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Marcin Maleszka 《Enterprise Information Systems》2019,13(7-8):1120-1142
ABSTRACTWe present a group dynamics model that shows knowledge integration as a process occurring over time. As each individual in the group contact others, his own knowledge changes, and over time the collective knowledge is obtained. This allows modeling knowledge diffusion in a social network and while the models presented in this paper are not competitive in that area, they approach the problem from previously unconsidered direction. We test the behavior of the model in a multi-agent simulation and we test a simple advertisement campaign in a social network. We provide discussion of elements needed for making model more competitive. 相似文献
3.
Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents. 相似文献
4.
国家行为与产权:一个新制度经济学的分析框架 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
早期的产权理论侧重于微观层次的分析,较少考虑中观(利益集团)及宏观层次(国家)对产权结构形成的影响及不同层次产权的交互作用的机制。文章从新制度经济学关于国家的定义入手,通过对个体权力与国家、集体行动与国家以及法治化社会与国家的三个层次的分析,提出建立产权制度分析的国家模型,从而论证国家与产权制度变迁的关系。 相似文献
5.
Jaakko Kiander Juha Kilponen Jouko Vilmunen 《European Journal of Political Economy》2004,20(4):983-999
This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment, average effective labour tax rates and public spending in 17 OECD countries. The focus is on the degree of centralization and cooperation in wage setting. Estimation results from a dynamic time-series-cross-section model suggest that the countries where wage setting takes place at the firm level have used labour taxes less extensively in financing welfare spending, compared to countries with centralized or decentralized bargaining. This is consistent with another finding, according to which labour taxes distort the labour demand the least in the countries with firm level bargaining. 相似文献
6.
Anne Laferrere 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2001,103(3):485-504
French couples may choose between two types of marriage settlements governing asset ownership after a divorce or inheritance: common property or separate property. A cooperative model considers the marriage contract as a means of providing for widowhood of the less endowed spouse. A second model addresses the probability of divorce and the production of a marriage good. The common property contract then becomes a means of inducing the wife to invest in the marriage good. Choice of contract, labor supply and fertility are simultaneous. Empirically we find that characteristics of the spouses such as relative age or differences in endowments influence the choice. So do the expected number of children and the wife's labor supply decision. This last decision is also shown to be influenced by the chosen settlement, while fertility is not.
JEL classification : J 12; J 4; K 12 相似文献
JEL classification : J 12; J 4; K 12 相似文献
7.
A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71 相似文献
8.
Peter F. Pope David A. Peel 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》1997,24(9&10):1433-1435
In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate. 相似文献
9.
A two-stage wage setting process whose outcomes are identified in the wage drift, at the local level, and in the tariff wage, at the central level, is analyzed. The impact of insider and outsider factors in each stage of the bargaining process is investigated both theoretically and empirically for Italy. In the light of its extreme policy relevance, particular attention is devoted to the analysis of the interrelationships between the wage drift and the tariff wage. Panel data estimation carried out on a sample of 105 Italian three-digit industries and 41 contract groups, reveals that: (1) Insider factors (productivity, inventories and the insider workers power) are important determinants of the wage drift while outsider factors (aggregate wage and unemployment) have a prominent role in determining the tariff wage. (2) Wage drift and tariff wage are closely interrelated. 相似文献
10.
Many employers are extending workplace rights by allowing for more employee voice in decision making. Numerous unionized organizations have established formal worker participation processes to help achieve this end and to improve organizational performance. Based largely on theory, such processes are normally designed to operate independently from the bargaining process. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between participation and bargaining processes, and the effect of this relationship on workplace satisfaction. A total of 712 Midwest union officials were surveyed, and the results indicate that the processes tend to become integrated in the workplace. Further, union officials' workplace satisfaction was greater where formal worker participation is institutionalized within the bargaining process. 相似文献