after‐crash period. We compare the motives in the acquisitions of Nasdaq targets during the after‐crash period with those in the ten‐year period before the crash. We find that the announcement period return to acquirers and the proportion of acquirers with positive gains declines in the after‐crash period. For both the periods, agency is the motive for takeovers that have negative total gains (acquirer + target), but synergy and hubris are comotives for takeovers that have positive total gains. The proportion of takeovers in which the managers of acquirers act against the interest of the shareholders increases after the crash.     

论我国现行代理制度的缺陷及完善

代理制度是民商法中一项重要的法律制度,它在现代商品经济中起着不可或缺的作用。过去我国由于商品经济长期不发达,我国的民法,特别是其中的代理制度处于严重的滞后状态,这对我国目前市场经济的发展产生了负面影响。因此,对我国民事代理制度存在的缺陷加以检讨和反思,以期对我国的代理立法和实务有所裨益。     

Extending working hours: why not work 42 h rather than 38?—a CGE analysis for Germany

Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported.     

浅议管理审计与公司治理

管理审计是公司内部审计的重要组成部分,是一项基于受托管理(经营)责任关系的以审查管理信息为中心任务的证实行为。公司治理是现代公司制的棱心,是以内部监督为挂心的制度安排,包括权力制衡、激励约束及信息反馈等内在机制。管理审计对于公司治理具有极其重要的作用,应充分发挥它的这种作用。