The role of network embeddedness across multiple social networks: Evidence from mobile social network games

This article examines peer influences from network relationships within a social network game (i.e., embeddedness) and across such games (i.e., multiplexity). Drawing on social influence theory, we develop a bivariate Poisson model of users’ repeated visits and latent attrition that accommodates peer interaction after controlling for homophily. We estimate the model using data from two social network games with considerable overlap among network members. We find that friends who are only multiplex across games exert greater peer influence on users’ game visits than members who are embedded within a single game. We also determined that ignoring network multiplexity across games may lead firms to mistarget users due to biased peer influences of embedded friends. This result provides an unresearched explanation—strength of peer influence—for the mixed findings in previous literature on network embeddedness. We utilized our results to conduct several scenario analyses to demonstrate how firms can effectively manage users’ engagement and target users in multiple social network games.     

Cooperative conversion and communalization: Closely observed interactions between the material and the mental

Various authors, including Elinor Ostrom, have shown that the legal form of a cooperative has many of the characteristics of a Common. Here we focus on cooperative conversion, through which conventional enterprises become labor‐managed firms (LMFs), viewing it dynamically as a communalization process. These processes are addressed in the light of a field survey carried out in France, looking at six firms involved in cooperative conversion. The changes entailed are two‐dimensional, both material and mental. This is visible, for example, when finding the capital to mount an LMF: members of the workforce must draw on their own funds; they must also believe in the project. Through our empirical observations we highlight the obstacles in the way of forming an LMF. In particular participants must undertake a work of negotiation hinging on stakes marked by the two, largely inseparable dimensions. Ultimately we query the ethic brought into play in the collective action of constituting a Common. Specifically, individuals must contribute to a collective action underpinned by principles of self‐governance, or commoning, the rock on which the Common rests. A key finding of our study is to demonstrate that a Common can only be successfully created if the constituent processes are consistent with the overall goal. In other words the manner in which we travel is inseparable from our final destination; otherwise we shall surely lose our way.     

A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON FARMER COOPERATIVES: PERFORMANCE,OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE,FINANCE, AND MEMBER ATTITUDE

The empirical literature on farmer cooperatives is now fast emerging and developing in the areas of performance, ownership and governance, finance, and member attitude. We discuss 56 peer‐reviewed publications to illustrate the main findings and conclusions while outlining challenges and opportunities for future research. Generally, cooperative membership is found to positively impact price, yield, input adoption, income, and other indicators of member performance, yet there is growing evidence of an uneven distribution of benefits for small and large producers. In terms of structure, evidence of a causal relationship of ownership and governance to performance has been elusive, yet there are now many findings of inherent equity and long‐term debt constraints, often in the context of consolidation to drive scale and scope economies. Further inefficiency is observed to be driven by increased heterogeneity in member attitudes and objectives, in particular in terms of commitment and participation. Thus, overall, empirical work portrays farmer cooperatives as flawed and complex business organizations which nonetheless have a strong positive impact on its members. While applied research may progress in various directions, a general improvement in empirical methodologies is needed to allow robust analysis of mixed objectives in dynamic environments.     

天地一体化信息网络中天基卫星网络架构设计

为了充分利用各种空间设施资源，提升天基信息网络覆盖与传输能力，分别从天基信息网络体系架构和逻辑功能架构角度进行了系统性设计。与以往天基网络的设计不同，该设计更注重各类卫星网络的深度融合应用，为此将网络虚拟化技术引入天基卫星网络。同时，还提出了解决新架构下卫星组网难题的方法，将电磁涡旋、卫星灵活载荷和边缘计算技术设计到天基网络。仿真表明，所提出的架构能有效提升频谱利用率和减少卫星网络信令开销。     

Victory margins and the paradox of voting

This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational–instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myerson's models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US.     

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated.     

Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments

Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University.     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: Applications and Extensions to Open and Closed Games

An earlier article, drawing on the mathematical theory of rules and rule complexes, extends and generalizes game theory (GGT). The theory has been used to conceptualize and analyze diverse social relationships, roles, and games as particular types of rule complexes.For instance, a social role, as a major basis of a parent's action in a game, consists of at least four key components – which are mathematical objects – in the determination of action: value complex, model of reality (including beliefs and knowledge bases), a repertoire of acts, routines, programs, and strategies, and modality, a role-specific algorithm for determining or generating action in game settings. This article applies and extends GGT in analyses of a market bargaining game (a type of open game) and of the classical game of prisoners' dilemma (a type of closed game). The applications show the concrete effects of social embeddedness on game structuring, game interaction patterns and outcomes, and social equilibria.