Krazy Kimmy's: A Case in Fraud Examination

This two‐part case allows for maximum student engagement through preparation, in‐class discussion, and through a Part B case that is part of the Teaching Note. Through this case, students work to identify possible fraud schemes, plan an investigation, and perform horizontal analysis calculations. Students will learn about the concept of ethical hacking, red flag identification, internal control weaknesses, and investigation considerations for fraud schemes. Further, in‐class planning for next steps and investigation can occur, providing an opportunity for group work and in‐depth learning. This case offers flexibility for instructors in that it can be covered over one class or multiple classes, or can be assigned as an independent or group assignment. This teaching note provides an overview of the case along with guidance for teaching this case.     

Financial scandals: a historical overview

I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of significant financial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a detailed dataset of significant events and news content, underpinned by examination of specific watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the implications for accounting and financial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of fraud and financial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors, particularly banking and finance, facilitated by complex group structures and international capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration. Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and international business networks, which, combined with wider financial deregulation, has led to a resurgence of fraud and financial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-nineteenth century.     

《萨班斯法案》孰是孰非:基于成本与效率(收益)的分析视角

《萨班斯法案》的出台堪称注册会计师行业的一件大事，从理论上看，该法案各项条款的出台确实具有积极的意义，但仍然存在缺陷，它更多地强调监管的作用，而监管的效率往往不如制衡的效率；它更多地强调经济处罚和刑事处罚的作用，而这两种处罚却必须以民事赔偿为前提，并最终使作假行为的作假成本大大高于作假收益。     

存货计价会计舞弊行为的审计

作为费用成本核算链上的重要一环——存货，是企业流动资产中占用比例最大、流动性最弱的项目。其种类繁多，收发频繁，经历采购、入库、保管、领发、使用等一些列生产经营过程，在企业滞留时间长，核算使用的账户多，内部流转和结算关系复杂，利用存货虚增资产、虚减税金、虚计损益的舞弊极易形成，而存货核算舞弊的手段之一便是利用存货计价的可选择性进行账户调节。因此，通过专门的审计方法与技巧来查找存货计价的舞弊原因与手段，对遏制会计信息失真有着重要意义。     

基于GONE理论的LK公司舞弊动因分析与审计风险防范

继浑水发布做空报告后,LK公司于2020年4月自曝2019年年度审计期间发现相关业务数据巨额造假,引起社会广泛关注.企业战略,尤其是商业模式,已经成为管理层产生财务报表层次重大错报风险的重要诱因.文章以GONE理论作为工具来识别和预判财务舞弊的倾向和风险,解释了企业管理层进行财务舞弊的动因.做空机构基于企业战略层面的潜在风险,有针对性地采取手段并取得了有力证据.注册会计师行业应思考如何发挥职业判断在防范审计风险中的作用,尤其要克服认知偏差对保持职业怀疑的影响,同时应借鉴并改进审计程序,以有效降低审计风险.     

安然会计造假机制分析

安然事件是公司经营失败的结果,为了掩盖这种失败,公司采取了一系列的具有欺诈性的会计方法。这些欺诈性的会计方法有使用备考利润,以掩盖公司的真实的经营业绩;利用特殊目的实体,掩盖债务和不良资产,实施利润欺诈;按市计价法操纵利润等。     

股权结构、董事会治理与上市公司高管违规行为——我国上市公司高管人员"落马"现象的实证分析

本文采集了2004年1月～2006年1月期间公开披露高管人员违规落马现象的31家上市公司作为研究样本,通过逻辑回归模型对股权结构、董事会治理与上市公司高管违规行为进行了实证分析.研究表明,股权集中度与上市公司高管违规成显著正相关;董事会规模、高管薪酬、学历构成、内部人控制等因素与上市公司高管违规有显著相关关系.治理上市公司高管违规,应重点从股权结构和董事会治理上取得实效.     

论中国CPA审计法律责任的制度缺失与重构

目前 ,我国CPA在涉及上市公司审计业务过程中 ,发生的舞弊现象十分严重 ,但是在处罚中存在严重的法律责任制度缺失问题 ,突出表现在法律责任缺乏界定依据 ,起诉主体法律条文不明 ,诉讼门槛起点太高 ,赔偿金额难以确定 ,处罚形式避重就轻。CPA参与上市公司舞弊的重要原因是 :民事赔偿机制严重缺失 ,地方政府过于庇护。重构CPA审计法律责任的制度设想 :明确CPA法律责任的界定依据和机构 ,建立民事责任赔偿机制 ,大力推广合伙制会计师事务所 ,建立CPA法律责任风险防范机制     

网络商务声誉博弈新论

当前网络商务欺诈现象日益增多,使得刚刚兴起的网络经济出现发展性障碍.一般的研究中,较为注重信用制度在网络环境下的变革和建立.本文则以一个全新的视角,借助博弈方法,从网络市场销售商行为和动机入手进行研究,试图为我国网络经济的健康发展提供制度设计的理论依据.     

The Relevance of Western Corporate Governance in Mitigating Management Misconduct in Thailand

This article provides empirical evidence on the relevance of structures central to Western models of corporate governance in mitigating management misconduct in Thailand. We find no evidence supporting the effectiveness of Western-based corporate governance structures such as board independence, audit committee effectiveness, and separating the roles of CEO and Board Chair in limiting management misconduct. However, we do find evidence supportive of independent directors with more experience and longer tenure, the presence of institutional ownership, and concentrated controlling ownership in limiting management misconduct. This provides some support for the validity of resource dependency theory in an emerging economy setting.