上市公司CEO的监管机制：一个三方博弈视觉的思考

所有权与经营权的分离是现代企业的基本特征,内部人控制问题已成为制约上市公司健康稳定发展的瓶颈因素。本文通过建立一个CEO、董事会和外部监管机构三方之间的博弈模型,强调了监管的重要性;并从完善董事会职能和加强外部监管力度两个方面对上市公司CEO的道德风险之监管提出合理性建议。     

FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE LONG‐TERM SURVIVAL OF MICRO,SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN ETHIOPIA

There is an increasing recognition of the potential importance of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) for employment, income and poverty reduction in Ethiopia. Although the MSME sector contributes significantly to the national economy, the high failure rate among well established small businesses and enterprises is a matter of major concern. A random sample of 500 small businesses and enterprises selected from five major cities in Ethiopia were followed up for 6 years in order to assess the impact of influential factors that affect the long‐term survival and viability of small enterprises. Hazard ratios estimated from the Cox Proportional Hazards Model were used to quantify the impact of key predictors of survival. Businesses that ceased operation were characterised by inadequate finance (61%), low level of education (55%), poor managerial skills (54%), shortage of technical skills (49%), and inability to convert part of their profit to investment (46%). The study shows that participation in social capital and networking (iqqub schemes) was critically helpful for long‐term survival. Businesses that did not participate in iqqub schemes regularly were found to be 3.25 times more likely to fail in comparison with businesses that did. Results of the study have implications that could be used for developing policy initiatives that are aimed at fostering long‐term growth in small businesses and enterprises.     

The negative trade-off between risk and incentives: Evidence from the american whaling industry

This paper analyzes the trade-off between risk and incentives in the share contracts of the American whaling industry. Using a newly collected panel of 5378 individuals who sailed on more than 1000 whaling voyages from 1855–68, the response of sailors’ compensation to an increase in risk is estimated. The risks used to identify this response resulted from the commerce-raiding naval vessels of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As the Confederate cruisers sailed primarily in the Atlantic, and therefore posed far less of a threat to whaling voyages to other oceans, a quasi-experimental approach focusing on the differences between Atlantic voyages compared to others is implemented. The results are consistent with a negative trade-off between risk and incentives in the industry’s contracts. Moreover, evidence is found of selection among less risk-averse sailors and merchants into riskier voyages during the war.     

南京市重大危险源监管体系中的物流对策分析

根据南京市重大危险源普查报告,分析了南京市重大危险源的基本状况和监管中存在的问题,以提高应急物流反应能力为目标,分别从监管模式的改进、监管政策保障措施建设和重大危险源监管体系建设等三个方面提出了提高南京市重大危险源监管水平的对策措施。     

肥胖对健康的危害及运动减肥

文章介绍了肥胖产生的原因及对人体健康的危害,并阐述了如何通过有效的体育运动进行减肥。     

制度在经济绩效中的作用

中央计划经济的绩效与市场经济的绩效有显著性的差异，产权和资源配置方式的差异是决定不同经济体系经济绩效差异最为重要的因素。制度是经济体中经济个体博弈的基本规则。市场经济比中央计划经济提供了更强的激励．从而更有效地减轻了道德风险带来的效率损失，所以从消费者福利来看，市场经济比中央计划经济更有效。在一定的条件下，无论是从产出还是从消费者的福利来看，市场经济都比中央计划经济更有效率。     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

Characterization of a class of moral-hazard, adverse selection games

Studying a principal-agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it, but the moral hazard is not reducible, shows that, if the principal uses all signals, then no solution exists, i.e. there is no contract that elicits truth-telling and motivates the agent to exert effort. When the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant, a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used, even though they obey the informativeness condition of Holmstrom (Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10, 74–91).     

道德风险存在下董事责任保险市场的保费水平分析

本文通过对董事责任保险市场的介绍,指出在董事责任保险市场中存在着严重的道德风险问题,通过对市场中保险双方行为的博弈分析,得到在道德风险存在下的保费变动范围,并指出防止或减轻董事责任保险市场中道德风险的方法.